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TAKING OUR ACTUAL CONSTITUTION
SERIOUSLY
Thomas D. Eisele*
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CON-

sTITuTION. By Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press. 1996. Pp. viii, 404. $35.
What is to be done? We can finally, after two hundred years, grow
up and begin to take our actual Constitution seriously, as those many
nations now hoping to imitate us have already done. We can accept
that our Constitution commands, as a matter of fundamental law, that
our judges do their best collectively to construct, reinspect, and revise,
generation by generation, the skeleton of liberal equal concern that
the great clauses, in their majestic abstraction, demand. We will then
abandon the pointless search for mechanical or semantic constraints,
and seek genuine constraints in the only place where they actually can
be found: in good argument. We will accept that honest lawyers and
judges and scholars will inevitably disagree, sometimes profoundly,
about what equal concern requires, and about which rights are central
and which only peripheral to liberty. [pp. 81-82]
_ Ronald Dworkin'
I. DwopixN's CHALENGE
This estimable book is the latest book-length work published by
Ronald Dworkin, whom many people, myself included, consider to
be the most important Anglo-American legal philosopher of the
past two decades. Freedom's Law does two things. First, it discusses "a variety of constitutional issues" (p. 1). In fact, Dworkin
suggests that the book covers "almost all of the great constitutional
issues of the last two decades, including abortion, affirmative action, pornography, race, homosexuality, euthanasia, and free
speech" (p. 1). In addition to these specific issues, however, and the
particular cases dealing with them, Dworkin also allows that "[t]he
book as a whole has a larger and more general aim," which he identifies as "illustrat[ing] a particular way of reading and enforcing a
political constitution, which I call the moral reading" (p. 2).
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In this review, by concentrating on the general aim of Dworkin's
book, I hope to contribute to the discussion this book is sure to
generate. What does the "moral reading" of our Constitution
amount to, and what alternative do we have to endorsing such a
reading? I ask these questions from what I would call a jurisprudential perspective. For, while I do teach Jurisprudence, I do not
teach Constitutional Law, other than some constitutional law
themes that find their way into my Property and Wills & Trusts
courses. Accordingly, I am not well placed to review the details or
the nuances of developments after Roe v. Wade,2 or the progeny
spawned by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 two cases that dominate Parts I and II, respectively, of the book. But this personal limitation leaves me room perhaps for a more considered review of
Dworkin's main thrust in this book, which is directed toward making his view of the Constitution credible, or palatable, to his reader.
Dworkin's theory of how to read the Constitution is, after all, central to his argument. And Dworkin would apparently support the
idea of a review of his theory from a jurisprudential perspective, for
he makes the following remark: "Scholars and lawyers disagree
about constitutional theory not because some of them have read
more cases than others, or read them more carefully, but because
they disagree about the philosophical and jurisprudential issues that
I emphasize" (p. 35).
In Freedom's Law, Dworkin collects seventeen of his recent articles, all published between 1987-1995 and almost all of which first
appeared in The New York Review of Books. The collection groups
itself around three foci. The first convergence of interests, comprising the six essays of Part I, considers matters associated with the
constitutional right of privacy. These essays take up abortion rights,
the right to practice homosexuality among adults, the right to determine the timing and circumstances of one's death, affirmative action as a constitutionally permissible remedy on behalf of minorities
who have experienced constitutionally forbidden discrimination,
and certain other matters subsumed under the heading, "Life,
Death, and Race." The second center of interest - found in Part
I, which is titled "Speech, Conscience, and Sex" - consists of five
essays on topics within the First Amendment, including matters involving freedom of speech and religion, hate speech, pornography,
and academic freedom. Dworkin's focus of attention in Part III is
the role of the judiciary in our constitutional polity and, in particular, the importance of the Senate confirmation process in vetting
and constraining the appointment of judges to the U.S. Supreme
Court. This Part, "Judges," contains five essays that deal with the
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas hearings, and a final essay that
affords us a personal and rather moving remembrance of Dworkin's
clerkship with Judge Learned Hand.
To this collection of articles, Dworkin has added an Introduction, "The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise," which
does the main philosophical work in this book. Dworkin's introductory remarks lay out in considerable detail his idea that the U.S.
Supreme Court, inferior courts faced with constitutional issues, and
plain lawyers and citizens of the realm should all follow the same
approach to reading and understanding the U.S. Constitution.
Dworkin calls this approach a "moral reading" of that document.
Everything he says in the book both flows from and is meant to
explicate his view that this is the common view of the U.S. Constitution, and the correct one: "[T]he moral reading is not revolutionary
in practice. Lawyers and judges, in their day-to-day work, instinctively treat the Constitution as expressing abstract moral requirements that can only be applied to concrete cases through fresh
moral judgments.... [T]hey have no real option but to do so" (p.
3). But why should it require an extended argument if, as Dworkin
claims, this approach to the U.S. Constitution is in fact the approach to the Constitution that is commonly taken by U.S. judges
and justices, as well as by American lawyers and lay people? Dworkin claims that while we do in fact engage in a moral reading of the
Constitution, we still deny that this is what we are doing, and we
continue to doubt that such a method of reading is a legitimate approach to our founding document.
In the first step of his argument, he tries to get us - the practitioners of this common approach - to acknowledge our use of the
moral reading openly. He wants us to admit that this is the approach we take to reading and understanding the Constitution.
Such candor, he believes, would do wonders for us. It would, for
example, help to improve our understanding of our own fundamental law, which Dworkin believes we do not fully appreciate. Given
our current understanding of how we read our Constitution, under
which judicial review is legitimate only in so far as judges divorce
themselves officially from any consideration of our shared moral
convictions, Dworkin's proposed "moral reading" stands in disrepute. In part, Dworkin argues that this disrepute results from our
failure to see that our fundamental law is itself based upon principles of political morality. This evident blindness on our part has
tragic consequences:
[T]he American ideal of government not only under law but under
principle as well is the most important contribution our history has
given to political theory. Other nations and cultures realize this, and
the American ideal has increasingly and self-consciously been
adopted and imitated elsewhere. But we cannot acknowledge our
HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1801 1996-1997
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own contribution, or take the pride in it, or care of it, that we should.
[p. 6]
According to Dworkin, we interpret the Constitution in a state of
dissonance, exhibiting "a striking mismatch" between what we do
and what we say we do. Reading the Constitution on its moral level
becomes, then, a kind of guilty pleasure, something we can indulge
only surreptitiously and without any intellectually respectable
justification:
[I]t would indeed be revolutionary for a judge openly to recognize the
moral reading, or to admit that it is his or her strategy of constitutional interpretation, and even scholars and judges who come close to
recognizing it shrink back, and try to find other, usually metaphorical,
descriptions of their own practice. There is therefore a striking mismatch between the role the moral reading actually plays in American
constitutional law and its reputation. It has inspired all the greatest
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court, and also some of the
worst. But it is almost never acknowledged as influential even by
constitutional experts, and it is almost never openly endorsed even by
judges whose arguments are incomprehensible on any other understanding of their responsibilities. [p. 3]
Dworkin urges us to make a candid admission of how we relate
ourselves to the Constitution, so that we might begin to appreciate
the extent to which we are bound by a gravely moral document,
which devolves upon us a moral trust. We might then resolve to
protect the constitutional treasure that is ours. As Dworkin says in
the quotation that I have placed as the motto to this review, 4 to
understand our "actual Constitution" would be to begin to take it
as seriously as do "those many nations now hoping to imitate us"
(p. 81). Those other nations realize more fully than we, apparently,
the moral and political treasure that we have.
To understand what we possess requires, first of all, that we acknowledge the extent to which our ordinary, normal constitutional
practice is a matter of moral reading of the constitutional text and
associated history. It also requires, however, that we defend our
constitutional practices - not all of them, but the bulk of them;
those that are rationally defensible - against criticisms from the
critical Left and the radical Right. In this respect, Dworkin sees his
"moral reading" as a moderate position centered within the great
tradition of Western liberalism, and he eagerly defends it:
This book does indeed offer a liberal view of the American Constitution. It provides arguments of liberal principle and claims that
these provide the best interpretations of the constitutional tradition
we have inherited and whose trustees we now are. I believe, and try
to show, that liberal opinion best fits our constitutional structure,
which was, after all, first constructed in the bright morning of liberal
4. See supra text accompanying note 1.

HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1802 1996-1997

May 1997]

Reading the Constitution

1803

thought. My arguments can certainly be resisted. But I hope they

will be resisted in the right way: by pointing out their fallacies or by
deploying different principles - more conservative or more radical
ones - and showing why these different principles are better because
grounded in a superior morality, or are more practicable, or in some
other way wiser or fairer. It is too late for the old, cowardly, story
about judges not being responsible for making arguments like these,
or competent to do so, or that it is undemocratic for them to try, or
that their job is to enforce the law, not speculate about morality. That

old story is philosophy too, but it is bad philosophy. It appeals to
concepts - of law and democracy - that it does not begin to understand. [pp. 37-38]

I am not as sure as Dworkin that I know whose philosophy is bad
here. If, indeed, it is as obvious as Dworkin thinks it is that our
Constitution is a charter of abstract moral principles, then probably
we deserve the epithet "cowardly," for surely Dworkin is right to
say that the moral aspect of the U.S. Constitution and its judicial
construction gets relatively short shrift in our traditional story of
constitutionalism and the institution of judicial review. But perhaps
it is not quite so obvious that our Constitution is a congeries of
abstract moral principles. If this latter possibility proves in fact to
be the case, then our reluctance to make judges moral savants, or
"philosopher-kings" (p. 11), is both intelligible and justifiable. Our
reticence may then be due not to cowardice but to prudence, and to
an appreciation of what Alexander Bickel called "the passive virtues."5 More
about this later, when I take up directly Dworkin's
challenge. 6
While emphasizing that his proposed "moral reading" of the
Constitution reflects our normal approach to the document, Dworkin claims that we fail to appreciate the value of such a reading to
our republican democracy. Dworkin argues that his approach is
fully consistent with democratic and republican principles of government, when those principles are properly interpreted and understood. "When we understand democracy better, we see that the
moral reading of a political constitution is not antidemocratic but,
on the contrary, is practically indispensable to democracy" (p. 7).
So, according to Dworkin, the American institution of judicial review is in fact an ally of democratic and republican principles, not
their enemy.
We are not apt to realize this because we tend to focus on the
inherent uncertainty in deciding matters of political morality.
5. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARv. L. Rnv. 40 (1961) (discussing the devices available to the Supreme Court
to avoid questions of constitutional law not ripe for decision). For a reply to Bickel's characterization of these judicial devices, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues," 64 COLuM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
6. See infra Parts III-V.
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Dworkin is quite open about the fact that his method of reading the
Constitution "brings political morality into the heart of constitutional law" (p. 2). But that process affords no guarantee that the
judges will decide such matters in a manner that we would consider
fair. If the judges get to decide what the Constitution means, and if
they are authorized to do so at least in part by consulting their own
understanding of the political morality instanced in our Constitution, what protection does this scheme of governmental arrangement afford us, the subject citizens, from dictatorship by a judicial
elite? "[T]he moral reading of the Constitution is therefore said by
its critics to give judges absolute power to impose their own moral
convictions on the public" (p. 2).
Dworkin thinks this charge wrong, in part because it does not
appreciate how judges are constrained by constitutional text, history, and practice. 7 This is the first part of Dworkin's response to
this traditional objection to judicial review, and in subsequent sections of this review I shall say something more about these constraints. But Dworkin has, as well, a second response to this
traditional objection to judicial review: he questions the assumption that judicial review contravenes our commitment to participatory democracy even if it is true that judicial review does limit
majority rule. His argument goes something like this. He says that
our leeriness toward judicial review stems from a defective understanding of "democracy's fundamental value or point" (p. 15). To
remedy this defect, Dworkin contrasts two differing accounts of democracy's value or point: an account based upon what he calls "the
majoritarian premise" (p. 15), which Dworkin disfavors, and a competing account based upon a "constitutional conception of democracy" (p. 17), which he endorses. The majoritarian premise assumes
"that the laws that the complex democratic process enacts and the
policies that it pursues should be those, in the end, that the majority
of citizens would approve" if the majority "had adequate information and enough time for reflection" (p. 16). Dworkin rejects this
premise in favor of a different one. Instead, he "takes the defining
aim of democracy to be... that collective decisions [must] be made
by political institutions whose structure, composition, and practices
7. An important part of Dworkin's response to his critics is that we have several checks in
place constraining the judiciary, at least one of which is political rather than intellectual.
The constitutional process of nomination and confirmation is an important part of
the system of checks through which the actual Constitution disciplines the striking judicial power it declares. The main engines of discipline are intellectual rather than political, however, and the academic branch of the profession has a responsibility to protect
that intellectual discipline, which is now threatened from several directions.
P. 82. The entire third part of Dworkin's book is devoted to a consideration of the extent to
which Senate confirmation of presidential appointees to the bench is a neglected, or wasted,
opportunity to improve our constitutional polity. This is not a part of the book that I can
treat in depth.
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treat all members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and respect" (p. 17). Hence, for Dworkin, it is not any notion
of majority rule, but rather an abiding concern for the equal status
of citizens by the political instrumentalities constituting the state
which serves as the defining characteristic of his "constitutional
conception of democracy." Dworkin concludes that our disaffection with judicial review can only be explained by the strong grip
that the "majoritarian" conception of democracy has had over our
imaginations (p. 18).
Dworkin follows this discussion by distinguishing between what
he calls "statistical" and "communal" collective action, claiming
that only the latter is valuable to a correct conception of constitutional democracy. He gives extended consideration to the compatibility of constitutional democracy with the values of liberty or
freedom, equality, and community (pp. 19-31). He concludes with
the following suggestion:
I put the suggestion that judicial review may provide a superior
kind of republican deliberation about some issues tentatively, as a
possibility, because I do not believe that we have enough information
for much confidence either way. I emphasize the possibility, nevertheless, because the communitarian argument simply ignores it, and
assumes, with no pertinent evidence, that the only or most beneficial
kind of "participation" in politics is the kind that looks toward elections of representatives who will then enact legislation. The character
of recent American elections, and of contemporary national and local
legislative debate and deliberation, hardly makes that assumption
self-evident....
...

The argument of this [book] aims only to show why the ideal of

community does not support the majoritarian premise, or undermine
the moral reading [of the Constitution], any more effectively than do
liberty and equality, the two senior members of the revolutionary brigade. We must set the majoritarian premise aside, and with it the
majoritarian conception of democracy. It is not a defensible conception of what true democracy is, and it is not America's conception. [p.
31]
To sum up Dworkin's motivation, he thinks that his proposed
reading of the U.S. Constitution will benefit us in two respects.
First, it will help us appreciate that the "moral reading" of the U.S.
Constitution is the norm for us and that such a reading deserves to
be our shared approach simply because it is the most natural way to
read that document and the most effective way to realize its moral
promise. Second, his way of reading the U.S. Constitution in fact
plays an important role in the deliberative democratic process that
makes us, and keeps us, who we are.
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MORE DETAILS ABOUT THE "MORAL READING" OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION

In the quotation serving as the motto to this review, 8 Dworkin
invites us to "grow up" and begin taking seriously our actual Constitution. Dworkin proposes to take seriously the Constitution we
actually possess by having us read it as a charter of moral principle.
If we do this, Dworkin believes that our understanding and our appreciation of the U.S. Constitution will increase accordingly. Let us
consider his claim in more detail.
According to Dworkin, a moral reading of the Constitution
should lead us to see that the Constitution "commands" judges to
do their collective "best" to realize the political ideal of "liberal
equal concern" that Dworkin finds the abstract clauses of the Constitution to anticipate or "demand" (p. 82). Judges must accomplish
this task the only way they legitimately can, which to Dworkin
means interpreting the Constitution on the basis of the moral principles it expresses or implies. The only true constraint judges have
in this regard, Dworkin says, is the quality of their arguments on
behalf of their principled constitutional interpretations. If we face
this difficult fact, Dworkin believes that "[w]e vill then abandon
the pointless search for mechanical or semantic constraints, and
seek genuine constraints in the only place where they can actually
be found: in good argument" (p. 82).
For Dworkin, a "good argument" is a constitutional interpretation consistent with principles that are expressed in or implied by
the constitutional text, leavened by our experience as it is established in our constitutional history. Interpretations are checked by
the constraint that they must integrate or cohere with the bulk of
our already accepted constitutional doctrine.
I emphasize these constraints of history and integrity, because
they show how exaggerated is the common complaint that the moral
reading gives judges absolute power to impose their own moral convictions on the rest of us. Macauley [sic] was wrong when he said that
the American Constitution is all sail and no anchor, and so are
the other critics who say that the moral reading turns judges into
philosopher-kings. Our constitution is law, and like all law it is
anchored in history, practice, and integrity. Most cases at law - even
most constitutional cases - are not hard cases. The ordinary craft of
a judge dictates an answer and leaves no room for the play of personal moral conviction. Still, we must not exaggerate the drag of that
anchor. Very different, even contrary, conceptions of a constitutional
principle - of what treating men and women as equals really means,
for example - will often fit language, precedent, and practice well

enough to pass these tests, and thoughtful judges must then decide on
8. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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their own which conception does most credit to the nation. So though
the familiar complaint that the moral reading gives judges unlimited
power is hyperbolic, it contains enough truth to alarm those who believe that such judicial power is inconsistent with a republican form of
government. The constitutional sail is a broad one, and many people
do fear that it is too big for a democratic boat. [pp. 11-12, footnote
omitted]
The constitutional text is our sail, but our constitutional practice
provides us with an anchoring drag. This is the challenge, then, that
attempting to live freely within a constitutional democracy places
on its inhabitants, both its citizens and its officials: we are required
to negotiate a delicate balance between the lift of our constitutional
sail and the accompanying drag of our constitutional anchor. We
must learn to accept the burden of this challenge if we are to earn
the ensuing blessings of liberty. Such a delicate balance is an ideal
of constitutional culture, and it is engendered by the personal freedom that a republican democracy promises - freedom that it produces, and that in turn sustains this very form of life and law, i.e., a
republican democracy. The form of law and of life that we know as
constitutional democracy, then, is what Dworkin calls "freedom's
law." It is law produced by freedom and, reciprocally, such law sustains the freedom which produced it.
This is not quite the way Dworkin puts his position, but I believe
that my reconstruction is faithful to his vision. Clearly, in his references to our "constitutional sail" and the "democratic boat" in
which we ply these dangerous seas, Dworkin is making a metaphorical claim for the heroic American voyage or adventure. If the seas
of constitutionalism remain uncharted, or at least incompletely explored, Dworkin continues to believe that the American people are
well placed - as they also are invested with the duty - to undertake such explorations. It is a part of the responsibility that our
great charter devolves upon us, and its fulfillment requires courage.
This is why Dworkin so often speaks in terms of the virtue of "courage" - which he believes the moral reading of the Constitution
requires us to display - and the vice of "cowardice" - which he
believes we have shown in failing to defend directly and candidly
this most natural way of reading our founding document. Once,
Dworkin even terms our behavior "shameful" (p. 6).
A constitutional democracy also demands courage of us in another respect, for it requires us to face the inevitability of conflicting convictions. Dworkin claims that "[v]ery different, even
contrary, conceptions of a constitutional principle - of what treating men and women as equals really means, for example - will
often fit language, precedent, and practice well enough to pass
these tests, and thoughtful judges must then decide on their own
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which conception does most credit to the nation". (p. 11). But
Dworkin also admits the following:
The moral reading therefore brings political morality into the
heart of constitutional law. But political morality is inherently uncertain and controversial, so any system of government that makes such
principles part of its law must decide whose interpretation and understanding will be authoritative. In the American system judges - ultimately the justices of the Supreme Court - now have that authority,
and the moral reading of the Constitution is therefore said by its critics to give judges absolute power to impose their own moral convictions on the public. [p. 2; footnote omitted]
This dissonance between what our constitutional culture invites
the investigation of our shared political morality and its underlying
principles by the judges appointed for this task - and what that
same constitutional culture promises - no particular closure reflecting the majority's preferences or values - can be both frustrating and disillusioning. Does this scheme of government mean that
unelected public officials dictate morality or politics to us? It is at
such a juncture that Dworkin suggests the need for perseverance in
the face of such inevitable conflict. So long as we all engage in this
joint endeavor rationally and in good faith, and so long as our representatives, the judges, carry out their office in a principled way,
we can ask no more of ourselves or of our fellow citizens or of our
form of government.
The moral reading asks [judges] to find the best conception of constitutional moral principles - the best understanding of what equal
moral status for men and women really requires, for example - that
fits the broad story of America's historical record. It does not ask
them to follow the whisperings of their own consciences or the traditions of their own class or sect if these cannot be seen as embedded in
that record. Of course judges can abuse their power - they can pretend to observe the important restraint of integrity while really ignoring it. But generals and presidents and priests can abuse their powers,
too. The moral reading is a strategy for lawyers and judges acting in
good faith, which is all any interpretive strategy can be. [p. 11]
Legitimate, respectable, justified disagreements are certain to
occur when judges engage in this serious business of trying to determine, at any given time in the life of our nation, "what equal concern requires" or "which rights are central and which only
peripheral to liberty" (p. 82). But such disagreements should not
discourage us, for they are bound to happen, given the nature of
our constitutional system; in fact, Dworkin suggests, our political
system is based upon a recognition that such conflicts are beneficial
to our eventual growth and maturity, if we have the wisdom to endure their creation and their overcoming.
Dworkin does not insist, however, that our institution of judicial
review is the only form of judicial decisionmaking fit for a democ-
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racy. Nor does he suggest that our institution of judicial review is
the best one that any people could invent or adopt. He says, rather,
that this form of judicial review happens to be consistent with the
idea -

and the ideal -

of constitutional democracy.

I do not mean that there is no democracy unless judges have the
power to set aside what a majority thinks is right and just. Many institutional arrangements are compatible with the moral reading, including some that do not give judges the power they have in the American
structure. But none of these varied arrangements is in principle more
democratic than others. Democracy does not insist on judges having
the last word, but it [also] does not insist that they must not have it.
[p. 71
Speaking as Dworkin does, and making the sorts of claims that
Dworkin does, may seem to be an idealistic way to behave toward
our Constitution and the culture it has produced. Surely, when it
comes to matters of primary importance to the political life of this
nation, Dworkin can seem to be taking an optimistic view of our
own situation and of our personal capacities for principled argument and respectful disagreement. Nonetheless, Dworkin speaks
this way, and he does not do so cavalierly. Instead, this is one of the
ways Dworkin takes our Constitution seriously, paying it and its
obligations the respect and deference to which he believes they are
entitled. Dworkin fully realizes that such idealism and optimism
are out of step with our contemporary penchant for cynicism and
deconstruction; as I read him, he would admit to the charge that he
is being optimistic and even idealistic. He would then turn such
charges against his critics:
It is in the nature of legal interpretation - not just but particularly constitutional interpretation - to aim at happy endings. There
is no alternative, except aiming at unhappy ones, because once the
pure form of originalism is rejected there is no such thing as neutral
accuracy. Telling it how it is means, up to a point, telling it how it
should be. What is that point? The American constitutional novel
includes, after all, the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision, which
treated slaves as a kind of property, and the Court's twentieth-century
"rights of property" decisions, which nearly swamped Roosevelt's
New Deal. How happy an overall view of that story is actually on
offer [in this book]? Many chapters raise that question, and it cannot
be answered except through detailed interpretive arguments like
those they provide. But political and intellectual responsibility, as
well as cheerfulness, argue for optimism. The Constitution is
America's moral sail, and we must hold to the courage of the conviction that fills it, the conviction that we can all be equal citizens of a
moral republic. That is a noble faith, and only optimism can redeem
it. [p. 38; footnote omitted]
In a constitutional democracy dedicated to liberty and equality, yet
dependent in large part -upon the good-faith efforts by its elected
HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1809 1996-1997
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and appointed officials for achieving anything approximating these
ideals, there is no alternative but to do our best and to take our
chances.
This is a heartening vision of our Constitution and the culture it
is meant to sustain, and there is much in this vision to endorse.
Likewise, Dworkin's book as a whole is what we have come to expect of him: thoroughly competent and rigorously professional.
The prose is itself rarely inspiring, but its pitch usually is deft and
difficult to fault. In the following remarks, I shall nonetheless try to
point out some faults that I find; but I do so within the context of
admiring the accomplishment this book displays. In particular,
Dworkin's optimism is not only refreshing and timely, but also suggests that the attitude we entertain and sustain toward our constitutional endeavors may be a factor in any constructive purchase such
endeavors afford us in this world. As Dworkin puts it, "Telling it
how it is means, up to a point, telling it how it should be" (p. 38).
This is so, I suppose, because the world does respond, to an extent
and "up to a point," to our conceptions of the world, i.e., to the
ideas and the concepts and the ideals we apply to it. And this in
turn suggests that ideals and idealism have a role to play in the
building, or the reconstruction, of our world. 9
III.

OuR "AcruAL CONSTITUTION": DOES IT ExPRESS OR

MORAL PRINCIPLES?
Dworkin's theory of the American Constitution takes that document to speak in a moral voice or to operate in a moral mode. To
test his proposed theory, I shall turn to the constitutional text itself
and try to see whether his theory fits the text. This procedure emulates some sage advice from Stanley Cavell, who recommends to us
that "the way to overcome theory correctly, philosophically, is to let
the object or the work of your interest teach you how to consider
it."10 How should we consider the Constitution?
We can begin by looking more closely at some of Dworkin's
specific claims on behalf of his theory. His "Introduction" begins
with the following statement:
Most contemporary constitutions declare individual rights against the
government in very broad and abstract language, like the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides that
Congress shall make no law abridging "the freedom of speech." The
IMPLY

9. For extended treatment of the theme that ideals are vital elements in what we are able
to make out of the materials of our world, see CHARLES ALTERI, CANONS AND CONSE.
QUENCES: REFLECIONS ON THE ETmcAL. FORCE OF IMAGINATIVE IDEALS (1990); JAMES
BOYD WHrm,Acrs OF HOPE: CREATNo AUTHOR=T IN LrrERATURE, LAW, AND POLmCS
(1994).
10. STANLEY CAVELL, PURSUITS OF HAPPnESS: Tim HOLLYWOOD COMEDY OF REMARWAGE 10 (1981).
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moral reading proposes that we all

-

judges, lawyers, citizens

-

in-

terpret and apply these abstract clauses on the understanding that
they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice. The
First Amendment, for example, recognizes a moral principle - that it
is wrong for government to censor or control what individual citizens
say or publish - and incorporates it into American law. So when
some novel or controversial constitutional issue arises - about
whether, for instance, the First Amendment permits laws against pornography - people who form an opinion must decide how an abstract moral principle is best understood. They must decide whether
the true ground of the moral principle that condemns censorship, in
the form in which this principle has been incorporated into American
law, extends to the case of pornography. [p. 2]
In this compact statement of his thesis, Dworkin makes a number of
important observations. Consider, for example, his first claim: that
moral principles are to be found in the Constitution's abstract
language.
This should be a claim that we can test, but it turns out, on critical inspection, to be exceedingly difficult to do so. First of all, how
exactly are we meant to take this claim? Is it that clauses in the
Constitution flat out state moral principles? If this were the case, I
would expect to see moral principles explicit in the text, but I do
not see them there. Or is it Dworkin's claim that the language of
the Constitution simply implies or invokes moral principles, by
means of the abstract language of various clauses in the Constitution? If this were so, the claim would seem to be that the constitutional language itself, being abstract yet not explicitly moral, has to
be made concrete by being given content in some way, and Dworkin proposes to give it content by filling in the clauses with moral
principles.
The initial question, then, is this: Does the Constitution express
these moral principles explicitly, or are they implied?" It may
seem obvious that Dworkin's claim is that these moral principles
are only implicit, because he says that his method of reading the
Constitution recommends that "we all... interpret and apply these

abstract clauses on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice" (p. 2). So Dworkin's claim
11. The question, "Explicit or implicit?" is not the same as "Enumerated or unenumerated?" As to this latter question, at the beginning of chapter 3, Dworkin says that he thinks
the "distinction between enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights ... is bogus."
P. 72. Given that Dworkin is famous for having argued that our rights derive from principles,
I suspect that his rejection of this distinction would cover its application to principles as well
as to rights. In passing, I should note that I find bemusing Dworkin's rejection of the distinction between enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights. For someone who emphasizes that his "moral reading" of the Constitution is the "most natural" way to read that
document, and who puts great store in finding the "best fit" with the constitutional text for
one's interpretation of it, how does Dworkin get around the fact that the Ninth Amendment
explicitly makes the distinction he rejects?
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seems to be that the Constitution only implies these principles and
does not state them explicitly. Yet there are other passages where
Dworkin seems to make a stronger claim. Consider, for example,
the following:
According to the moral reading, these clauses must be understood in
the way their language most naturally suggests: they refer to abstract
moral principles and incorporate these by reference, as limits on government's power. [p. 7]
On its most natural reading, then, the Bill of Rights sets out a network of principles, some extremely concrete, others more abstract,
and some of near limitless abstraction. Taken together, these principles define a political ideal: they construct the constitutional skeleton
of a society of citizens both equal and free. [p. 73]
[T]he revisionists... argue that the natural interpretation I described
- that the Constitution guarantees the rights required by the best
conceptions of the political ideals of equal concern and basic liberty
- is not in fact the most accurate interpretation. They say that that
natural interpretation neglects some crucial semantic fact, some property of language or communication or linguistic interpretation which,
once we grasp it, shows us that the abstract language of the great
clauses does not mean what it seems to mean. [p. 75]
The most natural interpretation of the Bill of Rights seems, as I said,
to give judges great and frightening power. It is understandable that
constitutional lawyers and teachers should strive to tame the Bill of
Rights, to read it in a less frightening way, to change it from a systematic abstract conception of justice to a list of discrete clauses related to
one another through pedigree rather than principle. [p. 81]
These passages make the stronger claim that moral principles are
either referred to in the constitutional document or are explicitly
"set out" there. Mixed with these claims of explicitness, however,
are other formulations speaking of the most natural way to "interpret" the Constitution. Such formulations imply that the moral
principles are to be found in the text only through a process of interpretation, not of reading. But reading a text is not the same as
interpreting it - is it? Thus, from the beginning, I am confused as
to Dworkin's claim about the exact nature of his procedure; that is,
his claim about exactly how he finds in the Constitution the moral
principles which he claims to find there.
Whether the question is put in terms of Dworkin's claim for his
procedure - namely, is it a way of reading, or of interpreting, the
Constitution? - or in terms of Dworkin's claim about the constitutional text - are its so-called moral principles explicit or implicit?
the concern I am expressing is meant to press Dworkin for further clarification. Perhaps we can seek it by looking again at his
own words.
The clauses of the American Constitution that protect individuals and
minorities from government are found mainly in the so-called Bill of
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Rights - the first several amendments to the document - and the
further amendments added after the Civil War. (I shall sometimes
use the phrase "Bill of Rights," inaccurately, to refer to all the provisions of the Constitution that establish individual rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of citizens' privileges and immunities and its guarantee of due process and equal protection of the
laws.) Many of these clauses, are drafted in exceedingly abstract
moral language. The First Amendment refers to the "right" of free
speech, for example, the Fifth Amendment to the process that is
"due" to citizens, and the Fourteenth to protection that is "equal."
According to the moral reading, these clauses must be understood in
the way their language most naturally suggests: they refer to abstract
moral principles and incorporate these by reference, as limits on government's power. [p. 7]
Here, at least, Dworkin seems to be reasonably clear: many of the
Constitution's clauses "are drafted in exceedingly abstract moral
language" (p. 7). This is a claim that the moral language is explicit
in the document itself. As evidence for his claim, Dworkin simply
recites for us a few select words.
Is it true that these uses of "right" and "due" and "equal" constitute an appeal or reference to abstract moral principles? I do not
see that they must, or that they do. While it is true that such terms
can be used in moral discourse, and often are, it is equally true that
such terms are used in ordinary discourse without any particular or
special moral content. For example: "Be right with you"; "You are
right as rain." They are used in political or legal discourse as well
- for example: "Proceed with all due speed"; "The following sum
is now due and payable." These same words are even used in scientific or mathematical contexts - for example: "These two equations are not equal." The same word in our language usually has a
multiplicity of uses - and, thus, of meanings - and it is a mistake
to assume that the meaning of any instance of a word can be known
or identified simply from the "look" of the word. A century ago,
Mr. Justice Holmes reminded us, specifically, that it was fallacious
to assume that the use of the same word in morals and in the law
meant that the two uses of that word were synonymous.
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere
force of language [this phraseology] continually invites us to pass
from one domain to the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to
do unless we have the boundary constantly before our minds. The
law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and negligence, and so forth, and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more common in legal reasoning, than to take these words in their moral sense,
at some stage of the argument, and so to drop into fallacy. For instance, when we speak of the rights of man in a moral sense, we mean
to mark the limits of interference with individual freedom which we
think are prescribed by conscience, or by our ideal, however reached.
Yet it is certain that many laws have been enforced in the past, and it

HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1813 1996-1997

1814

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1799

is likely that some are enforced now, which are condemned by the
most enlightened opinion of the time, or which at all events pass the

limit of interference as many consciences would draw it. Manifestly,
therefore, nothing but confusion of thought can result from assuming

that the rights of man in a moral12sense are equally rights in the sense
of the Constitution and the law.

It seems to me that Dworkin passes much too quickly over this possible objection, and simply assumes without argument that the uses
of "right" and "due" and "equal" in three Amendments of the Constitution are instances of those words in their moral employment.
By expressing the precaution I have mentioned above, I do not
mean to be trivializing Dworkin's point; instead, I am simply trying
to remind us that words taken in isolation do not have a specific or
identifiable connotation. They have connotations - and these
meanings or senses are what any good dictionary collects and collates. But a dictionary does not tell us which use of a word in a
given context is meant or intended; it merely displays for us the
possibilities of meaning that our language makes available to us. It
is the use of a word in a given context that, typically, fixes or determines its actual meaning in that context. And so we must have
some definite sense of a word's use and of the context in which it is
being employed if we are to learn the word's meaning and, in particular, if we are to understand the associational force - be it
mathematical, legal, or
moral, political, religious, economic,
13
whatever -

the subject word has.

Later, I want to take up directly the question of what kind of
document the Constitution is and, thus, the question of what kind
of context it affords the words used within it. But, for the moment,
I wish to continue to explore the initial question I asked above:
12. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAnv. L. REv. 457,459-60 (1897). By citing
Holmes to this effect, I do not wish to be taken as endorsing his apparent belief that the use
of "right" in a legal context can be divorced from the use of "right" in a moral context. I
would argue that the mere fact that we can distinguish separate uses of the same word does
not mean that those two uses are unrelated. It is quite possible, for example, that the legal
force that an appeal to "right" may have in the context of the law is dependent upon or
derived from its force and use in discussions of morality. All the same, Holmes is correct in
so far as he argues that having such a connection, or a relation of derivation or dependency,
does not mean that the two uses are synonymous.
13. Dworkin might grant all of this, but then go on to argue that he has given us the
context in which "right" and "due" and "equal" appear, the context in which they are used or
employed - namely, he has given us their use in the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This response is adequate only if we are sure that those
Amendments are themselves moral statements; or, it is an adequate response only if the
Constitution itself is a moral document, speaking in a moral voice. Dworkin must be making
a claim, then, that he knows how to take the U.S. Constitution. This claim is not only that he
knows how to read it - which claim amounts to not much more than his argument that
taking these constitutional clauses "most naturally" means to read or construe them as moral
injunctions - but also that he understands the Constitution in so far as it operates as the
context in which these abstract words ("right," "due," "equal") are used. I shall consider this
claim more directly in the succeeding section of this review. See infra Part IV.
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Does the Constitution put forth explicit moral principles? If so,
how so? To accept Dworkin's claim that moral principles are to be
found in the Constitution requires one to read the Constitution as a
moral document, or to hear it speaking in a voice something like
that of a moral philosopher. Do we read or hear the Constitution
this way? I do not.
We are on treacherous ground here, and I must admit that I am
unsure how to try to adjudicate this disagreement between Dworkin's reading and my own way of taking the Constitution. I suspect
that the argument may come down to a matter of testing and comparing our linguistic intuitions, or our responses to language, or,
even better, our responses to the use of language in this specific
14
text. This is a matter that is both delicate and uncomfortable. I
can propose, however, one way to test our experience of the
Constitution.
To see whether or not the Constitution speaks in a moral voice,
we can compare the constitutional text with some representative
philosophers who speak in moral terms. Below are sample quotations from two of the most respected moral philosophers of the
time, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, both of whom were
writing or speaking during the 1780s, which is exactly the time of
the creation of the Constitution - a fact to which Dworkin appeals
in justifying the liberal cast of his constitutional reading. 15
Kant's statement of moral principle comes in the form of three
versions of his "Categorical Imperative":
'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will
that it should become a universal law.'
'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through
your will a universal law of nature.'
...

14. Perhaps this matter is both delicate and uncomfortable because the possibility of
community and of rationality seems to hang in the balance. Nothing shows this better than
Stanley Cavell's work on the later philosophy of Wittgenstein:
The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis
of which we say what we say, are claims to community. And the claim to community is
always a search for the basis upon which it can [be] or has been established. I have
nothing more to go on than my conviction, my sense that I make sense. It may prove to
be the case that I am wrong, that my conviction isolates me, from all others, from myself.
That will not be the same as a discovery that I am dogmatic or egomaniacal. The wish
and search for community are the wish and search for reason.
STANLEY CAvLU, Tim CLAIM OF REASON: WrrrE7jsNmn, SKEPTICISM, MORALrrY, AND
TRAGEDY 20 (1979).
15. As Dworkin puts it: "I believe, and try to show, that liberal opinion best fits our
constitutional structure, which was, after all, first constructed in the bright morning of liberal
thought." P. 38.
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... Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in
never simply as a
your own person or in the person of any other,
16
means, but always at the same time as an end
Bentham's statement of moral principle comes in the form of his
"principle of utility":
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency
which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the
party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other
words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action
action of a private indiwhatsoever; and therefore not only of every 17
vidual, but of every measure of government.
When I read the U.S. Constitution, I do not find any language
remotely resembling these kinds of formulations. To test my assertion, try this as an experiment in reading: Look at Articles I-IV,
and see whether or not the language of any of these articles strikes
you as setting out moral principles, or anything akin to the formulations expressed above by Kant and Bentham. I personally do not
see any similarity. Here are some samples of their language:
Article I
Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives. 18
Article H
Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the
Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for
the same Term, be elected, as follows .... 19
Article m
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
as the Congress
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
2 0
may from time to time ordain and establish ....

Article IV
Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof.21
16. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 88, 89, 96 (H.J.
Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1785) (footnotes omitted).
17. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEOIs.
LA-nON 11-12 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789) (footnote omitted).

18. U.S. CONST. art. I § 1.
19. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.

20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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The Constitution speaks mainly in imperative terms, dictating that
certain things "shall" be done by a particular branch of the federal
government. Occasionally, however, the document uses a permissive tone. But, in any event, the matters dictated or permitted by
the Constitution have little or nothing to do with any moral test or
concern, and everything to do with establishing a federal government and a set of relations between that federal government and
the states that constitute it.
As a second test of Dworkin's claim about how "most naturally"
to read the U.S. Constitution, one might then look at the Bill of
Rights - by which I mean, unlike Dworkin, only the first ten
amendments to the original document. Here again we find imperative language, but in this case the language is specifying how a relation between an individual and the government should be
established or maintained. In this case, these amendments do strike
me as coming closer to statements of principle, even somewhat
analogous to the Ten Commandments. But they are not statements
of moral principle; rather, they seem pretty clearly to me to be
statements of politicalprinciple, defining or adjusting the relations
not between one person and another person, as I believe moral
rules and principles attempt to do, but between a people and their
government, or between the federal government and its constituent
states.
To test my reading, I want to consider more of the text of the
Bill of Rights than the small segment to which Dworkin limits his
attention, which consists of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Look, for example, at the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments:
Amendment IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the
22
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Amendment VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence. 23
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Amendment VIII.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,

nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 24

These passages seem to me to set out prescriptions for the appropriate way in which the government is to treat those among its citizens
who are suspected or accused or convicted of crimes. But there is
nothing "moral" about the language used in these Amendments.
That is, on my reading, the Constitution makes no moral judgment
about what does or does not constitute an "unreasonable" search,
or a "speedy and public trial," or "excessive" bail, or "cruel and

unusual" punishment. Rather, as I read it, the Constitution uses
these terms to create and adjust the proper political relations that
should exist between the state and an accused citizen threatened
with the loss of his liberty or life. Perhaps we might with some
justice call the Bill of Rights our "Ten Commandments of Political
Life in the United States." What holds true of these three amend-

ments equally holds true of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments: They express no moral judgments but do express or imply
some political judgments. 25
It is possible, I suppose, that Dworkin might agree with the
claim that this language in the Constitution expresses "political"
24. U.S. CowsT. amend. VIII.
25. In drawing a distinction between moral judgments, or morality, and political judgments, or politics, I am relying upon the following rough line of demarcation - which line is
suggested in Michael Oakeshott's work. In making moral judgments, we normally are concerned with individuals as people, as human beings, and their status as moral agents or actors. A moral paradigm would be presented in terms of our concern for how a person was
acting, or how a person was being treated by someone else. Moral judgments about corporations or nation-states derive their moral connotation, I believe, from the paradigm of personal relationships and attachments. On these matters, Oakeshott's philosophy includes the
following remark:
The moral life is a life inter homines. Even if we are disposed to look for a remote
ground (such, for example, as the will of God) for our moral obligations, moral conduct
concerns the relations of human beings to one another and the power they are capable
of exerting over one another. This, no doubt, spills over into other relationships those with animals, for example, or even with things - but the moral significance of
these lies solely in their reflection of the dispositions of [humans] towards one another.
MICHAEL OAx.sHorr,

The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes, in

RAmONAUSM

248, 248 (1962).
In speaking about politics, on the other hand, we normally are concerned with a group of
people who form a community, a state, or a polls. If we also are concerned with individuals
within such a group or community, we are typically concerned with their status as citizens, or
as members of the group, not with their personal relations. Individuals' political rights and
duties normally stem from their political status and not from their personal relations. On
these matters, Oakeshott's philosophy includes the following remark:
Politics I take to be the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a set of
people whom chance or choice have brought together. In this sense, families, clubs, and
learned societies have their 'politics.' But the communities in which this manner of activity is pre-eminent are the hereditary co-operative groups, many of them of ancient
lineage, all of them aware of a past, a present, and a future, which we call 'states.'
MICHAEL OAKESHOT, PoliticalEducation, in RATiONAiSM iN PoLrmcs AND OTHER ES.
SAYS, supra, at 111, 112 [hereinafter OAKESHOTrT, PoliticalEducation].
IN PoLrMCs AND OTHER EssAYS
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judgments. He has, after all, claimed in an earlier book to have
what he calls a "full political theory of law,"' 26 and he sometimes
seems to be claiming only that his method of "moral reading" injects our political morality into the constitutional picture or equation.2 7 He also speaks as though the labels, "conservative" and
"liberal," are moral labels rather than, as I assume, political labels.
For instance, he says:
[B]oth scholars and journalists find it reasonably easy to classify
judges as "liberal" or "conservative": the best explanation of the differing patterns of their decisions lies in their different understandings
of central moral values embedded in the Constitution's text.... The
moral reading is not, in itself, either a liberal or a conservative charter
or strategy. [pp. 2-3]
I should have thought that such labels would suggest not that the
judges are basing their decisions on their different understanding of
moral values - as, for example, might be the case if we were to
label judges "utilitarian" or "Kantian" or even "Rawlsian" - but
rather that these judges were acting out of a political predilection of
a leftward-leaning or rightward-leaning kind. Apparently, Dworkin
considers these to be terms illustrating the moral persuasion of such
judges. This apparent conflation of political and moral terms leaves
me confused, and I cannot think that it helps us to understand
Dworkin's claim that he is proposing a "moral reading" of our "actual Constitution."
IV. OuR "ACruAL CONSTrTUTION": Is IT A MORAL CHARTER?
Dworkin's recommended "moral reading" of the Constitution is
based upon an assumption that he, Dworkin, knows or understands
what kind of a document the Constitution is. At the most basic
level, Dworkin seems to think that he knows how the Constitution
works and, in particular, that he knows how it speaks. Dworkin
claims that the Constitution speaks with a voice pitched in, or toward, the register we call "moral discourse."
The exercise in the preceding section asked us to read various
clauses in our Constitution and to test our experience of reading
that document against the claims made by Dworkin. This exercise
is meant to show us that what statements of principle we may find
in the American Constitution are political - not moral.28 I have an
additional argument to make against Dworkin's proposed method
26. RONALD DwoRIuN, LAW's EwmnE 110 (1986); see also Thomas D. Eisele, Dworkin's
'FullPolitical Theory of Law,'7 CnIM. Jusr. ETmcs, Sunmer/Fall 1988, at49 (book review).

27. See, eg., p. 2.
28. The section of the Constitution that might be said to have the most obvious moral
overtones is the Preamble, and Dworkin pays no attention to this part of the Constitution.
But the Preamble is not simply a moral tract; instead, it states the purposes for the instrument of federation that is expressed in the body of the Constitution:
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of reading the Constitution, because I believe that even such political principles form only a small portion of the U.S. Constitution, a
portion that perhaps is not even the document's core. Let me
elaborate.
As I said above, when I read the U.S. Constitution, I do not find
language heavily laden with moral connotations or overtones. I do
find a document of political principles, one that charters a federal
government out of a collection of separate states. It is therefore a
document that occasionally refers to normative matters of propriety
and appropriateness and the like. But, for me, the bulk of the Constitution is given over to the organization and implementation of a
system of government. As such, the Constitution serves not so
much as a moral charter, but rather as a political charter and, in
particular, as a charter establishing the body politic. I read the
Constitution, then, as a special kind of corporate charter.
A corporate charter is an originating, an organizing, and an operating instrument. The Articles of Incorporation create a corporation; in doing so, the Articles are an originating document. The
Articles also comprise the initial, skeletal organization of the corporation being set up. In this respect the Articles of Incorporation
display the schema by which the various branches or divisions or
parts of the organization are supposed to interrelate. The initiating
and organizing document also accomplishes a third function: it sets
out some of the basic mechanisms by which that corporate entity is
supposed to operate. 29
I suggest that we think of the U.S. Constitution on the same
model as a typical corporate charter and bylaws. In other words,
the body of the Constitution is analogous to articles of incorporation, and the Amendments to the U.S. Constitution are analogous
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CoNsT. preamble.
These words set forth the reasons for instituting the Constitution and the objects our
forebearers had in mind as they formed this type of government. The Preamble also begins
to explain why the Framers would agree to this form of government. While some of its
concerns or purposes seem to have a moral component, the Preamble also expresses political,
legal, economic, and religious concerns. It makes sense to read the Constitution in the light
of this collective statement of purpose, but I am not persuaded that this statement is so
overwhelmingly moral in tone or intent that we should construe the Constitution as a moral
document. On the Preamble as a literary statement with its own force and effect, I recommend Craig M. Lawson, The Literary Forceof the Preamble,39 MERCER L. RE. 879 (1988).
29. The traditional articles of incorporation set up, for example, the offices or officers of a
corporation along with their duties and responsibilities and powers, and they specify the directors who shall oversee the operations of the corporation and its officers. The Articles also
usually contain some statement of the corporate purpose or goal and other details of operation. Supplementing this instrument, of course, is the accompanying statement of bylaws;
these bylaws typically set out in more detail the ways in which the corporation should operate
within the framework created by the Articles of Incorporation.

HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1820 1996-1997

May 1997]

Reading the Constitution

1821

to an evolving set of bylaws. This analogy is not farfetched: The
first attempt at establishing a federal government was entitled,
"The Articles of Confederation. ' 30 In any case, I prefer such an
analogy to the one offered us by Dworkin, which pitches the Constitution as a document of moral principle.
Dworkin might respond to all of what I have said with the comment that he has, in fact, taken all of my criticisms into account. He
would claim that the moral reading of the Constitution was never
meant to be a theory of the entire document; rather, it is intended
only to give us a true glimpse of certain selected portions of that
text. Dworkin sometimes speaks this way:
Of course the moral reading is not appropriate to everything a
constitution contains. The American Constitution fncludes a great
many clauses that are neither particularly abstract nor drafted in the
language of moral principle. Article II specifies, for example, that the
President must be at least thirty-five years old, and the Third Amendment insists that government may not quarter soldiers in citizens'
houses in peacetime. The latter may have been inspired by a moral
principle: those who wrote and enacted it might have been anxious to
give effect to some principle protecting citizens' rights to privacy, for
example. But the Third Amendment is not itself a moral principle:
its content is not a general principle of privacy. So the first challenge
to my own interpretation of the abstract clauses might be put this
way. What argument or evidence do I have that the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (for example), which declares
that no state may deny any person equal protection of the laws, has a
moral principle as its content though the Third Amendment does not?
[p. 8]
To this question, Dworkin answers: "This is a question of interpretation or, if you prefer, translation" (p. 8). Dworkin's basis for distinguishing between the purportedly moral content of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the supposedly nonmoral content of
the Third Amendment is that he interprets them this way.
I find this unsatisfactory. It fails to offer us any way in which to
make the distinction that Dworkin proposes between the Third and
the Fourteenth Amendments. Is it simply that the level of abstraction in the language of the Third Amendment differs from the level
of abstraction of the language used in the Fourteenth Amendment?
I fail to see such a difference in "levels" of abstraction in the
amendments' respective language. Even if I could discern such a
difference, I am not sure how the purported difference in levels of
linguistic abstraction between amendments can be taken as proving
that one of those amendments speaks in terms of a moral principle
and the other does not.
30. See 1 THE DEBATE ON TIE CONSTITUTION 954-64 (B. Bailyn ed., 1993).
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Dworkin tries to explain his differing interpretations of these
two amendments by saying that "[w]e must try to find language of
our own that best captures, in terms we find clear, the content of
what the 'framers' intended [each Amendment] to say." He goes
on, in this regard, to allow that "[h]istory is crucial" in making a
correct or defensible interpretation. 31 If this is true, however, then
I do not see that history suggests that the Third Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution was any less "principled" a statement of its drafters' political thoughts or wishes or intentions than was the Fourteenth Amendment when it was adopted almost a century later.
Along these same lines, consider Dworkin's claim to have found
moral content in the First Amendment: "The First Amendment...
recognizes a moral principle - that it is wrong for government to
censor or control what individual citizens say or publish - and incorporates it into American law" (p. 2). Yet, all that the First
Amendment says is: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... 32 This wording seems to be
a clear prohibition placed on Congressional power, a proscription
imposed on a delegated power that Congress might otherwise have
expected to exercise. But how is this reflective of any moral judgment? It might reflect a political judgment about the wisdom of
governmental control over public expression, or a religious judgment about the proper place of government in the affairs of human
beings, or something else again. I should think that it is most easily
understandable as a political decision to place a limit on the power
earlier delegated to Congress in Article I.
How, then, does Dworkin know that, in speaking in the way it
does, the First Amendment is "recogniz[ing] a moral principle...
and incorporat[ing] it into American law," whereas he also wants to
insist that the Third Amendment fails to recognize a principle of
privacy when it speaks in terms of the quartering of troops in private homes during peacetime or wartime? I cannot see any rational
basis for Dworkin's saying that the First Amendment is so different
from the Third Amendment. It seems to me that the Third Amendment is as much based upon a principle of the appropriate relation
31. P. 8. I agree with Dworkin's claim that history is crucial to interpreting the Constitution, but I do not agree with the constraints that Dworkin places on this methodological
maxim. For example, Dworkin says: "We turn to history to answer the question of what [the
framers] intended to say, not the different question of what other intentions they had. We
have no need to decide what they expected to happen, or hoped would happen, in consequence of their having said what they did, for example; their purpose, in that sense, is not
part of our study." P. 10. This is one reason, I take it, why Dworkin ignores the statement of
purpose in the Preamble. But why does Dworkin believe, on the basis he has stated, that we
can simply pick and choose from among the apparently relevant portions of a text which
portions we shall use or consider in interpreting that text? This selective use of history (or of
the document's text) is a weakness in Dworkin's method.
32. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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between the government and a citizen as is the First, or the Fourteenth, Amendment.
Despite Dworkin's repeated references to the need for our making principled arguments in cases of constitutional interpretation, I
do not see that in this respect he has fulfilled his own requirement.
The problem here, from my perspective, is that Dworkin's recommended "moral reading" of the U.S. Constitution is based upon an
ahistorical treatment of that document. Dworkin pays lip service to
the need to consult history in interpreting our founding document;
yet I do not believe that in practice Dworkin truly consults or listens to the historical record in reading the Constitution. Let me try
to make this criticism more complete.
As I mentioned at the beginning of this review, Dworkin opens
with the remark that the book covers "almost all of the great constitutional issues of the last two decades, including abortion, affirmative action, pornography, race, homosexuality, euthanasia, and free
speech" (p. 1). These leading cases of the past two decades apparently serve as the basis for Dworkin's theory that the best and most
natural way to read the Constitution is as a moral document. All
the topics in the listing Dworkin provides fall within the ambit of
either the First or the Fourteenth Amendment, with the Fifth
Amendment as a kind of textual backdrop or connecting clause.
On the basis of this limited record, it is not surprising that Dworkin
would find a moral element running through the cases. They all
involve individuals asserting a purported constitutional right against
the government. In this sense, the people involved in these cases
seem to be good candidates for treatment under moral categories or
analysis, since morality is one way of assessing and dealing with the
actions of individuals. Morality is not, however, the exclusive lens
through which to view those cases, nor must judges engage in moral
analysis or theorizing in order to resolve such cases in a legally acceptable or constitutionally competent way.
Does the fact that such cases invoke the Constitution as a way of
deciding the rights of these individuals against governmental action
mean or entail that the Constitution therefore speaks morally, or
that it exhibits moral principles? I do not think so. It simply meahs
that we have a case in which the actions of the person or people
involved can be assessed either from a moral perspective or from a
constitutional perspective. This fact surely does not mean, however, that the moral perspective is the same as the constitutional
perspective. More than one conceptual or normative framework
can apply to the same situation.
At one point in his discussion of Roe v. Wade, 33 in fact, Dworkin's argument seems to reflect the distinction I just made between
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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morality and constitutionality. As he begins his discussion of Roe,
Dworkin makes the following query:
Is the human fetus a person from the moment of conception?
That question has been argued by theologians and moral philosophers
and ordinary people for many centuries. It cannot be resolved by
legal research or scientific evidence or conceptual analysis; it will continue to divide people, as it divides Americans now, so long as deep
disagreements remain about God and morals and metaphysics. [p. 45]
Dworkin is saying that this issue is in part a question of morality,
which he doubts will soon be answered. But he then goes on to say
that, legally or constitutionally speaking, the issue is answerable,
and it must be answered by the courts:
The key question in the debate over Roe v. Wade is not a metaphysical question about the concept of personhood or a theological question about whether a fetus has a soul, but a legal question about the
correct interpretation of the Constitution which in our political system must be settled one way or the other judicially, by the Supreme
Court, rather than politically. It is the question whether the fetus is a
constitutionalperson, that is, a person whose rights and interests must
be ranked equally important with those of other people in the scheme
of individual rights the Constitution establishes. That is a complex
and difficult question, and it does involve moral issues. But it is nevertheless different from the metaphysical question philosophers and
theologians debate .... [p. 46]
To say that a legal or constitutional question involves moral issues is
not to say that the judges adjudicating such a case must have, or
must produce, a moral theory in order to resolve the legal or constitutional question posed. In addition, it seems to me that Dworkin
recognizes that a question arising out of the same situation can be
treated differently from a moral perspective and from a legal, or
constitutional, perspective.
As Dworkin understands it, the American Constitution speaks
in a moral voice by expressing or implying a skeletal framework of
moral principles that are meant to secure various individual rights
against the central government. But, on my view, whatever principles are expressed in the U.S. Constitution tend to be political in
nature, not moral. They are not controlling personal relationships,
for example, as I believe moral rules or principles or maxims mainly
attempt to do; nor do these principles speak in terms of the rightness or wrongness - the good or bad - of various individual or
collective actions. These terms of approbation or disapprobation
have been the main moral terms in Western culture. Rather, as I
have suggested, the Constitution is the initial attempt by our
forebearers to build a nation, an attempt that continues today in so
far as we have inherited that document and the nation it constitutes,
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and to the extent that we accept the responsibility such an inheritance places on us.
The Constitution itself was not the first installment in the American project to create a federal government. As I noted above, it
came second, after the Articles of Confederation. This history suggests to me that the Constitution was an attempt to rescue or to
redeem whatever could be salvaged from that first, failed, ten-year
experiment, from 1777 to 1787. The Constitution reads to me as an
attempt at securing a better, more balanced, form of government.
The formation of the government - not the moral relations between that government and its citizens - is the primary goal of this
text. Whatever our need may have been for moral instruction or
protection at the time of the creation of our Constitution, we were
in even more desperate need of a fundamental or foundational document that would help to create a federal government within which
the disunited states could live and prosper. I read this document in
the light of this need for instituting a federal form of government
within republican and democratic principles.
It does not surprise me, then, that the seminal cases in Constitutional Law - by which I mean Marbury v. Madison34 and McCulloch v. Maryland 5 - have nothing to do with individual rights
against the government and everything to do with the separation of
powers within the federal government just formed and with the relations between that federal government and the several states.
The historically important issues central to our entire nation and its
founding were the separation of powers and federalism. The initial
problem was how to form a more perfect union, one that would last
longer and better than the ill-fated confederation created by the
Articles of Confederation. It took us two tries to get it right, and
even then the union was not perfect - but it was feasible; it was
viable.
We learned, of course, that a half-free, half-slave nation could
not hold; it took the horrors of the Civil War to give us the impetus
to amend our Constitution to include the kinds of protections of
civil rights that we are familiar with today. But those amendments
came almost a century after the creation of the U.S. Constitution,
its adoption, and its initial amendment by way of the Bill of Rights.
34. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In this regard, I recommend the penultimate chapter
of Jim White's magnificent book, When Words Lose Their Meaning, entitled "Constituting a
Culture of Argument: The Possibilities of American Law." In this chapter, White offers a
brief summary of the Declaration of Independence, an introduction to the Constitution, and
a complicated reading of McCulloch that addresses in great detail many of the topics touched
on by this review. See JA.Ns BoYD WmTm, WHEN1
WoRDs LosE Tsmm MEANING: CoNsTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND CoMMUNITY 231-74
(1984).
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I do not believe that the Constitution should be read as though the
Civil War Amendments were, from the beginning, somehow "implicit" in the original document or the Bill of Rights. What made us
cognizant of the need to amend the Constitution was not, I think,
our discovery that some aspect of the Constitution as it then stood
required or received its full expression in the Civil War Amendments. Rather, the need for these amendments came from our discovery that our lives as we then wished to lead them outstripped the
Constitution; or, that our expectations and our ideals for ourselves
and our country outstripped those we found in the Constitution.
Adopting the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
(re)created a foundational document that comported with our lives
as we wished to lead them after the Civil War.
On this reading, the Constitution is not a tract reciting moral
principles; it was, and is, a political "experiment" 36 in creating, managing, and maintaining a national polity on a constitutional basis, or
what I earlier called "the body politic." As such, the Constitution
requires occasional adjustment and continual inspection and checking to ensure that the project it defines remains on track. While
sometimes the nation formed by this constitutional process will itself develop ahead of the initial constituting document, as I think
occurred prior to and during the Civil War, at other times the constitutional document may outstrip the development of the nation it
helped, and helps, to constitute. This is what happened, I believe,
in the aftermath of the Civil War, when we failed to live up to the
promise of those three amendments. In such a context, it may take
the courage of court action to prod the nation to bring itself into
conformity with its constituting text. I think this process occurred
37
in the judicial evolution of the nation from Plessy v. Ferguson to
Brown v. Board of Education.38 Sometimes, as well, the document
will leap ahead into the future, dragging the nation behind it into
what then becomes the present, as I think happened with the Nineteenth Amendment, introducing women's right to vote.3 9 At other
times, of course, an attempt to leap forward, taken on behalf of the
constitutional document, will be resisted by the nation, sometimes
successfully, as occurred with the Eighteenth and Twenty-First
Amendments, which, respectively, instituted and repealed Prohibition.40 No doubt, not all of the constitutional experiments that we
propose or that we try will be successful; some will be unsuccessful
because they richly deserve to fail. In this respect, however, the
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Louis Pollak, The Constitution as an Experiment,123 U. PA. L. REv. 1318 (1975).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX, § 1.
See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI.
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symbiotic process between the constitutional text and the constituted nation seems to me to be preeminently political, not moral.
The theme of national constitution and reconstitution continues
today, just as it has for the past two centuries. From my perspective, this aspect of our constitutional polity is the dominating theme
of the Constitution. Recent cases in this same narrative line would

include Baker v. Carr,41 the Pentagon Papers case, 42 the Watergate
Tapes case, 43 and perhaps even Clinton v. Jones.44 All deal, one

way or another, with the issue of what kind of a nation we are to
have, what kind of a people we are to be, or what kind of a people
we think we are.
This is how I view the Constitution. Dworkin sees it, on the
other hand, as fundamentally a moral document. To some extent, I
think that Dworkin's "moral reading" proposes a theory that ignores or misreads much of the constitutional text and the available
historical evidence. Dworkin's single-minded brief on behalf of his
"moral reading" expresses a penchant for seeing the Constitution
only as a "skeleton" (pp. 73, 74, 82) of moral principles. This misconceives at a stroke the density and complexity of the original text
and its several amendments, as well as ignoring both the history
behind them and the constitutional culture that has grown alongside the text. Such a one-dimensional conception does not comport
with our "actual Constitution" as I understand it.
V. "MORAL

READING" AS IDEOLOGY: MUST JUDGES
THEORIZE ABOUT PRINCIPLES?

I have argued in the foregoing sections that Dworkin's suggested method of "moral reading" is based upon a conception of
the U.S. Constitution that is mistaken in at least two respects: First,
I do not think that moral principles are to be found in the Constitution; and, second, I do not think that the Constitution operates as a
moral charter. While I have tried to anticipate some of Dworkin's
responses, he might simply point to American judges and say:
"Look at them: Aren't they proceeding in the way I describe?" If
this were true, it would be the best refutation of my criticisms and
the most credible support for Dworkin's approach to the Constitution. But, it turns out that Dworkin's account of how judges should
41. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (addressing the justiciability of a political question).
42. New York Tnes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding publication of
classified governmental papers during an undeclared war not a threat to national security).
43. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding that a sitting president must
surrender tapes to independent prosecutor who is conducting criminal investigations and
prosecutions because executive privilege offers no exemption from judicial process).
44. 65 U.S.L.W. 4372 (U.S. May 27,1997) (holding that sitting president does not have an
executive privilege from private suit while in office when suit alleges wrongdoing prior to
election to presidency).
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go about the business of constitutional adjudication transforms the
practice of judging into an activity of ideological theorizing. I do
not think that ideological theorizing has a place in the courtroom.
Let me begin with Dworkin's description of how he thinks
judges should go about the business of judging. As I mentioned
earlier, Dworkin is fairly harsh in his criticism of what he considers
to be our timidity toward the "moral reading" of the U.S. Constitution; he assumes that this diffidence is based upon a disingenuous
denial of the truth or validity of such an approach to the Constitution. On the one hand, Dworkin says, "there is nothing revolutionary about the moral reading in practice. So far as American
lawyers and judges follow any coherent strategy of interpreting the
Constitution at all, they already use the moral reading, as I hope
this book will make plain" (p. 2). But, to Dworkin's consternation,
we Americans persist in denying that we use "moral reading" as our
approach to the constitutional text. So, Dworkin claims, while "the
moral reading... has inspired all the greatest constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court... it is almost never acknowledged as
influential even by constitutional experts, and it is almost never
openly endorsed even by judges whose arguments are incomprehensible on any other understanding of their responsibilities" (p. 3).
On Dworkin's view, what are a judge's responsibilities? According to him, "fidelity to the Constitution and to law demands
that judges make contemporary judgments of political morality" (p.
37). In this respect, Dworkin's proposed "moral reading" makes
possible - it even encourages - "an open display of the true
grounds of judgment, in the hope that judges will construct franker
arguments of principle that allow the public to join in the argument" (p. 37). Dworkin describes in some detail how this judicial
duty is to be fulfilled:
The moral reading proposes that we all - judges, lawyers, citizens interpret and apply these abstract clauses [of the Constitution] on the
understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice.... So when some novel or controversial constitutional issue arises - about whether, for instance, the First
Amendment permits laws against pornography - people who form
an opinion must decide how an abstract moral principle is best understood. They must decide whether the true ground of the moral principle that condemns censorship, in the form in which this principle has
been incorporated into American law, extends to the case of pornography. [p. 2]
The "people" who must decide, as Dworkin points out, are the
judges; this is their particular responsibility and they dare not shirk
it. Their specific duty in trying to apply the Constitution to a "novel
or controversial constitutional issue" is that they "must decide how
an abstract moral principle is best understood" (p. 2). This requires
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the judge to decide "whether the true ground of the moral principle" invoked by one or both of the parties in fact "extends to the
case [posed]" (p. 2). This description of constitutional adjudication
pictures the deciding judge as first identifying the relevant moral
principle and then determining whether or not that principle should
be extended to cover a new case.
At times, Dworkin calls his method of "moral reading" a "strategy" for understanding and applying the Constitution (pp. 2, 6, 11,
13). I find this term revealing. For one thing, it suggests that in
Dworkin's view we can relate ourselves to something as fundamental in our lives and our law as the Constitution by means of an interpretive device, a consciously adopted construct. This label,
"strategy," implies a mechanical or artificial way to proceed, and I
doubt its efficacy. 45 In addition, Dworkin goes on to suggest that
judging done in accordance with his strategy is a kind of lockstep or
dictated activity, one that he characterizes as having a questionand-answer form. Here are several selections that make this point:
The moral reading is consistent with all these institutional solutions to the problem of democratic conditions. It is a theory about
how certain clauses of some constitutions should be read - about
what questions must be asked and answered in deciding what those
clauses mean and require. [p. 34]
So of course the moral reading encourages lawyers and judges to
read an abstract constitution in the light of what they take to be justice. How else could they answer the moral questions that abstract
constitution asks them? [p. 37]
Since the great clauses command simply that government show equal
concern and respect for the basic liberties - without specifying in
further detail what that means and requires - it falls to judges to
declare what equal concern really does require and what the basic
liberties really are. But that means that judges must answer intractable, controversial, and profound questions of political morality that
philosophers, statesmen, and citizens have debated for many centuries, with no prospect of agreement. [p. 74]
The First Amendment's guarantee of the "freedom of speech, or of
the press" is a constitutional provision that patently cannot be understood other than as an abstract moral principle. Lawyers and judges
who apply it to concrete cases must ask and answer a variety of questions of political morality. [p. 165]
So Dworkin argues that a judge must ask and answer certain questions, and that the process of asking and answering is the best way
of developing a coherent theory of the relevant moral principles in
45. It occurs to me that Dworkin's claims for the "naturalness" of his moral reading
method are undercut by his use of the term "strategy" to characterize such a method. Given

Dworkin's characterization of his reading method as a critical "strategy," his repeated references to the "naturalness" of his method strike me as inapt.
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the Constitution - if, that is, the judge is to fulfill his or her responsibility in cases involving constitutional issues.
But judges need not do this; they need not engage in any lockstep process of moral theorizing. Rather, it is incumbent upon each
judge to exercise his or her own judgment in determining which
issues of law (whatever political or moral or religious or economic
principles may be involved) need to be decided in any particular
case posed to that judge, and how these issues are to be decided.
We vest the requisite authority in the judges to do this - to make
these judgments - and leave it to them to fufill this delegated responsibility the best way they know how. And, I would add, this
responsibility can be fulfilled in a variety of rational ways - i.e.,
ways that make sense and that are legally and logically defensible.
The primary task for any judge remains, however, to decide or settle the case facing himself or herself by whatever legal means he or
she has at hand and chooses as best.
Because of the immensity of the power reposed in a judge, we
ask a judge to decide only issues properly brought before his or her
court and

-

among such issues

-

only those issues that require a

judgment in order to render a decision in the case. We want a judge
to decide all questions bearing directly on the case, but we treat
everything else said in the opinion as mere dictum. This means, of
course, that a judge sometimes can even decide that a purported
issue in a case is not ripe for decision and can be avoided for the
moment, reserving judgment for another day.46

I do not believe, then, that judges must ask and answer certain
questions in order for them to render competent judgments in constitutional cases. In particular, they need not ask or answer various
moral questions, and this entails that they need not develop any
theory regarding the coherence or integration of any moral principles they may believe to be implicated in their decision. This is the
larger moral that I draw from my brief description of adjudication:
A judge need not have or develop a theory of morality, or a theory
of any moral principles found in the Constitution, in order to competently decide a case. Accordingly, I find Dworkin's description
misleading in so far as it suggests that judges must go through the
decisionmaking process Dworkin sketches - i.e., that they must
"ask and answer" a variety of theoretical questions about the meaning and extension of any express or implied moral principle found
in the U.S. Constitution.
I think there are a number of possible ways for a judge to act
within the range of judicial propriety and competence. On occasion, a judge may decide that a purported issue presented by a case
46. See Bickel, supra note 5.
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is not in fact presented. Leaving such "nonissues" unanswered is
wholly appropriate under the "case and controversy" requirement
of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. At other times, while a
judge may decide that an issue is presented, he or she may also
determine that it can be answered competently by considering
something other than morality. And, finally, even when a judge
identifies an issue presented for resolution as a moral issue, requiring an answer drawn from morality - as the judge determines what
morality is - the judge need not go through a process of moral
theorizing in order to reach a moral resolution of the issue. Dworkin does not acknowledge, I believe, this variety of possible judicial
processes of decisionmaking.
I disagree with Dworkin, then, because I disagree with his conception of what judges must or should do. I cannot help but think
that this disagreement stems, in part, from a conception of the ideal
judge (whom Dworkin calls "Hercules") which Dworkin has developed in some of his earlier writings. 47 Dworkin's ideal judge works
to develop a theory of what Dworkin calls our "political morality"
in every "hard case" the judge faces. This conception of judging has
never appealed to me, and I find it far from ideal - or real. But,
having said this, it is important to note that my disagreement with
Dworkin over his conception of the proper role for judges in constitutional adjudication goes deeper than simply disagreeing with his
conception of judging.
Dworkin's requirement that judges "must" engage in a kind of
ideological theorizing -

a kind of reasoning -

about various ab-

stract moral principles supposedly found in the Constitution can
also be understood as deriving from a particular vision of human
reason. I think that Dworkin's method can be traced back to a conception of the human mind found in the current of thought we call
"liberal reason. '48 As Lionel Trilling puts the problem with this
current of thought: "It is one of the tendencies of liberalism to simplify, and this tendency is natural in view of the effort which liber49
alism makes to organize the elements of life in a rational way."
Dworkin's is yet another attempt, from within a liberal perspective,
50
"to organize the elements of [legal and constitutional] life" in
what Dworkin takes to be, and what liberalism takes to be, "a rational way."'51 Yet, in effect, this liberal way simplifies our compli47. See DwomxN, supranote 26 at 239-75,313-412; RONALD DwomN, TAKING RIGMS

(1977).
48. See THOMAS A. SPRAGENS, JR., THE IRONY OF LIBERAL REASON (1981). The locus
classicus in mapping the contours of the liberal mind remains Lionel Trilling's brilliant study.
SERIOUSLY 105-30

See LIONEL TuLUNG, THm LIBERAL IMAGINATION (1950).

49. TRILu.NG, supra note 48, at xiv.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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cated notions of rationality and argument and judging. This is
somewhat ironic - or paradoxical - because Dworkin continually
emphasizes both the importance of history in understanding and
applying the Constitution and the ultimate uncertainty of issues of
constitutional law. But, in reading his prose, one gets the impression that his answers to these complicated constitutional issues are
rather predictable and even somewhat doctrinaire. Dworkin himself seems to feel some discomfort in this regard, because he tries to
deflect this type of criticism in the following way:
I should like... to reply to an objection that has been made to my
arguments before, and that I anticipate will be made again. It is said
that the results I claim for the moral reading... magically coincide
with those I favor politically myself.... [M]y arguments tend to endorse the Supreme Court decisions that are generally regarded as liberal ones, and to reject, as mistakes, those generally seen as
conservative. [p. 36]
Dworkin attempts to evade the brunt of this charge by entering a
number of qualifications, but eventually he pleads guilty (pp. 3638). I would simply note that the objection I am entering against
him in this section of my review is not a complaint lodged against
the substance of his political views; rather, it is a criticism of the
procedural or argumentative requirements that he lays down that is, that every argument must be based on or tied to a formulation Dworkin would recognize as a moral principle. Dworkin's
"moral reading" - with its emphasis on identifying and extending
moral principles of constitutional law - is steeped in, and derived
from, a liberal conception of reason; but this conception does not
describe the only way for judges to proceed in a rational way. Nor
does the liberal conception of reason afford us the best way in
which to understand the process of adjudication.52
Judge Learned Hand might have shared my difficulties with
Dworkin's recommendation that his "strategy" of "moral reading"
is the best way for judges to read and apply the U.S. Constitution.
About Judge Hand's hesitance to assume any mantle of ideological
theorizing, Dworkin says:
Learned Hand described judges who appeal to the moral reading of
the Constitution as a "bevy of Platonic guardians," and said he could
not bear to be ruled by such53a body of elites even if he knew how to
select those fit for the task.
Hand's diffidence was, I suspect, a function of what he felt was necessary for him to undertake in order to fulfill his judicial responsibilities, and also what he felt competent in undertaking during the
52. For an alternative conception of constitutional adjudication, with which I find myself
largely in sympathy, see Douglas Lind, ConstitutionalAdjudication as a Craft-Bound Excellence, 6 YALE J.L. & HUmAN. 353 (1994).
53. P. 22 (footnote omitted); see also pp. 342-43.
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course of fulfilling his duties. If a judge wishes to theorize about
the law, or about politics, morals, or religion, he or she can. But I
take Hand to be recognizing that a judge need not do any of this to
remain faithful to his or her oath of office. Learned Hand, I take it,
felt that moral theorizing either was unnecessary or was ineffective
in resolving the legal issues facing him as a judge and, thus, he declined to participate in that mode of thought. Yet, by all accounts,
he was a pretty fair jurist.
In this respect, then, I reject Dworkin's assertion that we lawyers and judges use "moral reading" as a tool but deny that we use
it, thereby making our actions unintelligible. Taking Judge Hand at
his word - that he could not imagine himself using the method of
moral reading as his method of constitutional adjudication - does
not in itself make his decisions unintelligible or "incomprehensible." I assume that Hand would have declined to use Dworkin's
"moral reading" method not because Hand would be afraid to do
so, but because he would not - and did not - see the value or the
utility in it. As I have tried to show, it was, and is, a poorly adapted
tool for the issues and problems at hand.
In arguing this way, am I falling back into the trap of what
Dworkin calls "the old, cowardly, story about judges not being responsible for making arguments like these, or competent to do so,
or that it is undemocratic for them to try, or that their job is to
enforce the law, not speculate about morality" (p. 38)? To reach an
adequate answer would take, I suppose, more work and more writing than I can manage here. But I have tried to indicate how someone could read the Constitution as more than a mass of principles,
and as other than a moral document, and still be working within
what I take to be our tradition of constitutional law. If I am right
about this in general - even if wrong in some of the particulars then I think this suggests that it need not be any part of a judge's
duties to engage in theorizing or speculating about either morality
or moral principles when engaged in constitutional adjudication. I
am not saying that it is harmful or wasteful for judges to do so just that it is not necessary for judges to do so.
Dworkin claims that this "old story" is "bad philosophy. It appeals to concepts - of law and democracy - that it does not begin
to understand" (p. 38). When I quoted this passage earlier, I allowed that I was less certain than Dworkin seemed to be about
whose philosophy was bad here. I remain uncertain, but I should
like to close this section with a suggestion as to why I am suspicious
of Dworkin's philosophy in this regard. His description of judging
makes the activity sound very logical; I would call it "rationalistic."
I do not say that Dworkin is making a plea on behalf of any
mechanical jurisprudence, because he many times states very
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clearly that he opposes any conception of constitutional interpretation that makes it mechanical or artificial. I only wish to note that
Dworkin's description of the judicial interpretation of the Constitution makes it sound as though determining or deciphering the logic
of the applicable principles is the only thing that matters in judging
and, thus, in law. Or, I might put it this way: Dworkin makes it
sound as though there is only one right way for a judge to act, or to
reason, with respect to a legal problem posed to him or her, and this
right way is via an activity of reasoning that comprises, first, finding
the purportedly applicable moral principles and, then, determining
whether they can be applied to the problem calling for their possible application. Is this good philosophy? We might, following
Michael Oakeshott's lead,54 call this direction of thought, "Rationalism in Law."
Let me suggest a different way to look at our constitutional system. I do not believe that political principles constitute either a
"skeleton" of our constituted society (p. 73), or a "charter" for our
community (p. 124) - at least, not in the way that Dworkin seems
to think they do. What matters most for us is the form of life and of
law that we have inherited. This form of life is based in part on our
constitutional text, but also on the actual ways of acting and thinking that we have inherited as we have been born into and raised
within our constitutional polity. This process of living within the
law is, I believe, first and foremost a matter of receiving and working with, and within, an inherited tradition of thought and behavior.
Michael Oakeshott describes our situation this way:
Politics is the activity of attending to the general arrangements of
a collection of people who, in respect of their common recognition of
a manner of attending to its arrangements, compose a single community.... This activity, then, springs neither from instant desires, nor
from general principles, but from the existing traditions of behaviour
themselves. And the form it takes, because it can take no other, is the
amendment of existing arrangements by exploring and pursuing what
is intimated in them. The arrangements which constitute a society
capable of political activity, whether they are customs or institutions
or laws or diplomatic decisions, are at once coherent and incoherent;
they compose a pattern and at the same time they intimate a sympathy for what does not fully appear. Political activity is the exploration
of that sympathy; and consequently, relevant political reasoning will
be the convincing exposure of a sympathy, present but not yet followed up, and the convincing demonstration
that now is the appropriate moment for recognizing it. 5
54. See MICHAEL OAKESHorr, Rationalismin Politics, in RATIONALSM iN PoLmcs AND
OTnER ESSAYS, supra note 25, 1-36.

55. OAKESHOTr, PoliticalEducation, supra note 25, at 123-24.
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Although Oakeshott speaks specifically about politics in this
passage, I take his remarks to be equally applicable to the activity
we know as "law," and this is so because law is related internally to
politics. In this respect, I agree with Dworkin that judges and lawyers work on the constitutional level with more than simply legal
rules; or, rather, that the legal rules with which they work invariably
and inevitably implicate them in matters of the polis and how it
functions and how we live and work within our constitutional polity. I do not think that this makes a judge or a lawyer the kind of
moral philosopher that Dworkin seems to think a judge or lawyer
must be in order to resolve a constitutional question. It does, however, make such a judge or lawyer a kind of statesman, someone
who must think about the state or the nation as being one of the
necessary parties affected by the resolution of any constitutional issue. But this is because any change in our political arrangements is
a change in the tradition we inherit and with which we live.
In law, as in politics, we are in pursuit not only of principles, but
also of intimations and possibilities which derive from the existing
arrangements of law and of politics that we already have and that
we already possess.56 We work from what we have to what we
think we might like to possess. And, as to this, of course we can be
mistaken; we can take a wrong turn. There is nothing lending infallibility to our pursuits of happiness - that is why our method of
cooperation and competition can best be characterized not as an
argument, but rather as a conversation, with all the rich give and
take and diversity and flexibility, yet stability, that this term connotes or implies. Rather than the coherence of a moral theory of
the Constitution, as Dworkin seems to endorse, I prefer the coherence of our constitutional tradition, as it stands and as we may pursue the variety of extensions and developments it intimates to us at
any given time in any given context.
56. Here I am paraphrasing and summarizing another passage in Oakeshott's essay, Political Education:

In politics, then, every enterprise is a consequential enterprise, the pursuit, not of a
dream, or of a general principle, but of an intimation. What we have to do with is something less imposing than logical implications or necessary consequences: but if the intimations of a tradition of behaviour are less dignified or more elusive than these, they are
not on that account less important. Of course, there is no piece of mistake-proof apparatus by means of which we can elicit the intimation most worth while pursuing; and not
only do we often make gross errors of judgment in this matter, but also the total effect of
a desire satisfied is so little to be forecast, that our activity of amendment is often found
to lead us where we would not go. Moreover, the whole enterprise is liable at any moment to be perverted by the incursion of an approximation to empiricism in the pursuit
of power. These are features which can never be eliminated; they belong to the character of political activity. But it may be believed that our mistakes of understanding will
be less frequent and less disastrous if we escape the illusion that politics is ever anything
more than the pursuit of intimations; a conversation, not an argument.
Id. at 124-25.
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VI. A MoRE MATURiE CONSITUTONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Dworkin suggests that "finally, after two hundred years, [we
can] grow up and begin to take our actual Constitution seriously"
(p. 81). His challenge may strike his readers as a tad severe, as
though we were being told in Dworkin's best schoolmaster tone
that we have been delinquent in our studies. But Dworkin is speaking seriously here, and he is proposing that anything less than a
thorough understanding of the accomplishment of the American
Constitution does it and ourselves an injustice, a dishonor. I have
tried to take up Dworkin's challenge on his terms. His charge implies that, up until now, our constitutional jurisprudence has existed
in a state of immaturity. I do not share this view.
Maturity is a question of experience acquired over time and put
to good use. In the first place, then, I criticize Dworkin for seriously undervaluing the considerable experience we have acquired
to date in constitutional jurisprudence. When I criticize him for being ahistorical, for example, I am taking him to task for ignoring
relevant constitutional experience. In addition, our constitutional
experience includes the achievement displayed in the practices of,
for example, Justices Holmes and Brandeis and Harlan, as well as
by Judge Learned Hand. In this book, Dworkin is consistently critical of both Holmes and Hand in terms of their lack of philosophical
sophistication, but I do not find his criticisms persuasive. Instead,
my own sense is that we are not in need of a new theory of constitutional reading; our practice of the past two hundred years itself constitutes a reasonably mature and coherent approach to the
constitutional text and to the thousands of decisions it has spawned.
A greater contribution to our knowledge might be made if we could
describe appreciatively what judges and justices do in their day-today craft. I realize, of course, that this is what Dworkin thinks he is
doing, or has done, in this book. But the preceding pages are meant
to show that at least his description is faulty. We do not require a
new theory of judicial review or of judicial reading, but rather a
deeper acquaintance with our constitutional history and practice, as
well as a better understanding of how they both combine to form
our constitutional tradition.
Others before me, much better situated than I am, have already
indicated the wealth of riches to be mined from a greater appreciation of our constitutional tradition. Let me, in closing, quote briefly
from one of the best treatments of constitutional material of which
I am aware, a treatment that overlaps to a large extent with Dworkin's interest in the First Amendment and what he calls "freedom's
law." Here I am referring to Professor Harry Kalven's A Worthy
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Tradition, a fine volume, published posthumously. 57 In a brief editorial summary of some of Kalven's views, we gain a sense of his
estimate of the efficacy of theory - versus that of experiential description - in the field of constitutional law:
[Kalven] was highly skeptical about the quest for a general theory....
It is a mistake to pursue a unitary theory of freedom of
speech under the United States Constitution. There are irreducible differences in the situations the Court is called upon to review
and no legal principle can accommodate them all. The most we
can aspire to is not a theory but specific solutions to a congeries
of speech situations. This after all has been the genius of the
Common Law.
-.

.

The sensibility [Kalven] brought to constitutional law was

steeped in the culture of the common law. Distrustful of theory, he
had great faith in the common law process. He valued its attention to
particulars, its tolerance for inconsistencies, its capacity for growth
and self-correction.... The constitutional law on freedom of speech,
he observed in class, is "a really great example of the common law
process at work in a single jurisdiction - judge-made law, inch by
inch, case by case."
[Kalven] was not anxious to generalize. He was concerned that
the search for a unifying principle, if pursued with too much singleminded intensity, would blunt rather than deepen perception. He
wanted to stay close to the ground of experience. In 1971 he told his
students:
On my current view, one should seek not so much an organizing principle to answer all speech issues as an organizingmap on
which to place the problems. They are difficult to conceptualize
and to relate to each other, depending in large part on the sociological feel of the situation - genre of the problem.
lack of overall formula," he told his stu•.. "In confusion and
'58

dents, "I see strength.
Since I am favorably disposed myself to the "genius" of the common law as a way both of solving legal issues or problems and of
understanding the way Anglo-American law works, I am firmly
aligned with Kalven's approach to constitutional law and opposed
to the rationalistic approach of Dworkin's "moral reading."
Where Dworkin reaches time and again for an "organizing principle" or an "overall formula" for solving First Amendment issues
or for explaining how we should read the U.S. Constitution, I find
myself thinking of Holmes' reminder that "[t]he life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience." 59 This is not, of course, a
57. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADrnON: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA

(Janie Kalven ed., 1988).
58. Janie Kalven, Editor'sIntroduction to HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION:
FREDOM OF SPEEH IN AMERICA, supra note 57, at xi, xvii-xviii.
59. OLIVER WENDELL HouMs, Ti COMMON LAw 5 (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., Belknap

Press 1963) (1881).
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claim that we need to abjure logic or reason. It is, rather, an attempt to suggest that law develops in ways that are not necessarily
captured or expressed in logical terms, but rather can be characterized in experiential terms. An example of this sort is my earlier
remark that the U.S. Constitution arose as a response to the failure
of the Articles of Confederation, and that we ought to try to take
account of this fact in reading and thinking about the Constitution.
In order to grasp the layout of our legal system, including our Constitution, Holmes' advice would lead us to attempt to understand
how a tradition of law can grow and change and evolve. For this
task - rather than the schemata of logic - experience may make
the better map. Whatever it lacks in terms of theoretical coherence
or integrity, it makes up for in
vitality and in responsiveness to the
"felt necessities of the time. '60
I do not suppose that Dworkin would agree with any of this, and
it would take a separate book to put forth the details of an alternative vision of the Constitution. It is true, however, that both Dworkin's book and my criticisms depend upon a call for increased study
of our heritage, of our constitutional inheritance. As to this, Dworkin and I are in agreement. We simply disagree as to what we think
such increased study will show. It is possible that the distance between our two positions may not be very far apart; at least, I am
willing to imagine that it is a rift within the general contours of the
liberal tradition, and not outside its potentially broad parameters.
Dworkin thinks that his theory of the "moral reading" of the
Constitution makes explicit what we have been doing all along. I
do not believe that this is the case but, still, I applaud Dworkin's
effort insofar as it is an attempt to explore and to understand the
tradition we have actually made for ourselves in constitutional law,
a tradition that it is still ours to inherit.
60. Id.
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IS MORALITY LIKE THE TAX CODE?
Larry Alexander*
ILL-GoTrEN GAINS. By Leo Katz. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. i996. Pp. xiv, 293. $ 29.95.
Mildred and Abigail are two actresses of the same vintage and
type who have always competed for the same roles. In this competition, Abigail has been the clear winner and has had a successful
career, while Mildred has always been in Abigail's shadow. There
is a part open that Mildred believes would salvage her career, if she
could land it. Mildred also believes, however, that if Abigail auditions for the part, Abigail will get it, as has happened so often
before.
Mildred does possess one trump card. She knows that Abigail
has been unfaithful to her husband. Mildred contemplates calling
Abigail and telling her that unless she stays away from the audition,
Mildred will inform her husband of her infidelities. The problem
with this plan is that it involves blackmail, and Abigail just might
turn Mildred in to the police.
So Mildred comes up with an alternative plan. She writes a letter to Abigail's husband detailing Abigail's infidelities and mails it
at a time that would make it due for delivery at Abigail's house
during the audition. Mildred then calls Abigail and tells her about
the letter. Sure enough, Abigail stays home to intercept the letter
before her husband can get it, while Mildred auditions and, without
Abigail's competition, gets the part.
The story of Mildred and Abigail is the first of many such stories
in Leo Katz's 1 marvelous new book, Ill-Gotten Gains. Many of the
stories are, like that of Mildred and Abigail, purely the product of
Katz's quite wonderful imagination. Others, however, are drawn
from real life, and from sources so varied that one is awestruck both
by Katz's erudition and by the catholicity of his reading.
At the end of each story, whether fictional or real, and whether
drawn from case reports, biographies of the famous, or Ann
Landers, Katz's question is almost always the same: Can he or she
get away with it, and not just legally, but morally? For example, has
Mildred committed blackmail, or has she succeeded in getting the
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. B.A.
1965, Williams; LL.B. 1968, Yale. - Ed. I wish to thank Michael Moore and Emily Sherwin
for their comments.
1. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.

1839
HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1839 1996-1997

1840

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1839

benefits of blackmail without incurring either legal or moral guilt
for her actions?
Katz's answer is that Mildred has so succeeded. She has
engaged in "avoision" - a neologism Katz coins out of "avoidance" and "evasion" - and avoision works not just in law but in
the underlying moral universe that law reflects. As with, say, the
tax code, in which the legal status of a transaction is frequently determined by its form rather than its substance or the purposes for
which it is engaged in, so too, argues Katz, is the morality of many
an act determined by its form rather than by the actual effects produced or the state of mind of the actor. That neither consequences
nor states of mind fully determine the morality of acts is what creates the possibility for avoision, the moral equivalent of having
one's cake and eating it, too. So long as the requirements of moral
form are observed, one can, like Mildred, pursue nefarious ends for
nefarious reasons without doing anything immoral.
Now this is a deeply counterintuitive position, as Katz is keenly
aware. Indeed, its counter-intuitiveness explains both why Katz has
written the book and the obvious relish with which he develops the
delicious real and hypothetical examples that he marshals to illustrate and buttress his claim. Like most counter-intuitive claims,
however, Katz's is, I believe, wrong, for reasons I shall address
shortly. Nonetheless, neither the counter-intuitiveness of Katz's
claim nor my pronouncement of error should warrant the conclusion that Ill-Gotten Gains can be ignored.
First, there is a chance that I am wrong and that Katz is correct;
and that chance, when multiplied by the theoretical importance of
the claim if true, makes the book quite important on that ground
alone. In addition, even if Katz is mistaken, his errors should be
instructive. Finally, Katz is an immensely entertaining writer,
whose erudition, keen wit, and imagination cannot fail to delight
the reader, even if she disagrees with Katz at every turn.
I. AN OvERVIEW
The most important part of the book is, in my opinion, Part
One. In Part One, Katz seeks to introduce and then solve the puzzle of avoision. The conventional view is that legal rules are frequently and perhaps necessarily over- and underinclusive when
measured against their background purposes, and -this over- and
underinclusiveness creates loopholes that clever lawyers, protected
by the terms of the rule and the principle of legality, can exploit for
the benefit of clients. Avoision is, on the conventional view, restricted to the domain of legal rules; it does not occur in the domain
of morality, which is neither posited nor encumbered by concerns
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germane to the posited, such as legality. 2 Whether or not Mildred
is guilty under the law of blackmail, on the conventional view, she is
morally a blackmailer.
Katz attacks the conventional view in stages. First, he argues
that avoision occurs in extralegal contexts, a phenomenon that cannot be explained by the conventional view. Avoision occurs in dictatorships that do not honor the principle of legality (pp. 17-19).
Avoision occurs within our own consciences, surely not an obvious
domain of fallibly drafted over- and underinclusive rules (pp. 1924). And avoision occurs within "Jesuitical" religious doctrines that
turn out to mirror closely the criminal law but that again do not fit
the contextual presuppositions that the standard account gives for
the necessity of blunt rules (pp. 24-30).
Next, Katz makes what is his central theoretical claim: Any system of morality that is not purely consequentialist inevitably is going to contain a certain amount of formalism, and formalism creates
the opportunity for avoision (pp. 52-59). In other words, any deontological morality - or deontological component of morality will be formalistic in the same way that the criminal law and the tax
code are formalistic. Complying with the morally prescribed forms
makes you morally safe, just as complying with the legally prescribed forms makes you legally safe. And this is true even if you
follow the prescribed forms solely in order to achieve a goal that
morality otherwise forbids.
Thus, according to Katz, if a deontological theory of morality
condemns harvesting one healthy person's organs to save five dying
persons, but does not condemn diverting a trolley from a track
where it will kill five persons to a track where it will kill one, it will
be possible for the determined organ harvester to achieve his otherwise immoral goal in a morally permissible manner if only he somehow can convert a "harvest" situation into a "trolley" situation (pp.
56-57). Or, if morality condemns private execution of those disposed to violence but does not condemn the use of deadly force in
self-defense, then it is morally permissible for Charles Bronson to
walk in Central Park at night for the sole purpose of enticing violently disposed persons to attack him so that he can, in turn, kill
them in self-defense.3 Or, to use an example about which Katz and
I have disagreed elsewhere, Katz would claim that it is morally permissible for you to drive at a safe, legal speed around your enemy's
neighborhood, even if you do so for no other reason than the slight
2. See pp. 16-17. The principle of legality - "no crime without law, no punishment without law" - which, in its narrowest sense, demands that all criminal laws be legislatively
enacted, is usually taken more broadly to mean that no one should be penalized except
according to laws that are published, prospective, and clear. See JosHuA DRaSSLER,
Co Aw. LAw 29-34 (2d ed. 1995).
UNDERSTANDIn
3. See DEATHWISH (Paramount 1974). Katz uses a similar example. See pp. 30-32.
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chance that your enemy will step out from behind a parked
car and
4
be run over by you before you can apply the brakes.
Thus, for Katz, who comes down squarely on the side of the
deontologists, the way we bring about desired results affects our
moral responsibility for those results, and because of this we can
bring them about in ways that leave us morally unscathed. There is,
therefore, avoision in deontological morality, and avoision in law
just as often mirrors avoision in morality as reflects the familiar
problems of drafting. Katz illustrates the pertinence of this claim
through a parade of problems drawn from tax (pp. 4-6, 113-19), corporate (pp. 8, 93-96), bankruptcy (pp. 7-8, 90-92), immigration (pp.
6, 71), and other areas of law - problems that Katz claims all
demonstrate moral, not merely legal, "loopholes" of form.
In Part Two of Ill-Gotten Gains, Katz focuses on an insight derived from his central claim about the formalism of deontological
morality: If the moral quality of an act is a function not only of its
consequences for someone (Victim) and the state of mind of the
actor, but also of how the consequences are brought about, then it
should follow that Victim, concerned only with consequences for
him and not causal chains, will often prefer an act that is seriously
wrong to one that is less seriously wrong or not wrong at all. Katz
gives the example of a victim who entreats a would-be thief to give
him a beating rather than take a precious heirloom. According to
Katz, if the would-be thief complies with this request, he commits a
more serious wrong than he would by taking the heirloom, notwithstanding the victim's preference for a beating (p. 148). Moreover,
the beating is a more serious wrong even if no third-party interests
are at stake, and even if the victim is a fully competent chooser.
That's just the way morality is.
Katz argues that this point, namely, that the seriousness of a
moral wrong is a matter of its form - here, beating versus theft and not merely its consequences - after all, the beating was less
harmful than the theft - can be generalized to solve the puzzle of
blackmail. That puzzle consists of the fact that the blackmail victim
would prefer to pay the blackmailer for silence rather than have the
blackmailer commit the perfectly permissible act of revealing the
victim's dirty secret. Yet, the law - and presumably morality deems the act of blackmail, which in the victim's eyes is less harmful, wrong, even though the more harmful act of exposure is
permissible.
Now, there are a multitude of theories about why blackmail is
wrong, as well as some libertarian theories according to which it is
4. See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CoNTrvN. LEoAL
(1994).

IssuEs,
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not wrong. 5 (I tend to find most attractive those accounts that liken
the wrong of blackmail to that of building spite fences, which consists of intentionally exploiting another's vulnerability, making the
actor better off than she would be had the victim not existed, and importantly - making the victim worse off than she would be had
the actor not existed.) 6 For Katz, however, there is no real puzzle
here. Because form can make all the moral difference, it is not surprising that it does so in the case of blackmail. Mildred would
wrong Abigail if she were to demand that Abigail stay away from
the audition by threatening to spill all to Abigail's husband, even
though Abigail would much prefer that deal to having Mildred
actually tell Abigail's husband about Abigail's affairs, an act both
legally and morally permissible. Furthermore, just as victim preference cannot make battery into a less serious wrong than theft,
neither can Abigail's preference for "payment" to Mildred make
Mildred's blackmail a less serious wrong than spilling the beans (pp.
151-60). Form, not function, is what makes blackmail, but not contrived warnings, morally impermissible.
The final part of the book applies Katz's basic insight about the
moral significance of form to the issue of the misappropriation of
glory. Katz compares the principles of allocating praise with those
for allocating blame and finds the two sets of principles to be quite
similar. He then points out some implications, primarily for the
criminal law, that follow from comparing the two sets of principles.
II.

ARE DEONTOLOGICAL MORALITS
NECESSARILY

FoRMALIsnc?

Katz makes two important theoretical claims. First, he claims
that deontological moralities will, of necessity, be formalistic. Major moral distinctions will turn on how consequences are brought
about, not simply on what consequences are brought about, or why.
Moral reasoning within deontological moralities will be Jesuitical or
Talmudic, not deduced from elegant theories.
Second, Katz claims that the formalistic distinctions within law
that generate the puzzles with which he is concerned track the formalistic distinctions within the law's underlying deontological morality. I shall comment on the second claim and then take up the
first.
Are the formalisms that so delight Katz a reflection of an underlying morality? Katz really only gives us an ipse dixit on this point.
For suppose someone were to say that Mildred's plan did involve
5. The best access to the literature on blackmail is through the articles collected in Symposium, Blackmai4 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1565 (1993).

6. See Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1639 (1993);
Scott Altman, Divorcing Threatsand Offers, 15 LAW & PHi.. 209 (1996).
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blackmail, morally speaking. What does Katz provide us to adjudicate between his claim that Mildred is morally in the clear and an
opposing claim? That proper casuistry would lead to Katz's verdict
is nothing but a promissory note, for nowhere in the book can I find
Jesuitical or Talmudic reasoning that convinces me. Nor is law's
underlying deontological morality ever elaborated sufficiently to
enable the skeptic to compare another's casuistry with her own.
Therefore, with respect to Katz's various claims about the formalistic distinctions of morality, an appropriate response might be "Says
who?"
Moreover, by portraying deontological morality as full of
Jesuitical formalisms, Katz leaves himself open to the internalist rejoinder, "If this is what morality is like, then why should anyone
care about it?" Of course, Katz may be an externalist, simply reporting grim news from the moral front and not prescribing, but I
doubt it. The tone of the book is that it is a good thing - in an
action-commending sense - that law reflects the formalisms of
morality.
Katz's case for the law's formalistic distinctions reflecting those
of morality is further weakened by the fact that many of the distinctions he finds within the law can be doubted. For example, is it
really so clear that Mildred is not legally a blackmailer? I would
assume that the answer could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
depending upon the wording of particular criminal statutes. If a
jurisdiction deemed Mildred a blackmailer, Katz could not argue
that it was wrong as a matter of law. He would instead have to
argue that the law of that jurisdiction was morally flawed. But the
law often serves as Katz's principal evidence for what morality prohibits and permits, so that exposure of the contingency of the law's
relation to morality tends to undermine the law's weight as evidence of moral distinctions. The distinctions the law draws might
be morally unjustified, reflecting venality, history, or accident; that
is, the law might be immoral. Or the distinctions the law draws
might be justified by indirect consequentialist reasons, reflecting
the familiar problems of guidance, administrability, privacy, and
control of government.
Thus, for Katz to make his claim convincing that formalistic distinctions within the law reflect similar distinctions within morality,
he would have to show that the formal distinctions really were in
the law and that they were neither morally unjustified nor justified
on indirect consequentialist grounds. Without an elaboration of the
underlying deontological morality, or at least a few examples of
"right before your eyes" moral casuistry, Katz cannot vindicate his
claim about the relation of legal formalisms to morality.
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This brings me back to Katz's other and more central claim,
namely, that deontological moralities are necessarily formalistic in
the Jesuitical sense. I must confess that I do not see why that is so.
Of course, all moral theories, even fully consequentialist ones, rest
on bedrock principles that function as axioms. Every moral theory
will be formalistic at its core, in the sense that no further substantive grounds can be adduced in support of those bedrock principles.
But this is not the kind of formalism Katz has in mind when he
invokes Jesuitical casuistry. Rather, he appears to be arguing that
deontological moralities resist classifying all possible actions in
terms of the basic values those moralities express, and instead must
classify at least some actions on the basis of factors unrelated to
those basic values. If so, then I submit he has not proved his case.
There are, of course, all kinds of moral theories that one might
describe as at least partially deontological or nonconsequentialist.
There are Kantian theories based on respect for others as ends in
themselves. 7 Then there are theories that reflect some balancing of
impartial concern for others' welfare and partiality towards one's
own well-being and projects. 8 I see no reason to expect any of
these deontological moralities to generate Katz-like formalisms,
although they undoubtedly contain difficult line-drawing problems
to the extent that they contain both elements of consequentialism
and nonconsequentialist-based rights.
A third set of deontological moral theories, sufficiently similar
in many respects to the libertarian Kantian theories that they might
be labeled neo-Kantian, are those built around what I shall refer to
as the nonappropriation norm: Do not appropriateanother's existence without her consent to make yourself better off than you would
be had she not existed, and her worse off than she would be had you
not existed.9 These theories might divide over whether the forbidden appropriation includes only appropriation of another's body,
labor, or talent, or whether it extends to belief-mediated pleasure
7. These Kantian theories come in a variety of versions, from the quite libertarian to the
relatively nonlibertarian. See, eg., BRucE A. AcKEmAN, SOCIAL JuSTICE INTHE LIBERAL
STATE (1980) (assuming an ambiguous position with respect to whether bodies, labor, and
talents are protected by side-constraints); JoHN RAWvs, A THEORY OF Jus-ncE (1971)
(same); ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (promoting Kantian libertarianism); see also Larry Alexander, Liberalism as NeutralDialogue,28 UCLA L. REv. 816,
822-26 (1981) (discussing the differences among Ackerman, Rawls, and Nozick).
8. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991). Compare SAMUEL
SCHEFFLER, THE REECrON OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (rev. ed. 1982) (advocating a non-

deontological balancing of personal and impersonal perspectives) with Larry A. Alexander,
Scheffler on the Independence of Agent-centered Prerogativesfrom Agent-centered Restrictions, 84 J. Pr. 277 (1987) (arguing that Scheffler's approach of necessity results in deontological side-constraints).
MORTALITY 279-80 (1996). Thomas Nagel has
9. See, eg., 2 F.M. KAMM, MoaarAL,
recently endorsed a nonappropriation deontology similar to Kamm's. See Thomas Nagel,
PersonalRights and Public Space, 24 Pnu.. & PUB. AF'F. 83 (1995).
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and distress as well,10 so that, for example, it might enjoin building
spite fences and similar exploitation of psychic vulnerability.
All nonappropriation theories would leave a large domain of action governed by purely consequentialist considerations. Thus, the
interactions of X and Y, where either X or Y or both will be worse
off than they would be had the other not existed - for example,
where X wishes to play rock music and Y wishes to sleep, where X
wishes to drive down a lane that Y wishes to walk on, or where X
and Y both wish to use the same natural resources - must be governed by consequentialist norms because they do not involve appropriation. These consequentialist norms might be implemented
by indirect consequentialist methods - formalistic rules of law or
convention that will be over- and underinclusive and draw somewhat arbitrary lines - but this is not the kind of inherent moral
formalism Katz is seeking to reveal. Although it would be a major
theoretical task to "mesh" the nonappropriation norm with the consequentialist norms, I see no reason to expect Katz-like formalisms
to pop up at the interface of these two moral domains.
Does the nonappropriation norm itself generate Katz-like formalisms? Again, I do not see why this should be so. Rather than
just assert that this sort of deontological morality can avoid the formalistic distinctions that Katz finds endemic to deontology, however, I shall devote the next Part to exploring how well the
nonappropriation norm handles some of Katz's (and my own) examples nonformalistically.
III.

THE NONAPPROPRIATION NORM IN ACTION

The nonappropriation norm explains the distinction between redirecting a runaway trolley so that it kills one rather than five and
carving up one healthy person in order to harvest his organs for the
benefit of five dying persons. The trolley case involves interaction,
not appropriation. In that case, no one is made better off than she
would have been had those made worse off not existed." The
organ-harvesting case is paradigmatic appropriation.
10. See, eg., JuDrr JARVIS THoMsON, Tim REALM OF RIGHTS 254-55 (1990) (rejecting
rights against belief-mediated distress).
11. I should acknowledge that there is a version of the trolley case that is devilishly difficult for the nonappropriation norm. In this version, the trolley tracks divide at point A and
rejoin at point B. The five potential victims are on the track past point B, while the trolley
has not yet reached point A. If the trolley goes down the left branch it will kill the five. If,
on the other hand, it goes down the right branch, it will not kill the five, but only because it
will kill one victim on that branch and will be stopped by the victim's body. If the victim
were not on the right branch, the trolley would continue to and beyond point B and kill the
five even sooner than had it traveled down the left branch. If someone steers the trolley to
the right to save the five by killing the one, has he violated the nonappropriation norm? Has
he if he merely omits to steer it away from the right branch, when, had the victim not been
there, he would have steered left in order to give the five a few seconds more to live?
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What of the person who fails to rescue another so that he can
then harvest the latter's organs? Katz says this conduct is morally
permissible because of its form - nonrescue. He is correct about
permissibility, but the conduct is permissible because it does not
involve appropriation. The victim is not worse off than had the exploiter not existed. The explanation is substantive, not formal.
Perhaps Katz and I agree in the sense that what I am calling a
substantive distinction between appropriation and nonappropriation is, to him, a formalistic one. After all, the line between killing
and not saving does seem morally insignificant to many, particularly
consequentialists, but also nonlibertarian deontologists. Nonetheless, if one regards nonappropriation as a core moral value, then the
distinction is as substantive as one can have.
Next, consider the problem of blackmail that is so central to
Katz's analysis. If the nonappropriation norm covers acts undertaken because they cause psychic distress, then many cases of blackmail violate that norm. For example, if Mildred would not inform
Abigail's husband of Abigail's infidelities except in order to either
cause Abigail distress or cause her to pay to avoid the distress including paying in the currency of forgoing a part - then
Mildred's original plan violates the nonappropriation norm. But so
too does Mildred's alternativeplan. The distinction between the two
plans is formalistic in the pejorative sense of the word - pejorative,
that is, to most, but not to Katz. There is no good reason to regard
the two plans as morally different.
Or consider the person who drives carefully around his enemy's
neighborhood for no other reason than the infinitesimal chance of
having an "accidental" collision with his enemy. Katz believes that
if his plan succeeds, and he accidentally kills or injures his enemy,
he is morally blameless though disreputable. But here the nonappropriation norm again declares, contra Katz, that the conduct is
morally wrong. The reasons why it is engaged in are just as important to its morality as its physical aspects. The state of mind affects
wrongdoing, not just culpability. Katz's formalistic moral loophole
does not exist.
IV.

SOME OTHER EXAMPLES AND THE THEsis OF
FORMALISTIC MoRALrrY

"Formalistic" is usually a pejorative term, associated at worst
with clever and unprincipled lawyers' loophole-exploiting casuistry
in service of clients' nefarious purposes, and at best with the moral
price that must be paid for the rule-of-law virtues of guidance, predictability, and administrability. Katz's aim in Ill-Gotten Gains is to
replace the pejorative sense of formalistic with an honorific sense.
If morality is formalistic, and the formalism of law is merely a mirHeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1847 1996-1997
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ror of this moral reality, then lawyers' Jesuitical maneuvers are to
be commended rather than condemned.
I have argued that Katz has failed to make the case for morality's formalism even if pure consequentialism is rejected. Or, if the
lines that deontological morality draws - say, between appropriative and nonappropriative acts - are formalistic, Katz has failed to
make the case that drawing such lines requires Jesuitical casuistry
rather than elegant theory.
I have made this case against Katz's thesis by focusing on a few
examples. Katz's book is rich with examples, however, so perhaps I
have stacked the deck in my favor by picking only those examples
that I can undermine, and ignoring the examples that provide irrecusable support for Katz's case. Although I cannot come close to
dealing with every example Katz gives, I shall devote this section to
a few of the choicest ones.
A central example for Katz is the following: Victim prefers being battered to having a keepsake stolen, or being killed to being
raped (p. 148). If Criminal batters rather than steals, or kills rather
than rapes, has he committed a lesser wrong than had he done the
opposite, and does he deserve less punishment than had he done
the opposite? Katz says "no," despite the fact that Victim preferred
the alternative Criminal chose.
Of course, one could argue that the criminal law must make
gross judgments about the seriousness of various crimes, and that
punishment cannot be tailored to the preferences of each victim.
Katz, however, believes that even if the practical difficulty could be
surmounted, it would remain true that the criminal should be punished more for battering or killing than for stealing or raping. Curiously, though, his argument for this conclusion seems inapposite:
"The victim's decision as to whom he would rather be victimized by
need bear absolutely no relationship to the culpability of the perpetrator" (p. 151). Why? Because we would rather live in a town in
which a vicious killer is predicted to kill one victim a year rather
than in a town in which a merely negligent factory operator is predicted to kill twenty victims a year, showing that culpability - the
vicious killer is the more culpable - and victim preference do not
track one another (p. 151). That is true, but it does not show that
victim preference is irrelevant to culpability. All other things being
equal, one who knows that one forbidden act will cause more harm
than an alternative forbidden act is more culpable for choosing the
former. If I know that you value your wedding ring more than not
being punched in the nose, I act more culpably when I take the ring
than when I punch you in the nose. Similarly, if the factory operator in Katz's example knows he is killing twenty people, he will be
more culpable than the vicious killer of one.
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Many of Katz's examples merely point up problems in the law
that even deontologists should easily acknowledge. Moral luck
plays too large a role in punishment. In many cases, this is because
consequences count too much rather than too little.12 In others,
this is due to asymmetries in the law of attempts that no deontologist need defend. 13 The law is ambivalent about the necessity to
retreat rather than employ force in self-defense, and therefore it is
unclear what the legal status is of one who, like Charles Bronson in
Deathwish,ventures out armed for the sole purpose of being able to
kill in self-defense. 14 Recklessness sometimes does not suffice for
criminality when it should, leading to the fiction that willful ignorance is tantamount to knowledge.' 5 Tort law frequently performs
the cost-benefit analysis of negligence without considering the costs
of defendants doing cost-benefit analyses or becoming aware that
they should do so.' 6 And the notion of what should count as consent to sexual intercourse frequently is analyzed poorly.17
In short, although I cannot deal with all of Katz's examples that would require a book twice as long as his - and although
many of his examples are provocative and puzzling, I found in none
of them, individually or collectively, any reason for deontologists to
abandon unifying theory in favor of formalistic casuistry.
V.

ANOTHER LOOK AT FORMALISM

Perhaps I have misinterpreted Katz's basic claim. Perhaps when
he maintains that morality is formalistic, he is alluding merely to the
fact that things other than consequences are morally material. And
perhaps when he endorses Jesuitical casuistry, he merely is admon12. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 7-22.
13. Katz gets mileage out of the following anomaly: One can be guilty of first degree
murder if one sets off a bomb on a plane regardless of whether one's motive is to collect on
life insurance on a passenger or property insurance on the plane; on the other hand, if the
bomb fails to detonate, one has attempted murder only if one's motive was to collect on life
insurance. See pp. 32-38,241. I agree that this is an anomaly, but it is one that merely points
out the need for reforming the definition of an attempt. The Model Penal Code has, in fact,
taken a step toward eliminating the anomaly. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(b) (1962)
(making knowledge as well as purpose a mental state sufficient for attempting a result crime).
14. See supra note 3.
15. See pp. 39-44 (discussing willful ignorance). For a good discussion of the legal treatment of willful ignorance, see Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: DeliberateIgnorance
as a CriminalMens Rea, 81 J. Camm. L. & CRnINoLoGY 191 (1990).
16. See p. 34 (comparing the legal treatment of human negligence with the legal treatment of state-of-the-art products that occasionally cause injury). For my views on why the
law errs in treating these two causes of injury differently, see Larry Alexander, Foreword.
Coleman and CorrectiveJustice, 15 HARv. J.L. & Pun. POLY. 621, 631-36 (1992).
17. See p. 48 (discussing the obtaining of sex by various forms of lies and noting that only
some lies appear to negate consent). For a discussion of consent to sex and how it is vitiated,
see Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL TmEoRY 165 (1996); Heidi
M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consen 2 LEGAL T moRY 121 (1996).
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ishing the moral reasoner to play with lots of concrete examples
and the intuitions about how those examples should be resolved
before inducing the governing moral principles. In other words,
perhaps he is telling us that (1) deontology is correct and consequentialism wrong, and (2) in determining the principles of a deontological moral system, we should look at lots of judgments about
particular cases.
If this is all Katz is claiming, then I surely can accept his claims.
I think, however, that he is making stronger claims. I think he is
claiming that morality permits one~to pursue and achieve nefarious
goals through Jesuitically clever means, and that because morality
does so, it cannot be reduced to a few basic principles that can be
theoretically systematized.
The key example is that of driving around another's house in a
safe manner for no other reason than the remote chance of truly
accidentally killing the occupant. 18 If a fatal accident does occur,
Katz would say the driver had not only achieved his nefarious goals,
but had also achieved them in a morally permissible way.
I, on the other hand, believe the actor's purposes always affect
the morality of his means, so that if the purpose is appropriation of
others, the means are impermissible. The terrorist bomber and the
strategic bomber employ the same means for the same ultimate
end, but the former's appropriative purpose gives his act a different
moral coloration. 19 The criminal law's definition of recklessness the conscious taking of a substantial and unjustifiable risk20 - displays the correct relation between our purposes and the morality of
our conduct.
Ill-Gotten Gains cannot fail to educate, provoke, amuse, and annoy the reader. It is a must read for anyone who is interested in
legal and moral theory and the relation between the two. If I have
failed to be persuaded by its stronger claims, it is perhaps because I
am an incorrigible optimist about the construction of an elegant
moral theory. But I must confess that, from time to time, I find
myself hoping that Mildred got away with it.

18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. On this point, I disagree with both Michael Moore, who completely separates state of
mind from wrongdoing, and Claire Finkelstein, who discounts the importance of the purposeknowledge distinction to culpability. See Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability,
76 B.U. L. REv. 319 (1996); Claire Finkelstein, The Irrelevanceof the Intended to Prima Facie
Culpability: Comment on Moore, 76 B.U. L. REv. 335 (1996). I think that the purposeknowledge distinction is quite material to moral assessment, but that in some cases - such as
terrorist bomber versus strategic bomber--it is material to wrongdoing itself and not merely
to culpability.
20. See MODrL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
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LAW AND FANCY
Robin West*
POETIC JUSTICE: Ti

LrrEIRARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LFE.

By Martha C. Nussbaum. Boston: Beacon Press. 1995. Pp. xix,
143. Cloth, $20; paper, $12.
Martha Nussbaum's graceful book Poetic Justice is an elegant
brief for the importance of our capacity for imaginative "fancy" to
our moral and legal lives. 2 Imaginative fancy, Nussbaum argues,
allows us to know the internal substance and quality of the lives of
others. It allows us to come to appreciate, to understand, to share,
and ultimately to resist others' suffering (pp. 72-77). It is, in short,
the means by which we come to care about the fate and happiness
of others. It is a part, but not the whole, of our capacity to transcend a narcissistic and infantile egoism. It is therefore central, not
peripheral, to our capacity for moral judgment, and it is accordingly
central, not peripheral, to our lives as public citizens (pp. 1-12).
Fancy is a part, not the whole, of what prompts us toward a generous, humanistic, egalitarian, and democratic stance toward others.
Fancy is a part, not the whole, of what enables us to give a due
regard to the individuality, the dignity, and the irreducible worth of
our fellows.
Given its importance to our moral, political, and legal lives,
Nussbaum argues, we should not only study our capacity for imaginative fancy, but we should also value, nurture, and encourage it.
Reading modem realistic fiction, particularly (but not only) in
novel form, is central to that end (pp. 1-12, 49-52). The modem
realistic novel, Nussbaum argues, is the fanciful genre, par excellence. Through reading realistic novels -'and only to a lesser extent watching films or reading history - we come to understand
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. B.A. 1976, J.D. 1979, University of
Maryland; J.S.M. 1982, Stanford. - Ed.
1. Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago.
2. This short book contains a number of promises of work to be developed in the future.
The most important promise the book contains, however, may be implicit rather than explicit. In this work and elsewhere, Nussbaum acts on her clearly deeply felt conviction that
the western literary and philosophical canon, correctly and critically read, suggests a case for
a moral and political structure that is at once humanistic, egalitarian, generous, and liberal in
its respect for individuals and communities alike. If sustainable, this is a claim of tremendous
importance and great hope, not only to law-and-literature or law-and-humanities scholars,
but obviously for all engaged citizens in liberal societies. Poetic Justice does not directly
argue for this claim although the first two chapters in particular - which rest almost entirely
on interpretations of Dickens's Hard Thnes

-

suggest it.
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the subjectivity and the perceptions of others, and we move some
distance toward actually sharing in that subjectivity (pp. 4-7). More
striking, though, we come to care about these fictional characters.
If written well, the characters are so richly detailed that we actually
concern ourselves with their projects, we share in their assessments
of their lives and life situations, and we worry about their fate (pp.
7-9). This care for the fictitious lives of others is an important part
maybe the most important part - of the distinctive experience
of reading realistic fiction. Because care for the real lives, fates,
and projects of others is such an important part - maybe the most
important part - of the moral point of view, it follows that the
capacity to read and respond to narrative fiction is related, perhaps
quite intimately, to our capacity for moral reflection and action.
The experience of reading a novel and then engaging in the flight of
fancy it engenders is not just a reminder of our moral capacities; it
is training for them. Learning to read novels sympathetically is a
part of our moral education (pp. 13-52).
More specifically, although they are never spelled out quite this
explicitly, at least three arguments run through Poetic Justice regarding the relation between fancy and our moral lives. First,
Nussbaum directs her elaboration of the capacity for fancy, and its
relation to novelistic realism, to an internal, decidedly friendly critique of utilitarianism (p. 66). Both classical utilitarianism and its
twentieth-century cousin, the normative law-and-economics movement, could attain much more sound footing if they would recognize the necessity of sympathy to moral judgment (pp. 3-33, 46-49).
Utilitarianism at its best counsels a due and equal regard for the
interests and well-being of every person affected by a moral or legal
decision. It also requires a tentative assessment of the components
of well-being - of the nature of suffering and of the good life which are independent of, and even at times contrary to, the felt
desires of individuals or communities (pp. 46-49, 66). Knowing an
individual's external circumstances or chosen "preferences" among
a range of market options does not aid an understanding of either
that individual's subjective interests or the nature of the good life.
Rather, one must know something deeply individualistic about the
experiences, perceptions, and aspirations of the other, and at the
same time know something deeply universal about the conditions of
general well-being or of the ideal life. To know both the subjectivity of another human being and to know something of the objective
content of the good life requires the capacity for fancy. Classical
utilitarianism and modern normative economics both run aground
when they try to eschew fancy and supplant it with more readily
quantifiable sources of data. The gain in quantification, predictability, and precision is nowhere near the cost to moral depth. The behavioral criterion of well-being at the heart of normative economics
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or utilitarianism is superficial when stripped of its relation to the
internal subjective experience of life. By eschewing concern for
subjective experience, both classical utilitarianism and twentiethcentury law and economics gain a facility for precise quantification,
but they do so by running a very real risk of inhumanity - of maximizing a sterile and behaviorally defined value without regard for
the organic, lived consequences of legal or moral decisionmaking.
The second argument, elaborated upon in the third chapter, is in
my view the heart of the book (pp. 53-78). In this chapter,
Nussbaum argues that fancy relates not just to utilitarianism or to
sound normative economics, but to moral decisionmaking generally. Fancy, Nussbaum argues, sharpens the capacity for those rational emotions -

sympathy, fear, and revulsion -

that in turn

inform the moral sentiments of the judicious spectator. Doing the
right thing and knowing the right thing to do require an understanding of the value of the consequences of actions to those affected by them, and that value is in turn partly a function of the
quality of the feelings of the persons affected. Our own sympathetic
feelings, or responses to the dilemmas of others, are windows to a
rich assessment of others (pp. 72-77). To borrow from Adam
Smith's original elucidation of this idea, when I see someone getting
hit in the shins with a stick, I wince in pain because I am sympathetically sharing in the pain of the victim. 3 I share in the subjective,
psychic, sensatory experience of pain; I do not share in the bruising
of the skin, muscle, and bone. That sympathetic echo of the victim's feeling - his pain - is a central component of my moral con-

viction that it is wrong to hit people in the shins. Our own
sympathetic feelings - our capacity to share in the actual experience, albeit not with the same intensity, of the feelings of others,
particularly their unpleasant feelings - are barometers of the emotional or simply the subjective well-being of others. Since feeling is
in turn a central component of well-being - the subjective misery
that goes with the experience of hunger, for example, detracts from
well-being, just as does the objective reality of malnourishment the capacity for sympathetic engagement in the emotional or subjective experiences of others is a necessary, not peripheral, component of moral judgment.
The third argument, alluded to throughout the book but most
explicitly stated in the final chapter, Poets as Judges, is that fancy
informs not just our moral sense, but, more specifically, our sense of
justice. Accordingly, the judge who employs her capacity for fancy
will simply be a better judge (pp. 79-122). Another way to put the
point, I think, is that fancy and the knowledge it facilitates are com3. See ADAM Smlrm, Tim TiEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTs 3-5 (George Bell and Sons
1875) (1790).
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ponents of justice. To judge common law cases, the judge must engage the subjectivity of the litigants if she is to do a good job. If
deciding the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting homosexual
sodomy, for example, she must ascertain the impact of such laws on
homosexual citizens (pp. 111-19). When deciding a sexual harassment case, she must decide whether a pattern of behavior might
reasonably be expected to prove unsettling to female workers (pp.
104-11). When determining whether a state is liable under civil
rights acts for its failure to protect its youth against violent assaults
by family members, she must assess the consequences, for a particular child, of that failure. Such a judge will have to enter the world,
the sensibilities, the attachments, the projects, the sensitivities, the
vulnerabilities, the anguish, and, yes, the suffering of the closeted
gay or lesbian citizen, the sexually harassed female worker, or the
violently abused four-year-old boy. That in turn requires, by necessity, not legal deduction and not even rational calculation, but
rather a flight of fancy for almost any judge. She, of course, may
have experienced being closeted, harassed, or violently abused. But
very likely she has not. The judge deciding virtually any legal question will encounter at some point the need to understand, assess,
weigh, and sometimes give voice to the subjective experiences of
others. The fanciful ability to live momentarily the life of the other
is an obvious prerequisite for our ability to do so, and to do so well
rather than poorly. The ability to do so, then, is a part of our ability
to do justice.
I will not comment here on the arguments of the first chapter of
Nussbaum's book - that utilitarianism or normative economics, or
both, uninformed by narrative wisdom risk being sterile, and that a
sensitive reading of both Dickens's Hard Times and Wright's Native
Son underscores that truth. Nussbaum has written elsewhere at
greater length on the pitfalls of both utilitarianism and normative
economics when not informed by what she calls "love's knowledge. ' '4 I have written on related topics elsewhere, s and I do not
want to use a book review format simply to repeat myself. I have
also commented elsewhere on Nussbaum's use of canonical fiction
toward egalitarian and progressive political ends, broadly speaking,
and the quite stark differences between the ways that she and
others within the law-and-literature movement tend to read canonical fiction. 6 Instead, I will focus on the arguments of the middle
two chapters, arguments concerning the role of imaginative fancy in
moral and judicial decisionmaking. I should stress at the outset that
I am largely sympathetic to the general claims Nussbaum makes.
4. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990).
5. See ROBIN WEsr,NARRAvE, AuTHoRY, AND LAW (1993).

6. See Robin L. West, The Literary Lawyer, 27 PAC. L.J. 1187, 1200-02 (1996).
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Nevertheless, I think there are a number of very real and deep
problems with them. The book would have been more powerful
had potential objections received more of an airing. In the remainder of this review, I want to raise three objections and attempt to
answer them.
The first objection goes to Nussbaum's quasi-psychological
claim about the nature of moral reasoning. In the end, it is simply
not at all clear that reading realistic novels strengthens one's ability
to even appreciate, much less sympathetically engage, the sufferings
of others in a morally meaningful way. Let me try to make a bit
more concrete what I take to be Nussbaum's claim by drawing on
my own reading experience. Last summer, I read a novel, Mason's
Retreat by Christopher Tilghman, 7 about a family on Maryland's
eastern shore that contained, among much else, a well-written and
gripping description of the accidental drowning of an adolescent
youth in the Chesapeake Bay. The boy was attempting to run away
from his family before their departure for England - ironically so
that he could stay on the dilapidated farm that his family had barely
managed to run for the prior two years and that he, alone among
the family members, had come to love. The boat he had constructed for himself was not seaworthy, and he drowned. The same
summer, I read in the newspaper of an accidental drowning of two
very real children in the Chesapeake Bay. They had gone canoeing
with their uncle, and that canoe similarly proved not up to the test
of an unexpectedly strong gust of wind. The uncle not only survived the accident, but struggled unsuccessfully to keep the two
children alive and afloat. One of the children died in his arms.
Both stories were terrifying to me and indescribably sad. I well remember sitting in my back yard crying truly inconsolably - "like a
baby" - for the small children, their parents, and their devastated
uncle. I also remember tearing up, although not so hysterically, to
be sure, for the young boy so artfully drawn in Christopher
Tfilghman's fine novel. The details of both the fictional and real
stories of these dead children have stayed with me more than I
would wish. It is, to be sure, quite interesting that my emotional
reactions to these two stories, albeit different in intensity, were so
very similar, given that the fictional drowning never occurred while
the newspaper story most assuredly did. But it does not at all seem
right that I reacted as strongly as I did to the newspaper story because of my ability, honed by the reading of realistic fiction, to engage in fancy. Rather, it seems closer to the truth to say that I
sympathized with the children and the adults in both the real and
fictional stories because I am a mother of young children, because I
am myself frightened of large bodies of water, and because I have
7.

CHRISTOPHER TirmGwAN, MASON'S RETREAT

(1996).
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warm feelings and memories of early childhood that encourage empathetic responses to stories regarding children, their vulnerabilities, and the tragedy of their suffering. I suspect that my emotional
responses, my moral sentiments, and my style of reading are all
more influenced by other and more basic experiences - primarily
early childhood experiences of nurturance, love, and connection than by one another.
Like some, but certainly not all, readers of fiction, I am easily
captured by realistic novels. I readily and willingly suspend disbelief and get caught up in the net of fictional characters. I fully see
myself as Nussbaum's reader of narrative, realistic fiction. Just as
Nussbaum suggests I should, when I read fiction I quickly come to
care - and care a lot - about what happens to the central characters (pp. 30-36). I know, though, that other readers of fiction, including many readers who care deeply and sympathetically about
the very real suffering of others, just are not easily captured readers: they always know they are reading fiction, they maintain distance from the characters, they are more aware of the craft of the
story than immersed in it, they witness rather than participate in the
tragedy or irony of the characters' lives. They do not get caught up.
Furthermore, whether or not one gets caught up in narrative
fiction may be inversely correlated with expertise. It may be that I
get as caught up in narrative fiction as I do precisely because I do
not read much of it and have no expertise regarding it. But I have
no idea whether or how that does or does not relate to the depth of
my responsiveness to real tragedies experienced by those either
close to or far removed from me. I am not claiming that they are
unrelated; I just do not know. Similarly, I am not saying that there
is no relationship between our moral sensitivities to others and the
way in which we do or do not read realist novels, but rather, and
only, that it is not obviously true that there is any such relation.
The existence of one needs to be argued or shown, rather than simply asserted.
By contrast, it does seem fair to say that reading some narrative
fiction will broaden the moral sensitivities of readers for a quite
different reason: such reading may teach us something about the
subjective realities of the lives of others about whom we would
otherwise know very little. This knowledge, in turn, may lead us to
care about people whom we otherwise would not. We may be
moved to care more about the plight of the working poor by reading Dickens. E.M. Forster might have caused a sea change in attitudes toward imperialism or homosexuality, and Harriet Beecher
Stowe might indeed have been partially to blame, or credit, for
starting the Civil War. Upton Sinclair's The Jungle and Steinbeck's
novels might have made a difference during and after the DepresHeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1856 1996-1997
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sion. Toni Morrison's and Alice Walker's and Richard Wright's fic-

tion may yet affect, and positively, our contemporary moral
sentiments across and within the divides of color. Indeed,
Nussbaum most assuredly insists on this political point (pp. 90-118).
Literature - at least the right kind of literature - can and does
teach us about, and teach us to care about, the lives of those we are
otherwise inclined to keep at a distance, and for that reason alone it
is of value.
But Nussbaum's claims for reading narrative fiction clearly go
deeper. Reading realistic fiction, she argues, is central to our capacity for sympathy, not only because it teaches us about otherwise
inaccessible peoples or cultures, but also because it develops our
capacity for sympathetic engagement with others and hence hones
our moral sensibilities. This is a more difficult claim to make, and it
is a much more difficult claim to prove. Nussbaum succeeds in
making the claim in this book - which is no small accomplishment.
I am not convinced, however, that she moves any appreciable distance toward proving it.
The second and perhaps more central problem I want to discuss
lies in the book's basic moral claim. Let us assume the causal claim
discussed above: that imaginative fancy, honed by reading realistic
novels, does indeed influence our capacity for sympathy and hence
our moral judgement. But is it true that fancy improves judgment?
Fancy, Nussbaum urges, enables us to see the grave error in the
calculating utilitarian's willingness to sacrifice one life or one person's suffering for the sake of a greater societal gain (pp. 67-70).
Through fancy we come to better appreciate the irreplaceable uniqueness of the individual, as well as the sheer magnitude of one
person's suffering. Such knowledge - which, following Nussbaum,
we might call love's knowledge - better enables us to assess the
costs to suffering individuals of a proposed course of action. This
might well be true. I think it is.
The objection I want to raise, which I think is not adequately
handled in the text, is that even if fancy does enable us to better
appreciate the magnitude and meaning of the suffering of one individual, it may also be the case that the use of imaginative fancy to
guide moral judgment might from time to time overcommit us to
the suffering individual. Precisely because of its discriminating nature, in other words, fancy might overcommit us to the project of
alleviating the suffering of the finely rendered, detailed, compelling
individual, and might unduly blind us to, or distance us from, the
relatively ill-defined interests, sufferings, or lives of those who compose a collectivity. Imaginative fancy might well enable a full understanding of the plight of particular individuals - that is its
strength, but it is also, quite clearly, its weakness. Because it not
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only gives us a window to the plight of the individual, but commits
us to alleviating the individual's plight, fancy may obscure the legitimate demands, needs, desires, or ends of the not-so-finely-rendered
collective. Imaginative fancy may lead us astray for the most basic
of moral reasons: an overly sympathetic response to the dilemma
or situation of one individual may cloud rather than crystallize a
moral decision, where the actor must balance the interests of an
individual against those of a group.
Nussbaum of course knows this, but she seems somewhat unwilling even to clearly define the problem. Her ambivalence goes
not only to how the problem should be resolved but to whether it is
a problem at all, and if so, of what sort. Her ambivalence becomes
most pronounced toward the middle of the central chapter of the
book, when she returns to Dickens's Hard Times to illustrate the
sort of moral insight that is facilitated by imaginative fancy. The
passage is worth quoting in full, as it nicely illustrates a tension that
reappears throughout the book - as well as throughout law and
throughout public moral deliberation:
Sissy is told by her utilitarian teacher that in "an immense town" of a
million inhabitants only twenty-five are starved to death in the streets.
The teacher, M'Choakumchild, asks her what she thinks about this plainly expecting an answer expressing satisfaction that the numbers
are so low. Sissy's response, however, is that "it must be just as hard
upon those who were starved, whether the others were a million, or a
million million." Again, told that in a given period of time a hundred
thousand people took sea voyages and only five hundred drowned,
Sissy remarks that this low percentage is "nothing to the relations and
friends of the people who were killed." In both of these cases, the
numerical analysis comforts and distances: what a fine low percentage,... and no action, clearly, need be taken about that. Intellect
without emotions is, we might say, value-blind: it lacks the sense of
the meaning and worth of a person's death that the judgments internal to emotions would have supplied. Sissy's emotional response invests the dead with the worth of humanity. Feeling what starvation is
for the starving, loss for the grief-stricken, she says, quite rightly, that
the low numbers don't buy off those deaths, that complacency simply
on account of the low number is not the right response. Because she
is always aware that there is no replacing a dead human being, she
thinks that the people in charge of sea voyages had better try harder.
Dealing with numbers it is easy to say, "This figure is all right" - for
none of these numbers has any nonarbitrary meaning. (And really,
notice that 500 deaths out of 100,000 is incredibly high for ocean
crossings, whether by sea or air). Dealing with imagined and felt
human lives, one will (other things equal) accept no figures of starvation as simply all right, no statistics of passenger safety as simply acceptable (though of course one might judge that other factors make
further progress on these matters for the present unwise or impossible). The emotions do not tell us how to solve these problems; they
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do keep our attention focused on them as problems we ought to solve.
[pp. 68-69]
There is obviously considerable tension in this passage between
Sissy's claim -

partially

embraced by Nussbaum -

and

Nussbaum's parenthetical concessions, which are more mature,
more balanced, and indeed more utilitarian. The starting, critical
point is clear enough: the utilitarian teacher is wrong to insist that
the numbers and only the numbers matter - Sissy's direct empathic knowledge of the suffering of the shipwrecked or the starving makes clear that one accidental death or one malnourished
baby is one too many, whatever may be the social gains. Parenthetically, though, we learn that perhaps the utilitarian's mistake is not
so much in thinking that the numbers matter, but simply in using
the wrong proportions. Five-hundred deaths per 100,000 passages,
Nussbaum suggests in the passage's first parenthetical, is just too
high a number. But this objection is quite different from Sissy's. If
this is M'Choakumchild's error, the debate is entirely intrautilitarian. In the last two parentheticals, as if to drive the point
home, Nussbaum entirely concedes away Sissy's position - or
whatever is left of it. Nussbaum acknowledges that only when
"other things are equal" -

an arithmetic relation, of course -

is

one life lost too many, and furthermore that it may not be practically possible to actually improve the numbers at any particular
point in history anyway.
In the next paragraph, when Nussbaum purports to argue directly for Sissy's position and against the utilitarian, this confusion
between argument and parenthetical aside comes to a head, and the
collapse of the anti-utilitarian position becomes total:
This does not mean that one would not use economic models of the
familiar type. Frequently in such cases they can provide valuable information. But one's use of them would be steered by a sense of
human value. Nor need emotion-based reasoning hold that human
life is "sacred" or "of infinite value," vague notions that probably do
not capture many people's intuitions when these are closely examined, and that have generated much confusion in arguments about
animal rights, the termination of life, the treatment of severely handicapped humans. We may concede that in some of these cases the
emotion-based vision of a single death might distort judgment if
steered by such a vague notion of infinite value, and that the "cold"
techniques of economics might give more accurate guidance. (For example, we certainly should be ready to accept a relatively low risk of
death or disease to attain considerable social gains.) But in this case,
I claim, what we are saying is not that the calculation per se is more
reliable than emotion per se: we are saying instead that a certain degree of detachment from the immediate - which calculation may
help to foster in some people - can sometimes enable us to sort out
our beliefs and intuitions better and thus to get a more refined sense
HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1859 1996-1997

1860

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1851

of what our emotions actually are, and which among them are the
most reliable. If we had only numbers to play with, and lacked the
sense of value embodied in emotions of fear and compassion, we
would not have any nonarbitrary way of answering such questions.
[p. 69; footnote omitted]
Poor Sissy! By the last parenthetical - the insistence that "we
certainly should be ready to accept a relatively low risk of death or
disease to attain considerable social gains" - Nussbaum has embraced M'Choakumchild's position in its entirety. They differ, if at
all, only in their assessment of what is and is not a "relatively low
risk" of death. Clearly, by the end of this paragraph, Sissy has lost
her advocate.
What is the sympathetic reader to make of this? Perhaps we can
sum up Nussbaum's point in the following way: M'Choakumchild
and Sissy are both mistaken, but in opposite directions:
M'Choakumchild puts too much weight on the numbers and not
enough on fancy, Sissy the inverse. To be sure, as between Sissy's
view (one death is too many), M'Choakumchild's (500 per 100,000
is pretty good), and Nussbaum's (one death is too low, but 500 too
high), Nussbaum is probably right. But to reach this conclusion we
are engaging in the M'Choakumchild-like reasoning that we are being simultaneously urged to disdain.
I want to return in a moment to explore whether or not Sissy's
view is mistaken, and if so how. First, though, let me comment
briefly on M'Choakumchild's mistaken judgment, since his mistake,
not Sissy's, is the real target of both Dickens's fiction and
Nussbaum's argument. Again, the central argument of Nussbaum's
book is that M'Choakumchild tolerates a death toll that is too high
because he lacks empathic capacity: he underestimates the sheer
misery entailed by even one accidental drowning. If he better understood that anguish, if he could somehow imaginatively share it,
he would not so cavalierly dismiss the twenty-five people starving in
the streets, or sacrifice on the altar of societal convenience the 500
lost at sea.
Let me return now to Sissy's assessment of value. Ignorant in
her innocence of the social gains to be reaped from transatlantic
transport, oblivious to qualifications of the all-things-being-equal
sort, and relying entirely on her knowledge, born of sympathy and
love, of the magnitude and meaning of one child's death or one
human's suffering, Sissy declares the cost of one life not worth the
gain whatever it may be. In a moment, I will suggest that Sissy is
mistaken in this immature and quite absolute judgment, as even
Nussbaum apparently concedes, and that there may be something
to M'Choakumchild's cold-hearted pedagogical claim: Sissy may be
inclined to make this sort of error precisely because she reads too
much sentimental fiction. But first let me stress that the question of
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whether she is mistaken or not should not be begged: it is not all
that obvious that she is wrong, or that the Luddites, neo-Luddites,
Amish farmers, Green Party members, and counter-cultural dropouts who might agree with her would be wrong to do so. It may
well be that if the bureaucrat, or the insurance claims adjuster, or
for that matter the juror in a negligence action assessing compensatory damages, fully understood the depths of a parent's grief upon
losing a child, the harm to a child of losing a parent prematurely, or
the suffering of a hungry child on the street, the bureaucrat and the
claims adjuster would quit their jobs. The juror would set damages
at a point high enough to bring our convenience and commoditydriven engine of dangerously produced industrial goods and services to a grinding halt. And again, it may be that these people, imbued with Sissy's sympathetic knowledge, would be right to do so.
In other words, we should not, in our mature collective judgment,
dismiss out of hand the child's insistence that the loss of even one
child, parent, brother, or husband to the assembly line belt is not
worth the transport, the luxuries, the conveniences, and more generally the consumption that make up modem life. If this is Sissy's
assessment - if this is what she means when she pronounces one
lost life as too high a price to pay for M'Choakumchild's functioning city or for one passenger's ocean passage - she may be right.
But, as Nussbaum parenthetically suggests, she may not be right,
and if she is not, it is worth asking what leads her astray. It may be
that like all empathic knowers - my label - Sissy commits herself,
perhaps overcommits herself, to the sufferer with whom she sympathizes. Her capacity for sympathy alerts her to the existence of suffering, and her commitment to alleviate that suffering puts her on
the path to moral action. Both are surely to the good, and
Nussbaum might be right to locate narrative as a social activity
which encourages and nurtures both reactions. But surely an absolute commitment to alleviate the suffering of the one regardless of
the costs to many is not always warranted. Even if Sissy and
Nussbaum are right to think that M'Choakumchild has stacked the
deck in favor of industrialism by undercounting the suffering of individuals, surely there are many circumstances in which excessive
attention to the exquisite anguish of one simply obscures the
greater suffering of a greater number.
Whether fancy can or cannot be fairly charged with leading to
this sort of mistake, I do not know, but it does seem clear that commitments born of sympathetic attachments, whatever their origin,
run precisely this risk. Indeed, whatever may be the cause of our
ability to make individualistic commitments to others - early
childhood attachment, honing our capacity for fancy, or some combination - such commitments are by their nature exclusive, unbalanced, and profoundly discriminating. When we are committed,
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truly committed, to the well-being of another, we necessarily violate
the utilitarian-egalitarian mandate to treat all equally. When we
are so committed to our child, our neighbor, or for that matter to
the fate of a character in a work of fiction, we simply cannot equate
the interests of the one with whom we have aligned ourselves and
all other affected persons. What it means to care for one, in a
sense, is to care less for all others. If love's knowledge truly and
completely guides moral judgment, the result will not be a better
informed and more humanistic utilitarianism. Rather, the result
will be profoundly anti-utilitarian, and inegalitarian and undemocratic to boot.
Let me expand a bit on this objection, and then offer a response.
Nussbaum, as noted above, suggests that empathic knowledge of
the quality of the internal lives of others is honed by narrative and
is a corrective to modem utilitarians' and economists' focus on
quantifiable data. To this extent, in my view, her argument seems
entirely correct. Read this way, her contribution is an internal and
decidedly friendly critique of utilitarianism, and to a lesser extent of
normative economics. Utilitarianism requires that we weigh the interests of all equally and that we aim to alleviate suffering. Love's
knowledge, or fancy, helps us ascertain the nature of the latter and
inclines us to do the former where we may otherwise be indifferent.
But at least in this book, at least some of the time, Nussbaum seems
to be intending a critique that goes further and is not so friendly:
she posits a deep and arguably irresolvable conflict between the dictates of utilitarianism and the dictates of love's knowledge (pp. 319, 30-33, 46, 48-49, 66-67). The utilitarianism that was the object of
Dickens's scorn in Hard Times and in some places the object of
Nussbaum's critique dictates an equal regard for the interests of all,
democratically equated and agnostically entertained: The interests
of all count as one, no more and no less, regardless of content. The
dictates of love's knowledge, by contrast, are profoundly discriminating and inegalitarian. Like Sissy, when our moral sensibilities
and judgments are steered by our sympathies, they are focused
rather than egalitarian, and discriminating rather than agnostic. We
wish to alleviate the suffering of the individual with whom we sympathize, regardless of interest-toting calculations to the contrary.
Sometimes fancy may indeed simply operate as a corrective of an
overly quantified utilitarian calculus. But sometimes, as
Nussbaum's ambivalence reveals, love's knowledge will conflict
with the judgments of even the most enlightened and sympathetic
of utilitarian decisions. This captures, perhaps, the conflict between
Sissy's pure identification and commitment to the suffering of the
individual and Nussbaum's own more balanced - more utilitarian
willingness to weigh that suffering against abstract social gains
enjoyed by the undescribed multitude. When such a conflict arises,
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it is not at all clear that the utilitarian is wrong or cold-hearted to
count the gains to the many in the calculus, or that the empathic
knower is right to focus so exclusively on the suffering of the
individual.
Now, if it is true, as Nussbaum argues, that the experience of
reading realistic novels hones the capacity for imaginative fancy,
and if it is also true, as she argues, that the capacity for imaginative
fancy improves our moral judgment, then we should indeed encourage and nurture the discriminating reading of fiction. But if it
is also true -

and I think it is

-

that at least some of the time,

precisely the same capacity - the capacity for imaginative fancy,
the ability to sympathetically understand and care for the internal
well-being of the other - inclines us toward an excessive embrace
of the demands of the one and an unjustified blindness to the sometimes competing interests, demands, or suffering of the multitude,
then it follows that we ought to be wary of the project being urged
upon us here: novel reading as moral training. Indeed, the tension
that Nussbaum develops in this book - between the utilitarian's
calculated concern for the pains and pleasures of the multitude and
the empathic knower's directed and committed concern for the
plight of the hurting individual - can just as readily be turned into
a lesson diametrically opposed to the one Nussbaum imparts here.
Thus, if fiction reading encourages not only sympathetic engagement, but also impermissible or unjustified bias, then what follows
is not that we should read fiction to correct or soften the utilitarian
mandate, but rather that we should embrace the utilitarian mandate
as a corrective to our all-too-human, fanciful inclination to bind and
connect with only a known few.
I would suggest, as a caveat to my endorsement of Nussbaum's
argument, that this opposing lesson also is one to which it is worth
attending. Realistic novels probably do strengthen our capacity for
sympathy, commitment, and care. It is true that sympathy, commitment, and care are at the heart of our moral capacities. But nevertheless, it is also true that - regardless of how well, or how much,
we read fiction - our ability to commit ourselves, to care, and to
forge ties that bind is severely limited. Indeed, it is limited by definition. We sympathize, care for, and commit ourselves to the particular, the few, and the known. Unsurprisingly, those to whom we
commit ourselves are generally those related to us or at least most
like us. The result is not only that our beneficence is maldistributed
although that is obviously so. The problem is even deeper. In a
world of radically unequal distributions of resources, those limitations on our sympathetic inclinations, on our imaginative fancy, and
on our capacities for care further entrench injustice: We care for
those most like us or for those with whom we most readily identify,
and if we are relatively well off, so will be the objects of our soliciHeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1863 1996-1997
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tude. Even if our sympathetic attachments are extraordinarily generous, and whether or not they are undergirded by fiction reading, a
world of moral judgment informed by them alone is likely to be an
unjust one.
Now let me suggest a way out. It is true that if we assume as a
baseline of the utilitarian mandate the cold indifference of
M'Choakumchild and the ignorance of the nature of suffering
which he embodies, then imaginative fancy is a sorely needed supplement. The utilitarian seeks to treat all equally and increase total
happiness - there is nothing particularly hard-hearted about that.
But it is true, as Nussbaum argues and Dickens shows, that if a
utilitarian, even if sincere and genuine in his desire to do good,
lacks basic empathic regard for the suffering and worth of individuals, the result will be a moral - and legal - calculus that verges on
the monstrous. If the moral actor is truly oblivious to the nature and hence the magnitude - of internal, emotional human pain, his
efforts will go awry. What such an actor lacks is love's knowledge.
What he needs to do and what he needs to learn is to inhabit the
hearts and minds of others and to engage and align himself with
their well-being. It is certainly worth contemplating the possibility
that realistic fiction encourages that capacity.
On the other hand, if we assume as the heart and soul of the
utilitarian mandate not a cold and ignorant M'Choakumchild, but
rather a warm-hearted, flesh-and-blood, fully committed, sympathetic, empathic, well-nurtured, and well-read human being, then
the risks, or possible errors, of utilitarian decisionmaking are quite
different and call for a quite different corrective. The risk of error
run by this decisionmaker, against which we must guard, is not that
she will discount or undercount the magnitude or meaning of
human suffering, but rather that she will be excessively and unjustly
committed to those to whom she is most closely relationally tied,
those with whom she most readily identifies, or those who capture
her imaginative fancy. Such a person is not likely to make
M'Choakumchild's mistake. But we should concede that such a
person is also likely to care most passionately about the suffering of
her children, siblings, parents, kin, neighbors, co-citizens, or, again,
those who, for whatever reason, capture her fancy. She is likely to
care considerably less for the suffering of strangers, foreigners,
aliens, those not related to her, or those to whom she just does not
connect. For this person - who is, one would hope, at least outside
of the legal academy a more common sort than M'Choakumchild
the cold utilitarian mandate to treat all equally - not to favor
the close over the far, the family member over the stranger, the
national over the alien - is a corrective to her naturally skewed
connections, biases, concerns, passions, and commitments. It is a
corrective that both she and the rest of us should embrace, however
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deep our revulsion at the M'Choakumchilds in our world. We need
not worry that it is a mechanical formula that will steer us away
from the harsh reality of human suffering or toward an inhuman
disregard for our fellows. When embraced by a sympathetic soul, it
is a corrective that points us toward the heart of justice.
Finally, the third objection one might pose to this very general
claim - that imaginative fancy, nurtured by the reading of realistic
novels, is central to moral and hence legal deliberation - is political. Nussbaum makes two claims in her book that can be roughly
characterized as political. First, she suggests throughout that imaginative fancy and the realistic novels that spark it instill in readers a
quintessentially liberal regard for the dignity, uniqueness, and
worth of every individual. Second, she also insists, quite separately,
that novel reading and imaginative fancy are central to a generally
progressive and egalitarian political sensibility. The first claim that novels in effect bolster liberalism - is a familiar one and is
widely held, as Nussbaum acknowledges, not only by Nussbaum
and other liberal defenders of novelistic sensibilities, but also by the
novel's Marxist critics, who decry it for precisely the same bourgeois, individualistic, liberal tendencies. 8 Nussbaum unequivocally
endorses this claim: the novel, by virtue of its form, embraces "a
liberal vision, in which individuals are seen as valuable in their own
right, and as having distinctive stories of their own to tell" (p. 70;
footnote omitted).
Of course, whether that is something to cheer or worry over depends on one's opinion of individual liberalism. I do not want to
rehash that question here. What I want to focus on instead is
Nussbaum's second political claim: that the novel embraces not
only liberal individualism but egalitarianism as well. This claim is
not so obvious or widely shared; in fact, it exists in considerable
tension with the first. One would think that to whatever degree and there is room for debate - liberalism conflicts with egalitarianism, the novel could not support both. Nussbaum makes at least
two different arguments, I think, in support of the somewhat
counterintuitive claim to the contrary.
First, Nussbaum concedes that an awful lot of realistic fiction including, importantly, Dickens's Hard Times - is overtly suspicious of collective action that originates on the political left. Nevertheless, she argues, reading about the suffering of the downtrodden
and coming to care about them in the way encouraged by realistic
fiction is a spur to left-wing or progressive political reform. Against
8. Pp. 70-72. For a discussion and refutation of Marxist critiques of the novel, see
RAYMOND WLLAMs, Cinema and Socialism, in THE Pou-rics OF MODERNISM: AGAIN sT
TmE NEw CoN~omrsTs 107,116 (Tony Pinkney ed., 1989). See also pp. 71-72 (discussing and

quoting Williams).
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this general backdrop, Dickens's reservations about the wisdom of
unionizing, for example, should be regarded as an anomaly:
[S]ometimes the novelist's suspiciousness of any form of collective action leads to error - as when, in Hard Times, Dickens seems to sug-

gest that it would be better to divert and entertain the workers rather
than to change, through trade union action, the conditions of their
labor; as when he portrays trade unions as in their very nature repressive toward individual workers. But such a failure in no way indicts
the whole approach. More often, I think, the vision of individual life
quality afforded by novels proves compatible with, and actually motivates, serious institutional and political criticism - as when, in Sissy
Jupe's lesson, the reader's emotions themselves indicate the meaning
of the hunger and misery of millions, directing the calculative intellect
to interpret the numbers in an urgently activist spirit; as when, in
Tagore's mordant portrayal of Indian nationalism, we find the movement's leaders neglecting, in their abstract zeal, the real economic
misery of the poor traders who cannot earn a living unless they sell
the cheaper foreign wares, while we, with the author's surrogate
Nikhil, understand better what it really is to make each life count for
one. [p. 71; footnote omitted]
This argument, of course, is a circumscribed one: if we are going
to read realistic novels to spur us on toward political action, then
we should be very careful to pick the right novels. Only some - in
point of fact, most likely only a handful - will point us in the right
direction.
The second argument Nussbaum urges against the Marxist critic
of the bourgeois novel cuts deeper. Regardless of content, the form
of the novel itself - careful regard for the fates of multiple characters in a range of circumstances - implies or embodies a sort of
utopian world which might be fruitfully regarded as the goal or
ideal of progressive political action. Whatever the political orientation or stance of the novel itself, or of the novelist, the regard in
which the novel urges the reader to hold each character, and the
moral attitude of respect which the novel instills in the reader
should be understood as a necessary component, at least, of the
good society toward which the activist labors:
'It seems appropriate, in fact, for any form of collective action to
bear in mind, as an ideal, the full accountability to the needs and particular circumstances of the individual that the novel recommends, in
its form as well as its content.... A story of human life quality, without stories of individual human actors, would.., be too indeterminate
to show how resources actually work in promoting various types of
human functioning. Similarly, a story of class action, without the stories of individuals, would not show us the point and meaning of class
actions, which is always the amelioration of individual lives.
Raymond Williams put this point very well, defending traditional realist narrative against socialist criticism:
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[I]f we are serious about even political life we have to enter that
world in which people live as they can as themselves, and then
necessarily live within a whole complex of work and love and
illness and natural beauty. If we are serious socialists, we shall
then often find within and cutting across this real substance always, in its details, so surprising and often vivid - the
profound social and historical conditions and movements which
enable us to speak, with some fullness of voice, of a human
history.
In a realist novel such as Hard Times we enter, I claim, that full world
of human effort, that "real substance" of life within which, alone, politics can speak with a full and fully human voice. This human understanding, based in part on emotional responses, is the indispensable
underpinning of a well-guided abstract or formal approach. [pp. 7172; footnote omitted]
But this is, in the end, not a very satisfying response, either to
the Marxist critic who worries that the realistic novel is unduly individualistic and bourgeois or to the liberal critic who worries that
socialist art, precisely because it purports to be socialist art, is just
not very good. Neither will be satisfied with Nussbaum's argument
here, for two reasons. First, if it is true that the novel is as she
describes, then it is not clear, as either a political or an aesthetic
matter, why we should value it. The Marxist, egalitarian, socialist,
or, for that matter, the democrat can justifiably complain that if this
moral stance is the point of the novel, then that is all the more reason the political activist should eschew it on the grounds that this is
not time well spent. Instead, the activist should work toward creating a society that embodies norms of equality and dignity, not an art
form that does so. On the other hand, the liberal can justifiably
complain that the artist who aims for political progress, rather than
good art, is equally misguided. If one's goal is art, one should aim
to produce good art; if one's goal is progress, one should, arguably,
work directly for the cherished city on the hill.
Second, and more importantly, it is not at all clear that the form
of the novel is committed to the progressive egalitarianism
Nussbaum posits. One can easily construct precisely the opposite
case. Nussbaum is right, one might argue, to align the point of the
formal novel and the point of liberal society, but she entirely misapprehends what that shared point might be. One might argue that
the point of both the liberal society and the realistic novel is not
egalitarianism at all but precisely its opposite: a world of opportunity in which the dramatically unequal talents, ambitions, inteffigences, strengths, powers, drives, and insights of particular,
concrete, valued-for-their-own-sake individuals are given full play.
The point of liberalism, one might sensibly argue, is to construct a
social world in which the individual, splendid in his unequally bestowed strengths, has a full canvas on which to display the product
HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1867 1996-1997

1868

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1851

of his individual vision. Furthermore, it is a world in which his
product and vision will be not only tolerated, but embraced, applauded, and, in a word, valued. More to the point, it is a world in
which the inequality of resources is more than simply tolerated.
Rather, radical inequality - born of freedom - is aggressively,
even constitutionally, protected against the opportunity and individualism-squandering egalitarian impulses of the masses. It is a
world, to take some examples, in which William Randolph Hearst's
mansions, his art collections, and his idiosyncratic and acquisitive
vision are as treasured and protected against redistributive madness
as Orson Welles's denunciatory depiction of the same in Citizen
Kane. It is a world in which the inequalities prerequisite to the production of both Welles's and Hearst's masterpieces are accepted as
integral and essential to expression. It is a world in which the noise
and clamor and chaos of individual and unequal expression, productivity, and effort are not only more valued than, but are also
quite consciously protected against, the acquisitive and demanding
oppressive silence of an egalitarian mandate.
I see no reason, on the face of it, to think that the novel, by
virtue of its form, favors an egalitarian over a libertarian conception
of the point of liberal democracy. In fact, there are at least two
good reasons to suspect that, if anything, the moral valence of the
novel will tend toward libertarian over egalitarian excess. The first
reason is utterly materialistic: the novelist is participating in a form
of work which flourishes under either the protective support of a
patron, the legislated subsidy of a government, or the profits driven
by market consumption. Either the patron, the government, or the
market must positively value the individual vision of the novelist, or
like all other art forms, this one will vanish. Perhaps basic conceptions of equality can be used to generate an argument that either
patrons, government, or the market should support the arts,
although it is not at all obvious how. But whether or not that is
possible, it is easy to see the argument from basic norms of liberty.
What liberty facilitates is, precisely, imaginative, fanciful expression. On this view, art, including novelistic art, is the point of the
entire liberal political project. Whatever may be the case of the
artistic impulse, whatever may be the held political world view of
the individual artist, and whatever may be the substantive political
implication of particular novels, the material base of the novel suggests that its form, if anything, is likely to imply not just a liberal,
but a decidedly libertarian and inegalitarian political orientation as
well.
The second reason the novel's form may not be as conducive to
egalitarianism as Nussbaum hopes is moral. Nussbaum herself hints
at this often enough. The novel's form, as she insists, is profoundly
solicitous of the individual, his projects, and his fate. It engenders
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in the reader respect for the individual, and it is this respect for
individualism that may just be incompatible with the egalitarian instincts with which she also wants to credit it. In other words, it may
not be possible to insist, as Nussbaum wants to, that the novel is not
only liberal and individualist, but also egalitarian and progressive as
well. Dickens, as Nussbaum shows us, abhorred the misery brought
on by poverty during the industrial revolution, but he also hated the
single-mindedness of the labor-union movement. The same can be
said of John Steinbeck in this country during the Depression. He
abhorred the misery of poverty, but also feared the union organizer.
Dickens's anti-union animus may not be, as Nussbaum wants to insist, simply a failure of a vision more overwhelmingly or more typically committed to egalitarian progress. It may not be an anomaly
at all. Collective action such as union organizing is often frightening to individuals precisely because of its self-conscious insistence
on the secondary and contingent status of the moral claims of particular persons over the imperatives of progress. There are many
people who do not want to participate in a revolution if they cannot
dance in it, and it surely would not be surprising if their number
included a disproportionate number of readers and writers of realistic fiction.
I have no idea, upon finishing this book, why Nussbaum does
not insist on this antithetical relation between the novelist and the
Marxist, rather than strive somewhat artificially to deny it. The
novel can, and sometimes has, exposed the ugliness of market capitalism obsessively driven by profit. Melville, Dickens, Twain,
Sinclair, and any number of others quite explicitly tried to do so,
and to no small measure they succeeded. It is also simply true,
however, that the novel - indeed, often the same novel - can
expose the ugliness of a political sensibility obsessively driven by
high-minded progressive reform. The great anticommunist writers
such as Arthur Koestler, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Vaclav Havel,
and Milan Kundera; American progressives such as John Steinbeck;
libertarians such as Ayn Rand; and for that matter popular writers
such as Joe Klein all quickly come to mind. The lesson we should
draw from that might not be the easy claim that the novel can be
put to any political end. Rather, it may be that the Marxist critic,
the liberal enthusiast, and Nussbaum herself in other passages in
this book has it quite right (p. 70) - the novel is indeed the handmaiden of liberalism. That is its strength, not its weakness. That
does not make it useless to the progressive political actor. Rather,
like liberalism itself, it makes the novel a potent and necessary
moral corrective.
Let me conclude by briefly noting that the force of all three of
these objections is lessened in the context of adjudication.
Whatever may be the connection between imaginative fancy and
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our moral intuition, the connection between storytelling and legal
reasoning is self-evident. The common law especially, but indirectly
all of our judge-made law, proceeds by way of stories, counterstories, and stories within stories far more than by way of logical deduction. As I have argued at length elsewhere and will not belabor
here, the trade offs between the gains to the collective and the suffering of the individual are distinctive within the context of adjudication: the judge's mandate is to do justice, not maximize welfare,
and to do so requires an astute attentiveness to the internal lives of
individuals. It may be entirely proper for the judge to weigh the
interests and well-being of the litigants before her differently, and
more heavily, than the comparable interests and well-being of the
collective. It may be proper for the judge to do so, even if it is not
proper for a legislator to do so, simply because of their different
institutional obligations. The judge's duty is to the parties before
her; the legislator's is to his constituents. And finally, the inegalitarianism to which imaginative fancy leads, if it does, is surely not
as grave a concern for judges as for legislators. The judge is connected to individuals and to their stories more so than legislators.
Justice Breyer was right when he testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee at his confirmation hearings that "what
Brnte tells you is [that] ... [e]ach one of those persons in each one
of those houses and each one of those families is different, and they
each have a story to tell. Each of those stories involves something
about human passion" (p. 79). He was also right to conclude that
"sometimes ... literature [is a] very helpful... way out of the
tower" (p.79). To paraphrase, literature can be a help to the tasks
of human understanding at the heart of judging. Professor
Nussbaum is right, in this book, to endorse and expand upon Justice
Breyer's finding. Poetic Justice can perhaps best be read as an attempt to help us understand that literature to which Justice Breyer
referred, our passionate responses to it, and the role it plays and
should play in our legal deliberations.
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JURISPRUDENCE, AND TRUTH
Ken Kress*
TRrH. By Dennis Patterson. New York: Oxford
University press. 1996. Pp. 189. $39.95.
LAW AND

INTRODUCrION

Knowledge and truth are fantasies. Objectivity is unattainable.
Foundationalism is dead. We are limited to our historically situated, subjective perspectives. So we are told by postmodern scholars both inside and outside legal academe.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence - especially analytical jurisprudence in the tradition of Bentham, Austin, Hart, and Dworkin continues to fossick around, apparently oblivious to the
postmodern revolution. In part, this state of affairs results from the
social organization of knowledge, particularly specialization. In
part, it derives from prejudice: many postmodernists and analytic
philosophers view each other's work with disdain. Postmodernists
often dismiss, without taking seriously, analytical philosophers'
arguments that objective knowledge of the world is possible despite
our situatedness because we can transcend our situatedness,
because the high standard of justification as a prerequisite for
knowledge that postmodernism sets forth can be met, or because a
lower standard of justification is more appropriate and can be satisfied. Most analytic philosophers return the favor, rejecting
postmodern perspectives without attempting to understand them in
their best light.1
* Professor of Law and University Faculty Scholar, University of Iowa. B.A. 1978,
University of California, Los Angeles; M.A. 1983, J.D. 1985, Ph.D. (Jurisprudence and Social
Policy) 1989, University of California, Berkeley. - Ed. I am indebted to Randall Bezanson,
Jonathan Carlson, Jules Coleman, Richard Fumerton, Mark Osiel, and David Stem for helpful comments. I am also grateful to Eric Dorkin, Eugenia Hemandez, James Spolar, and
Jesse Weiss for invaluable research assistance.
1. Patterson describes the premodern world in terms of custom, ritual, cosmology, and,
especially, authority. P. 152. Modernism is a flight from authority, preoccupied with "legitimacy, progress, autonomy, rationality, and human emancipation." P. 152 (footnotes
omitted).
Modernism is defined by Patterson in terms of three dichotomies or axes, which, understood as a whole, "enable[] one to see a broad range of thinkers as all of a piece." P. 153.
The first axis, knowledge, is characterized as epistemological foundationalism: "Knowledge
can only be justified to the extent it rests upon indubitable foundations." P. 153. The two
ends of this axis are therefore foundationalism and skepticism.
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Dennis Patterson is well positioned to bridge the chasm
between postmodern philosophy and analytic philosophy, and the
one between postmodern philosophy and analytic jurisprudence.
Patterson is broadly read in all three disciplines and has a gift for
succinct and clear exposition. We can therefore be grateful that in
Law and Truth he attempts to bring modem jurisprudence up to
speed, first subjecting it to postmodern scrutiny and then replacing
it with a postmodern jurisprudence.
One way in which Patterson partially bridges the gap between
postmodernism and modernism is by staking out a position somewhere between postmodern radical skeptics and modem foundationalists, whose views are inspired by a physicalistic, scientific view
of truth, language, and knowledge.2 Patterson deploys a moderate
postmodemism - Brian Leiter elegantly describes it as a "sanitized" postmodernism 3 - inspired by the philosophical work of
Ludwig Wittgenstein,4 Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Michael
Dummett, and the constitutional jurisprudence of Philip Bobbitt.
Patterson rejects the possibility of an Archimedean point, God'seye view, or absolute perspective from which claims about truth
and knowledge can be asserted. Yet by accepting the
Wittgensteinian position that local practices can ground notions of
warranted behavior within the practice, as well as an understanding
of mistaken behavior, Patterson is able to justify modest claims to
objectivity, knowledge, and truth.
Patterson criticizes four related, but separable, views that, as he
sees it, constitute the core of modem jurisprudence's account of
legal truth and legal semantics. First, Patterson interprets modem
jurisprudence as committed to the claim that the meaning, and
The second dichotomy, the language axis, distinguishes language as representing objects
or facts in the world from language as expressing speakers' attitudes or emotions. Pp. 153,
155-56.
The third modernist axis distinguishes methodological individualism from collectivism.
Patterson cautions against reading these three axes atomistically: "Each represents not an
idea or element in a picture but an axis which, when taken with the others, enables one to see
a broad range of thinkers as all of a piece." P. 153.
Patterson then defines postmodernism negatively, in terms of what it is not: Postmodemism is "any mode of thought that departs from the three modem axes described above without reverting to premodern categories." P. 158 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Nancey Murphy & James McClendon, DistinguishingModern and Premodern Theologies, 5
MOD. THEoLOGY 191, 199 (1989)).
2. These foundationalists are the intellectual heirs to British empiricism, which held that
all knowledge was founded in the senses.
3. Brian Leiter, Why Quine Is Not a Postmodernist,50 SMU L. REv. (forthcoming 1997)
(manuscript at 2, on file with author).
4. Patterson is heavily influenced by G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker's interpretation of
Wittgenstein's later period and especially their interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of
normativity (rule-governed behavior). See, eg., G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, SKEPTICISM,
RuLEs & LANGUAGE (1984); G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, WrITOENTEIN, UNDERSTAND-

nir Am MEANING (1980).
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hence the truth, of a proposition of law is a matter of its truth conditions, namely, factual or nonfactual conditions or states of affairs
that, when they obtain, make the proposition true (pp. 5, 18-19).
The main goal of Law and Truth is an attempt to demolish this
truth-conditional semantics5 for legal statements (p. 19).
Second, Patterson attributes6 to modem philosophy - and
probably attributes to modem jurisprudence - a representationalist semantics of language according to which statements represent
states of affairs and events, names represent individuals, and predicates represent concepts and properties (p. 164). Patterson maintains that representationalism is explanatorily empty.
Third, Patterson attributes to modernism and modem jurisprudence the position that the predicate "'truth' names a relation
between an asserted proposition and some state of affairs that
makes the proposition true."'7 Patterson rejects this view of the
truth predicate, focusing his critique on its application to law.
Finally, Patterson claims to have uncovered a deep mistake
common to all major contemporary jurisprudes 8 except himself and
Philip Bobbitt: believing that something - a 'truth maker' makes propositions of law true (p. 181).
In place of modem jurisprudence's alleged commitments to
truth-conditional semantics, to representationalism, to the view that
a proposition is true if it accurately corresponds to the world, and to
the view that some truth maker makes propositions of law true,
Patterson recommends a view of "language as practice (meaning as
use)" (p. 169). He prefers a postmodern account of understanding
"that emphasizes practice, warranted assertibility, and pragmatism"
(p. 161). Patterson urges that a legal proposition "is true if a competent legal actor could justify its assertion" with arguments exemplifying argument forms that have been endorsed by our legal
culture: historical, textual, doctrinal, and consequentialist (prudential) (p. 152). For Patterson, to call a legal proposition true is to
5. Truth-conditional semantics is described infra text accompanying notes 36-44.
6. I employ "attribute" in a loose sense in this review essay. When I claim that Patterson
attributes a view to a theorist, I do not necessarily imply that Patterson claims that the theorist explicitly advocates that view. Rather, Iimply that Patterson claims that the theorist is
committed to the view by other aspects of his theory or that the view is a picture that informs
the theorist's perspective or illuminates the theory. Cf. infra note 13 (quoting Wittgenstein
on the way language and pictures we have of the way things are confound philosophical
inquiry).
7. P. 151. This sounds like the correspondence theory of truth, and definitely is, if the
relation in question is correspondence. If Patterson does intend to attribute the correspondence theory of truth to modem jurisprudence, then his inclusion of Ernest Weinrib, a coherence theorist, is problematic. I discuss additional concerns about Patterson's attribution of
the correspondence theory to H.LA. Hart infra note 130.
8. P. 151 ("I have considered the leading contemporary answers to the question of what it
means to say that a proposition of law is true.").
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endorse or commend the proposition as justified by the forms of
argument of legal practice (p. 152).
Law and Truth is a valuable contribution to legal theory.
Patterson raises a plethora of issues in this concise volume, including the realism vs. anti-realism debate in semantics and metaphysics; the application of that distinction to jurisprudence; the
postmodern rejection of that dichotomy as fruitless; modem and
postmodern theories of knowledge; the nature of legal meaning and
legal truth; the existence of right answers and gaps in the law; the
objectivity of legal statements; the nature of mistakes about legal
reasoning and propositions of law; and the issue of the legitimacy of
judicial decisionmaking, especially judicial review. With rare exceptions, and despite discussing sophisticated topics quite briefly,
Patterson writes with admirable clarity. He introduces his reader to
many of the major modem jurisprudential theories and provides
criticism, often quite original, of these theories from the perspective
of postmodern jurisprudence. In a regrettably brief ten pages,
Patterson develops a postmodern jurisprudence, which he claims
avoids his critique of modem jurisprudence (pp. 169-79).
As an introduction to postmodern jurisprudence and to a
postmodern critique of modem jurisprudence, Law and Truth succeeds. It will attract a wide readership among those with
postmodern sympathies and among those who want to be introduced to a postmodern critique of traditional jurisprudence.
Patterson's focus on concerns about truth, meaning, epistemology, metaphysics, their interface with law, and his project of characterizing legal theories in terms of the realism/anti-realism
distinction is, for the most part, welcome. 9 With a few notable
exceptions, 10 jurisprudes have paid insufficient attention to these
issues. Whether one accepts or rejects Patterson's claims, he raises
a host of important issues for further study.
Despite these virtues, ultimately Law and Truth fails to persuade for a number of reasons. For example, Patterson does not
sufficiently develop his general critique of the semantical theory of
truth conditions he attributes to modem jurisprudence. Additionally, Patterson attributes to some theorists semantic views which it
is dubious that they hold. Where Patterson does accurately attribute semantic views, these theorists could jettison those views without significant descriptive, explanatory, or normative costs to their
theories.
9. Patterson's focus on metaphysics, epistemology, truth, realism and anti-realism sometimes leads him to misdescribe theorists as if they were advancing scientific, theoretical reason accounts of law, when they are advancing practical reason theories of law.
10. See, eg., Jules L. Coleman, Truth and Objectivity in Law, 1 LEGAL THEoRY 33 (1995);
Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 (1985);
Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CArL L. REv. 151 (1981).
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More important, Patterson does not sufficiently tie his general
critique of representationalist theories, truth-conditional analysis of
legal meaning, the correspondence theory of truth, and the existence of truth makers to the specific critiques of the particular modem jurisprudential theories that he develops. Thus, Patterson's
attempt to show that all jurisprudes except Philip Bobbitt and himself make the same mistake of believing that something - a truth
maker - makes propositions of law true is not fully convincing.
Because his critique of modem jurisprudence fails, Patterson's attempt to construct a postmodem jurisprudence that avoids the errors of modem jurisprudence by avoiding representationalist, truthconditional, correspondence, and truth-maker theories is likewise
not fully convincing.
Additionally, the specific critiques that he develops, although
frequently original, are not sufficiently penetrating to devastate the
targeted theories. As a result, the theories he critiques, even if
flawed, are still competitors for the status of the best overall theory.
Yet Patterson's own theory is at present insufficiently developed to
be comprehensively compared to most of the theories he critiques.
Finally, Patterson does not hold his own account up to the level of
criticism he directs at his opponents.
The bulk of this review essay will focus on Patterson's rejection
of truth-conditional semantics for law and his claim to have discovered that all contemporary jurisprudential theories except Bobbitt's
and his own commit the fallacy of accepting the existence of truth
makers for propositions of law. I focus on these issues because the
rejection of truth-conditional semantics is Patterson's self-professed
major thesis (p. 19). Additionally, Patterson claims that the fallacy
of believing in truth makers is a "deep" error that Law and Truth
for the first time demonstrates to be common to modem jurisprudential theorists from Ernest Weinrib to Michael Moore to H.L.A.
Hart to Ronald Dworkin to Stanley Fish.
I will concentrate on these semantic and truth-theoretic aspects
of Patterson's critiques of Ronald Dworkin's unique version of natural law and H.L.A. Hart's legal positivism. One reason for this
focus is because Patterson's criticism of truth-conditional semantics,
the correspondence theory of truth, and the existence of truth makers is more explicit in his critique of Hart's positivism than it is in
his objections to other contemporary jurisprudential theories. A
second reason for concentrating on Dworkin and Hart is their
deserved prominence in contemporary jurisprudence. Furthermore, there are illuminating similarities between Patterson and
Dworkin and between Patterson and Hart. In certain respects,
Patterson's account is closer to Dworkin's, and in other respects, to
Hart's, than to any of the other theories he considers, except
HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1875 1996-1997

1876

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1871

Bobbitt's constitutional jurisprudence. This is the third rationale
for my focus on Patterson's critiques of Dworkin and Hart.
In Part I, I describe and critique Patterson's account of law,
legal reasoning, and legal truth. Section I.A describes generally
Patterson's rejection of traditional semantics and general theories
of truth as applied to law. It also develops Patterson's
Wittgensteinian, atheoretical, local-practice-oriented methodology.
Section I.B describes Patterson's positive account of law and legal
truth in terms of the forms of argument endorsed by legal practice,
and section I.C critiques that account. I consider the possible criticism that the vagueness of Patterson's description of the forms of
argument would render law radically indeterminate. I also argue
that the forms of argument and the techniques for resolving conflict
among them may not constitute coherent practices. Section I.D
compares Patterson's account of legal truth to the major theories of
truth and attempts to motivate the justificatory aspects of his account because law is a justificatory enterprise. Part II examines
Patterson's critique of Ronald Dworkin's natural law jurisprudence,
focusing on Patterson's critique of Dworkin as believing in truth
makers. Part III examines Patterson's critique of H.L.A. Hart's
positivism and concludes that neither Patterson's critique of positivism's alleged truth-conditional semantics nor his critique of positivism as a truth-maker account of law is persuasive. Part IV argues
that Patterson's forms of argument can be reconstructed as a truthconditional semantic theory, thereby placing in a new light his criticism of other contemporary jurisprudes for adhering to this
semantics.
I.

PATTERSON'S

AccouNT OF LAW AND LEGAL TRUTH

A. Patterson'sRejection of TraditionalSemantics and General
Theories of Truth
A book entitled Law and Truth naturally whets the reader's
appetite for answers to questions like these: What is a theory of
truth? Why do we need a theory of truth? What is a theory of
truth for law? What is a theory of truth for law about? Why do we
need a theory of truth for law? What is the relationship between a
theory of law and a theory of truth for law? What is the relationship between a theory of truth in general and a local theory of truth
for law?
Readers of Law and Truth seeking enlightenment on these
questions will, at least at first, be disappointed. Influenced by
Wittgenstein and Rorty, Patterson eschews general theory. In particular, he denies that a general or theoretical account of legal truth
contributes to understanding the meaning of "true" in law (pp. 21,
181). Patterson also claims that "[t]ruth is not an explanatorily useHeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1876 1996-1997
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ful concept" (p. 21). In context, Patterson is referring to legal truth,
but a reader of Law and Truth could hardly be faulted for inferring
that Patterson also believes that, as a general concept, truth is
explanatorily useless.
Patterson also claims that truth in law is neither a property of
truth-bearers (pick your favorite: sentences, statements, propositions) nor a relationship between propositions and the world (p.
19). The thesis that truth is not a property is called by philosophers
"deflationism," because it deflates truth from the honorific status
accorded it by the other major theories of truth.
For example, the correspondence theory of truth maintains that
a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts. If a
proposition fails to correspond to the facts, the correspondence
theory will withhold the honorific "true" and deem the proposition
"false." 11 The coherence theory of truth holds that a proposition is
true if and only if it coheres with other propositions which are
accepted, or otherwise suitably determined. The pragmatic theory
denominates a proposition true if and only if it is useful to believe
it. Warranted-assertibility theories call a proposition true when its
assertion is justified. Correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, and
warranted-assertibility theories provide substantive accounts of
truth, in contrast to deflationism's nonsubstantive account.
Although they disagree as to which substantive property or relation
constitutes truth, they agree - in opposition to deflationism - that

truth is a substantive property.
In keeping with his claims that truth in law is neither a property
nor a relation and that general theories of truth are not explanatorily fruitful, Patterson also asserts - but does not develop
disquotationalism (p. 19). The disquotational thesis, which is
frequently held as part of a robust deflationism, comes in two main
versions. The strong version asserts that "'p' is true" means the
same thing as "p." The weak version claims only that they are
materially equivalent: "p"is true if and only if p.12 Disquotationalism further explains why deflationist accounts of truth are nonsubstantive. According to disquotationalism, asserting "'p' is true"
adds no content beyond that already expressed by asserting "p."
In the spirit of Wittgenstein, rather than answering theoretical
questions about the nature of truth, Patterson aims to cure those
afflicted with the philosophers' disease of engaging in these nonsensical inquiries. He aims to let the fly out of the fly bottle and dis11. Or it might be that the proposition lacks a truth value.
12. Patterson's brief assertion of disquotationalism does not indicate which version he
holds: "'True' is best understood disquotationally." P. 19; cf. LUDWIG WrroTENSTEIN,
Pnr.OOPmCAL INVESIATIONS § 136 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) ("'p' is true =

p").
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solve jurisprudes' philosophical puzzlement about legal truth.
Ultimately, Patterson does address questions about the nature of
truth, but only indirectly. He hopes to release us from the grip of
the false philosophical picture that induces us to ask these unintelligible theoretical questions. In place of a fruitless attempt to
devise a general theory of legal truth, Patterson recommends
describing the practices of particular legal cultures. 13 Patterson
urges that a legal proposition "is true if a competent legal actor
could justify its assertion" with culturally endorsed arguments: historical, textual, doctrinal, and consequentialist (prudential) (p. 152).
For Patterson, to call a legal statement true is to endorse or commend the proposition as justified by the forms of argument that
constitute legal practice (p. 152).
Patterson attempts to dissolve the allegedly mistaken philosophical urge to theorize about the law and legal truth through a critique
of four related positions. First, Patterson claims that all contemporary jurisprudes except Bobbitt and himself are committed to an
analysis of the meaning of legal statements in terms of truth conditions - that is, factual or nonfactual conditions under which the
statement will be true (p. 179). In its strongest version, the truthconditional perspective maintains that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of legal propositions. A slightly
weaker thesis - which some of these theorists might endorse maintains that there are criteria for the correct application of legal
concepts and propositions, criteria that might fall short of necessary
and sufficient conditions. 14 Different theories can be distinguished
at least in part - by their deployment of different truth conditions in their analyses of the meaning of legal statements. Legal
positivists, Patterson claims, employ social facts as truth conditions
(pp. 3, 46, 63); natural lawyers, especially moral realists, deploy
moral facts as conditions (pp. 3, 63, 78). Stanley Fish, at least on
one interpretation, employs interpretive agreement (p. 99). Each of
these views is a truth-conditional semantic thesis. Truth-conditional
semantics, Patterson argues, is both explanatorily fruitless and false
(pp. 19, 181). Although, at one level, Patterson claims that the
problems that this semantic thesis generates differ depending on the
particular truth conditions that each theory employs, at a more general and deeper level, as we shall see shortly, all truth-conditional
theories for legal propositions commit the same mistake - namely,
13. Cf.WrGENsiN, supra note 12, § 115 ("A picture held us captive. And we could
not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably."); id. § 109 ("Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means
of language.").
14. For example, Hart is no fan of definition by necessary and sufficient conditions. See
H.L.A. HART, TmE CoNCEPT OF LAW 13-17 (2d ed. 1994); see also infra text accompanying
notes 107-11.
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they assume there is a truth maker that makes propositions of law
true (pp. 19, 181).
Because demolition of truth-conditional semantics is the major
goal of Law and Truth, we should pause for a brief examination of
that semantics. Truth-conditional semantics associates an individual
or object with each name - the individual to whom the name
refers. It also associates sets of objects with predicates, namely, the
set of objects to which the predicate applies. These associated individuals or sets are the terms' references or extensions. Truthconditional semantics then explains how the truth values of complex sentences derive from the references of their parts and the order in which the parts occur. A simple example will clarify. "Bill
Clinton" is said to refer to, or, in another terminology, to have as its
extension, the person Bill Clinton. By contrast, the predicate "is a
politician" is associated with a set of individuals, called the extension or reference of the predicate, namely, those individuals who
are politicians. The sentence "Bill Clinton is a politician" is true,
according to truth-conditional semantics, if and only if the object
referred to by "Bill Clinton," Bill Clinton, is a member of the reference of "is a politician," that is, the set of politicians. Since Bill
Clinton is a member of the set of politicians, the sentence "Bill
Clinton is a politician" is deemed true by truth-conditional semantics. By contrast, the sentence "Bill Clinton is a tree" is deemed
false because Bill Clinton is not a member of the set of trees. 15
What I have described is part of extensional truth-conditional
semantics. The rest of that theory describes the semantics of the
quantifiers "some" and "all," and logical connectives such as "it is
not the case that," "and," and "if and only if." A complete truthconditional semantics for law would need to go beyond extensional
semantics and include intensional semantics to account for intensional terms such as "foresees" and "intends," but understanding
extensional truth-conditional semantics will suffice to assess Law
and Truth.16
15. In fact, the formal semantics of model theory is even sneakier than the above description. Neither Bill Clinton nor any politician need appear in the universe of objects in the
model to analyze the sentence "Bill Clinton is a politician." The universe could consist of any
set of objects, for example, the natural numbers. An arbitrary natural number would be
correlated with Bill Clinton and 'dressed up' to resemble him, by being the reference of "Bill
Clinton," a member of the set of natural numbers that is the reference of "is a politician,"
and a member of the set of natural numbers that is the reference of "likes fast food," and the
sole member of the set consisting of a natural number that is the reference of "married to
Hillary Rodham Clinton," yet not being a member of the set of natural numbers that is the
reference of "is a tree," and so on.
16. For descriptions of intensional semantics, see RuroLF CARNAP, MEANING AND
NEcEssrry (1947); 1 DAVID LEwis, General Semantics, in PmLOsoPmcAL PAPERs 189, 190
n.4,193-203 (1983); RicHARD MONTAGuE, FORMAL PsMLosoPHY (Richard H. Thomason ed.,
1974).
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The second position Patterson attributes to modem jurisprudence is a representationalist theory of the semantics of legal language, according to which legal statements represent aspects of the
world, such as legal facts, and legal terms represent legal concepts
or properties. Patterson urges that representationalism is unsuccessful and explanatorily empty.
Third, Patterson rejects the correspondence theory of truth that,
as applied to law, holds that legal propositions are true just in case
they correspond to 'legal' facts. Call this theory the thin correspondence theory because it involves no metaphysical or ontological
claims about what facts are. The traditionalcorrespondence theory
of truth adds to the thin theory a realist metaphysics about facts:
facts are independent of our beliefs or conventions about those
facts; there may be facts that no human will 17or can ever know.
Facts may transcend our evidence about them.
Finally, as noted above, Patterson also claims to have discovered
a "previously unnoticed" but "deep" similarity in the theories of
law and legal truth of all major contemporary jurisprudes except
Philip Bobbitt and himself: "[E]ach author views propositions of
law as true in virtue of 'something'; each theory is an effort to identify the 'truth maker.' My effort has been to show the fruitlessness
of such an approach to law and to point the way to a different
approach."' 18 The fallacy of attempting to identify a truth maker,
17. A realist would believe that there is now a fact of the matter about whether there will
be a sea battle tomorrow, even though history has not yet unfolded. An anti-realist might
deny this. Similarly, a realist would believe that in ancient times, there were electrons, even
though it was not then possible to verify that claim.
18. P. 181. Regrettably, Patterson does not always distinguish the question of the proper
philosophical account of the truth predicate or concept of truth from the logically independent question of whether a truth-conditional semantics is theoretically fruitful, and if so, what
the truth conditions for propositions of law are. He states, for example: "The central difficulty is that the participants [in the realistlanti-realist debate] share a dubious premise about
the natureof truth. Both realist and anti-realist alike believe that the truth of propositionsof
law is a matter of truth conditions." P. 18 (emphases added). Notice the subtle movement
from discussion of the nature of truth to the claim that the truth of propositions of law is a
matter of truth conditions. 'The change in subject matter is greater yet because Patterson,
like Donald Davidson on language in general, see Donald Davidson, Truth and Meaning, 17
SYr'rrmsE 304 (1967), describes the meaning of propositions of law, and not just their truth,
as a matter of truth conditions. Thus, Patterson slides from the nature of truth to the meaning of propositions of law in terms of truth conditions.
A similar conflation occurs on the succeeding page: "The heart of the position I advocate
...is inthe denial of the truth-conditional account of propositions of law. 'True' does not
name a relationship between a state of affairs and a proposition of law. 'True' is best understood disquotationally." P. 19. Here Patterson's movement is in the opposite direction:
from a truth-conditional account of propositions to an account of the nature of the predicate
"true." A similar confusion may occur in Patterson's discussion of H.L.A. Hart. See p. 68,
To inquire under what conditions legal propositions are true is one concern. what a
speaker is doing when he claims that a legal statement or proposition is true is a quite separate issue.
The truth-conditional analysis can be represented as follows:
It is the law in jurisdiction J that p if and only if [fill in truth conditions].
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Patterson would presumably allege, is the natural concomitant or culmination - of the other three gravely mistaken theses that
Patterson detects in modem jurisprudence.
The four positions that Patterson critiques are most at home as a
common-sense theory about the semantics of and nature of truth
respecting everyday objects. Alternatively, these four theses are a
plausible semantics and view of truth for a scientific, physicalistic
world view. For example, one sensible way to understand the
meaning of "grass is green" is to claim that it is true if and only if
grass is a member of the set of green things. This is a truthconditional analysis of the semantics of the sentence "grass is
green" and of the proposition that grass is green. Similarly, the
view that "grass" refers to that green stuff growing in your yard and
requiring constant mowing is reasonable. This is a representational
view of the noun "grass." It is plausible that the sentence "grass is
green" is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact, namely, the fact
that grass is green. This is a weak form of the correspondence theory of truth. Finally, itseems reasonable that the fact that grass is
green is the truth maker that makes the sentence "grass is green"
true, and the proposition that grass is green is true; this is, of course,
an example of the view that truth makers make propositions true.
One theme of Law and Truth is that most modem jurisprudence, especially legal positivism and natural-law moral realism, has
a mistaken view of law because it views law as if it were a natural
science about the external world, whereas law is a normative (rulegoverned) local practice. Patterson rejects these four theses as general theory and devotes Law and Truth to critiquing their application to law.
Patterson, following Bobbitt, rejects the existence of truth makers and maintains that nothing makes propositions of law true: "It
is in the use of the forms of argument that legal propositions are
shown to be true or false." 19 Unfortunately, Patterson does not
The meaning of the truth predicate and the nature of the concept of truth appear to be
entirely different matters. while Patterson might reject this claim, most of us believe that
when we claim that automobiles are heavy, or that Bill's new automobile exceeds ten feet in
length, we are attributing properties to objects. By contrast, when we assert that a legal
sentence or proposition is true, are we doing something similar? Is truth a substantive property of legal propositions, as correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theorists allege? Or
is the attribution of truth to a legal proposition nonsubstantive, as deflationists claim? See
Coleman, supra note 10, at 37-38 (distinguishing the nature of truth from truth-conditional
semantics).
19. P. 137 n.42 (citing Pur, BOBBrrr, CoNsTrrtMoNAL FATE: THEORY o THE
CoNs-rrtn-ON 12 (1982) [hereinafter BoBBrr, CoNsrruoNAL FATE]). Regrettably, the

cited statement is not supported by the cited page. Patterson probably intended to cite
BOBBrrr, CONSTTTONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT,
CoNsTrITmoNAL INTERPRETATIoN]. The forms of arguments are culturally endorsed backPHmip

ings for inferences or warrants from legal grounds to legal claims. For a richer development
of the forms of argument, see infra section I.B.
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provide explicit guidance for determining when a perspective claims
that something makes propositions of law true and when a view
claims that nothing makes propositions of law true. This significant
lacuna engenders difficulty in. assessing Patterson's claimed novel
discovery that all major contemporary jurisprudes except Bobbitt
and himself are committed to the false view that some truth maker
makes propositions of law true. Additionally, Patterson provides
insufficient guidance for his reader to understand just what he and
Bobbitt mean in claiming that nothing makes propositions of law
true.
Part of Patterson's point is that traditional jurisprudence holds
that some factual or nonfactual condition or conditions make propositions of law true. For example, according to Patterson, H.L.A.
Hart's legal positivism alleges that the enactment of a state statute
proclaiming, "No vehicle shall drive on the highway in excess of
fifty-five miles per hour," makes the proposition that it is
prohibited to drive a vehicle on the highway in excess of fifty-five
miles per hour true. I will initially interpret Patterson as alleging, in
contrast, that legal practice, specifically the practice of statutory
interpretation, makes it true that driving over fifty-five miles per
hour is prohibited (pp. 67-68). He states, "[p]ractice, not facts, is
what the truth of legal propositions consists in."'20 The enactment
of the statute, by itself, Patterson urges, does not make any legal
proposition true.21 Only in the context of the practice of statutory
interpretation do we understand the meaning of a statutory act:
Appeal to the text as a mode of justifying one's claim of legal truth is
possible only because textual argument is a recognized mode of legal
justification. Appeal to the text only makes sense in a practice where
the text is accorded justificatory power. Without that presupposition,
appeal to the text would be nothing more than an empty, perhaps
unintelligible, gesture. 22
20. P. 68. I will sophisticate this interpretation infra text accompanying notes 128-29.
21. P. 68. But what about the proposition that the legislature enacted a statute stating:
"No vehicle shall drive on the highway in excess of fifty-five miles per hour"? Does a fact
make that proposition true? Patterson might allege that legal practice determines when a
legislative enactment has occurred. What of the proposition that the code of jurisdiction J,
section X, provides: "No vehicle shall drive on the highway in excess of fifty-five miles per
hour"? Patterson might respond that only jurisdiction J's legal practice determines what constitutes enactments in jurisdiction J and what they provide. Consider now the proposition
that the book in my hand, entitled Code ofJurisdictionJ,contains, at section X, the sentence
token: "No vehicle shall drive on the highway in excess of fifty-five miles per hour." 'This
proposition is true because of our general language and written language practices, and not
due to specifically legal practices, according to practice-based accounts of truth. If Patterson
responds that the above proposition is not a proposition of law, he will likely encounter
difficulty giving an account of what a ground of law is. For further discussion of grounds, see
infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
22. Pp. 95-96 (footnotes omitted); see also p. 64 ("The truth of a proposition of law is the
product of an activity (justification) and is not a matter of correspondence between a proposition and a social fact.").
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Under the circumstances, enactment of the state statute is necessary, but not sufficient, for the truth of the proposition that the
speed limit on the highway is fifty-five miles per hour.32
Several sentences ago, I self-consciously attributed to Patterson
the view that legal practicemakes legal propositions true. Patterson
would reject that description of his view and claim that nothing
makes legal propositions true. But the claim that nothing makes
legal propositions true is obscure, if not downright mysterious.
Patterson repeatedly asserts that propositions of law are shown to
be true by use of the historical, textual, doctrinal, and consequentialist forms of argument employed in legal practice. For example,
in discussing Bobbitt's constitutional jurisprudence, from which
Patterson borrows the idea of forms of argument, he states:
It is essential to understanding Bobbitt's central contention to
realize that there is nothing more to constitutional argument than the
[forms of argument]. As he argues repeatedly, there simply is nothing
more for "philosophy" to do than describe accurately the practice of
constitutional argument, for that practice is constitutional law. If
there is nothing more nor less to constitutional law than the [forms of
argument], then there is nothing more to talk about other than how
the forms are employed to sustain claims that some proposition of law
is either true or false.24
Patterson does not elucidate the crucial distinction between (1) propositions being shown to be true by legal practice, even though
nothing makes them true, and (2) some truth maker making them
true. Nor does he explain how the assertion that nothing makes
propositions of law true is compatible with his claim that
"[p]ractice, not facts, is what the truth of legal propositions consists
in."2s Pending further explanation and demystification of what it
means for nothing to make propositions of law true, I shall provisionally interpret Patterson as holding that legal practice - not fac26
tual or nonfactual conditions - makes propositions of law true.
The overwhelming majority of Law and Truth's 189 pages is
devoted to describing and critiquing contemporary theorists' views.
Patterson approvingly notes that one sympathetic reader describes
the book as "'a work of demolition"' (p. 181). Still, Patterson does
23. P. 68. The statute is not necessary for the truth of the proposition in general. A
federal statute, an administrative act, or even a judicial decision could supply a legal ground
for that proposition in the absence of the state statute. Under the circumstances of the
absence of some other legal ground for the speed limit, the state statute is necessary. Patterson neglects this qualification. P. 68.
24. P. 136 n.39. I have substituted Patterson's phrase "forms of argument" for Bobbitt's
equivalents "modalities" and "modes of argument."
25. P. 68 (footnote omitted); see also pp. 95-96 & nn.143-44.
26. I will argue that this interpretation of Patterson, or a moderately more sophisticated
version of it, moots his criticism of Hart and renders his view consistent with a version of
positivism. See infra text accompanying notes 127-31.
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devote ten pages to a positive account of law and legal truth,27 even
though he rejects the claim that his account is a theory.2 Methodologically, Patterson accepts Wittgenstein's claim that philosophy
cannot provide foundations, but can only leave things as they are.
At its best, philosophy can describe local practice.29 Patterson's
positive view describes American, or perhaps Anglo-American,
legal practice. Its closest methodological analogue is positivist particular jurisprudence, which describes a legal system or a set of
closely related legal systems. 30 In the end, Patterson is counseling
lawyers that, qua lawyers, they can safely ignore philosophy and
stick to their knitting. Put crudely, Patterson's positive account is
that legal truths are the conclusions of legally warranted arguments,
and only careful observation of legal practice will show which arguments are legally warranted.
B. Patterson'sPositive Account of Law and Legal Truth
Patterson claims that certain culturally endorsed practices - he
calls them "forms of argument" - provide the warrant, or inferential connection, between legal claims and their grounds. To oversimplify, the forms of argument are the kinds of arguments in which
lawyers typically engage and which legally educated individuals
consider appropriate to deploy in court or elsewhere to establish
the truth of legal claims. The forms of argument that Patterson recognizes include textual, doctrinal, historical, and prudential (p.
171). Textual argument appeals to the meaning a text has to the
"common, professional reader. '31 Historical argument, Patterson
27. In critiquing others, Patterson foreshadows his own view, so it is partially misleading
to claim that his own account occupies only 10 pages. This is particularly true in light of his
22-page discussion of Bobbitt's constitutional jurisprudence in chapter 7, from which
Patterson borrows the notion of forms of argument, and his 18-page discussion of
postmodem philosophy in chapter 8.
28. See Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth: Replies to Critics,50 SMU L. Rav. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 8, on file with author) (denying that his account amounts to a general theory of truth or even a local 'theory' of legal truth).
29. Indeed, Patterson valorizes the following famous quote from Wittgenstein's
PhilosophicalInvestigations as the epigraph to Law and Truth. "Philosophy may in no way
interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give
it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is." P. 2 (quoting WrrroENSTEIN, supra
note 12, § 124). The same point is repeated in the Afterword to Law and Truth." "[]hen it
comes to law, I wish to leave everything as it is." P. 181.
30. For further description of jurisprudential methodologies, including Patterson's, see
infra text accompanying notes 83-94.
31. P. 66; see also p. 176. At first glance one might think "professional" is limited to
lawyers and the legally educated. But in replying to David Luban, Patterson suggests that
"ordinary citizens can judge for themselves the legitimacy of legal decisions" in part because
they "have access to and understanding" of ordinary textual meaning. Patterson, supra note
28 (manuscript at 14). Yet one wonders how well ordinary citizens, or first-year law students,
understand how text and purpose can combine, like ingredients in a cake, to produce a result
recognizably different from that which either alone would recommend. Witness, for exam-
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claims, appeals to the actual historical intent of the legislature 3 2
Prudential argument is consequentialist, intended to promote a goal
(pp. 131, 137). Doctrinal arguments apply rules developed in precedents (pp. 66-67, 137).
Patterson does not define claims and grounds, and only gives a
few examples. But it appears that claims are conclusions of law and
that grounds are similar to legal positivists' sources
of law, such as
statutes, precedents, and constitutional provisions 33 This curt summary does not do justice to the complexity of Patterson's discussion
of grounds, warrants, and forms of argument, but it will suffice for
our purposes.
As Patterson notes, a form of argument might be applied by
different lawyers to reach opposed conclusions, different forms of
argument might recommend conflicting conclusions, and some
might even question the legitimacy or precise form of a form of
argument (p. 152). So we must complicate the account to accommodate these conflicts.
Patterson maintains that these conflicts are resolved by resort to
Willard Van Orman Quine's brand of coherentist methods, in particular by applying Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation to resolve a conflict by giving up as few of our prior beliefs or practices
pie, how surprised they are to discover that the same words can have different meanings in
different statutes, or even in different parts of the same statute.
32. P. 66. But see pp. 176-79, where Patterson is receptive to William Eskridge's attempt
to argue that 'historical argument' should be responsive to changed social and legal circumstances, and not merely to the intent of the legislature at the time of enactment, particularly
when the legislature's aspiration for a statute would not be furthered by a literal interpretation of the text.
Dworkin's distinction between concrete and abstract intentions may be illuminating. The
legislature's abstract intention in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to
create a color-blind society. At the same time, its concrete intention was to outlaw discrimination based upon race in order to create a color-blind society. Many now believe that the
legislature's abstract intent will not be accomplished by prohibiting race-based, voluntary
affirmative action programs such as those in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979). To the contrary, these individuals believe that permitting such voluntary programs is
essential to the eventual creation of a color-blind society. The legislature's abstract and concrete intentions conflict, and the Court must choose between them. See RONALD DwoRUN,
LAw's Empn'm 329-37 (1986).
33. Pp. 170-71. Patterson derives the distinction between grounds and warrant from
Toulmin. P. 170 n.71. Toulmin describes grounds as data or facts and warrants as principles,
rules, or inference licenses. See S-EPrmN EDErLsoN Toutinm, TnE UsEs OF ARoGumB 97107 (1964). Toulmin concedes that the distinction between grounds and warrants is not absolute or logical. He merely claims that in some situations, two distinct logical functions are
operative. See id. at 99. Given Patterson's deployment of Toulmin's distinction, it is puzzling
that Toulmin asserts that: "This distinction, between data [grounds] and warrants, is similar
to the distinction drawn in the law-courts between questions of fact and questions of law, and
the legal distinction is indeed a special case of the more general one .... " Id. at 100.
Toulmin's description of warrants as rules is in tension with Patterson's critique of H.L.A.
Hart. Patterson claims that the forms of argument cannot be interpreted as a Hartian rule of
recognition because they "are not a rule (or several rules). They are what makes following a
legal rule possible." P. 69. For further discussion of whether the forms of argument could be
a rule of recognition, see infra text accompanying notes 133-40.
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as possible 4 Resolving conflict in a normative enterprise such as
law solely by minimizing change strikes me as wrongheaded. Why
not maximize coherence, if coherence is valued, 35 or maximize
other values? Patterson would remind us that his claim is descriptive, not prescriptive: he alleges that legal practice does resolve
conflicts by resort to Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation. It is
no part of Patterson's thesis that legal practice is perfect and could
not be criticized from the perspective of moral or political theory.
He is claiming only that legally legitimate behavior is a matter of
following the forms of argument of legal practice and of following
the maxim of minimum mutilation to resolve conflicts among the
forms of argument. For Patterson, to assert a legal proposition is to
appraise, commend, or endorse the proposition as justified by the
forms of argument (pp. 70, 152).
C. A Critique of the Forms of Argument
1. Vagueness and the Forms of Argument
a. Introduction. An initial difficulty for Patterson's account of
the forms of argument is how vague his description of them is.
Patterson does not provide a detailed account distinguishing the
different kinds of legal arguments from each other, or from
arguments outside of legal practice. This is intentional. As a
Wittgensteinian, Patterson views legal practice as a linguistic ability,
the mastery of a technique (pp. 70, 169). Someone who has mastered legal language simply sees that X is an historical argument,
that Y is a prudential argument, and that Z is not a legally authoritative argument at all. Still, as Patterson notes in his discussions of
Richard Posner's and William Eskridge's challenges to the historical form of argument, someone might dispute the contours of a
form of argument (pp. 174-78). Such challenges to the traditional
understanding of historical argument raise a conflict between historical argument as the actual intent of the legislature and, in Eskridge's case, historical argument as also responsive to changed
circumstances and present concerns.
34. P. 172; see also W.V. QuinE, FROM STIMULUS TO SCIENCE 49 (1995); W.V. QuNE,
TmE PURsurr OF TRun 15,56 (1992); W.V. Qunm, QUIDDrrES 142 (1987) (describing the
maxim of minimum mutilation).
35. My doubts about the normative value of coherence are elaborated in Larry
Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles,in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHLosoP~sY 279, 308-26 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); Ken Kress, Coherenc4 in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 533, 546-51 (Dennis Patterson
ed., 1996) [hereinafter Kress, Coherence]; Ken Kress, Coherence and Formalism, 16 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY. 639 (1993) [hereinafter Kress, Coherence and Formalism]; Ken Kress,
Coherence and Its Normative Value (Mar. 20, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author) [hereinafter Kress, Coherence and Its Normative Value].
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b. Understanding and Interpretation. For Patterson, adjudicating this conflict moves us from the level of merely understanding
and seeing to the realm of interpretation. When the forms of argument do not conflict, we simply apply them. For Patterson, this is a
simple matter of understanding, which is a linguistic ability, the
mastery of a technique. When controversy arises because the forms
of argument conflict, interpretation is necessary. Oversimplifying,
understanding suffices in easy cases, but interpretation is necessary
in hard cases. As a Wittgensteinian, the distinction between understanding and interpretation is crucial to Patterson's account. It is
the engine driving his main critique of Dworkin and Fish, whom
Patterson characterizes as universal interpretivists who fail to recognize the role of understanding and the correlative limited scope
of interpretation.
At first glance, understanding, as an ability, appears to be a
form of knowing how to. By contrast, interpretation arises at a different level for Patterson, a more explicit and propositional level,
perhaps even a knowing that. The existence of two distinguishable
activities within legal practice, understanding and interpretation,
raises difficult questions about the relationship between them. The
difficulty is compounded because there are legal practices that
appear to be situated on the borderline between understanding and
interpretation and - out of the frying pan into the fire - other
practices that appear to have one foot in understanding and another
in interpretation. One difficulty for Patterson will be distinguishing
mistaken or incompetent applications of a form of argument misunderstandings - from creative and novel deployments of it interpretations.
c. Indeterminacy. The failure to have a precise delineation of
the forms of argument and an explicit, detailed account of when
one application of a form of argument is preferable to another will
suggest to some that Patterson's account is radically indeterminate.
Patterson can respond in three ways. First, legal practice and competent legal practitioners can distinguish correct from incorrect
applications of the forms of argument even though criteria for
doing so cannot be made fully explicit. Second, precise delineation
of the forms of argument may be a historical, not a philosophical,
task (p. 182). Third, insofar as an interpretive dispute about the
precise scope of a form of argument erupts, or the forms of argument conflict, or practitioners disagree about the correct application of a form of argument, the conflict is to be resolved by resort to
Quinean coherentist methods and the maxim of minimum
mutilation.
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Patterson's deployment of Quine's coherentist methodology will
not eliminate indeterminacy, although it may reduce it. As Quine
has famously noted, coherentist methods are indeterminate. 36
Patterson is therefore committed to the claim that law is, at least
partially, indeterminate - there are gaps in the law. So are most
other contemporary jurisprudes. Because many - perhaps most jurisprudes find attractive both weak disquotationalism and partial
indeterminacy, the clash between them has consequences for jurisprudence beyond a criticism of Law and Truth.
Classical legal positivism has its doctrine of hard or unregulated
cases with the resulting exercise of judicial discretion. 37 Depending
upon how many and which moral principles are incorporated into
the law, and whether the incorporated morality always provides
right answers, actual incorporationist positivist legal systems may or
may not have truth-value gaps. At the level of general jurisprudence, however, incorporationist legal positivists are committed to
the prospect of truth-value gaps. 38 In some possible legal systems,
incorporated moral norms will not resolve all hard cases. 39
Even Ronald Dworkin, who famously proposed the controversial right answer thesis in his early work, has backed away from it
- Joseph Raz claims he has "jettisoned" it - in more recent writings. Even in his early middle period, Dworkin conceded the prospect of "rare" or "exotic" truth-value gaps when opposing parties'
arguments were of equal strength.40
36. See W.V. QuINE, WORD AN OBjEcr 26-79 (1960); see also W.V. QuiNE, Speaking of
Objects, in ONTOLOGicAL RELATvITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 1 (1969).

37. See, eg., HART, supra note 14, at 124-54 (discussing judicial discretion); JosEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHoRrY OF LAW 45-46, 96, 172-75, 181-83 (1979) (discussing unregulated disputes).
38. See HART, supra note 14, at 247-48, 250-54; W.J. WALACHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL
PosITIVsM (1994); Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.

139 (1982). Incorporationist legal positivism is described infra text accompanying notes 10917.
39. A possible incorporationist position might deny this position, claiming that all of critical morality is incorporated into all legal systems and that morality resolves all hard cases.
For reasons that I hope are obvious, this view is implausible, and no incorporationist holds
this position as a matter of general jurisprudence. A more plausible position might employ
an interpretivist methodology and claim that the American legal system (or some other)
incorporates all (or enough) critical morality in a way that resolves all legal questions.
40. RONALD DwoRmaw, Appendix: A Reply to Critics [hereinafter DwoRi., Appendix],
in TAING RIoHTs SERIOUSLY 291,334 (1978) [hereinafter DwoRKiN, TAK G RIotrrs SERi.
ousLY]; RoNALD DwoRnaN, Can Rights Be Controversial?,in TAKING RiGHTS SERIOUSLY,
supra, at 279,279; RONALD DWORaiN, Hard Cases, in TAvKIo RIos SERIOUSLY, supra, at

81, 81; Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 30-32 (1978); Coleman,
supra note 10, at 49 ("[Dworkin] has now seen fit to jettison [the right answer thesis]"); Ken
Kress & Scott W. Anderson, Dworkin in Transition, 37 AM. J. Com. L. 337, 340 (1989);
Joseph Raz, Dworkin- A New Link in the Chain, 74 CAT_ L. REv. 1103,1116 (1986) (reviewing RONALD DwouIN, A MArER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)). For the most subdued version of

Dworkin's position, see DwoRxm, supra note 32. But see Ronald Dworkin, Indeterminacy
and Law, in PosrrvisM TODAY 1 (Stephen Guest ed., 1996).
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If law is partly indeterminate, 41 then it appears to follow that
legal truth is not disquotational. The existence of indeterminacy is
inconsistent with Patterson's and others' acceptance of the seemingly innocuous weak disquotational thesis. I digress briefly to
develop the argument. Readers uninterested in this issue may proceed to section I.C.2.
The weak disquotational thesis asserts all instances of the
schema:
"p" is true if and only if p.
Those familiar with Alfred Tarski's semantics will recognize that an
instance of the weak disquotational schema is a Tarski sentence. 42
Tarski maintains that a material adequacy condition of a theory of
truth is entailing the Tarski sentences. 43 Some believe that a theory
that entails the Tarski sentences provides a full theory of meaning. 44
Thus, there is strong support for the truth of the weak disquotational Tarski sentences. Nevertheless, I shall argue that disquotationalism is inconsistent with indeterminacy.
Consider a proposition that lacks a truth-value, that is neither
true nor false but indeterminate. Hart provides the example of
whether it is valid law in England that Parliament - under the doctrine that it may regulate the manner and form of legislation could bind itself not to repeal a minimum wage law for engineers
without approval of the Engineer's Union, thereby in practical
effect limiting the power of future Parliaments, something it could
not straightforwardly accomplish. 45 I shall abbreviate this proposition to "Parliament may bind its successors by indirection."
Then
(1) "Parliament may bind its successors by indirection" is true if and
only if Parliament may bind its successors by indirection.
and
(2) That Parliament may bind its successors by indirection is true if
and only if Parliament may bind its successors by indirection.
both appear to be false! The weak and, a fortiori, the strong disquotational theses are false.
41. I discuss legal indeterminacy in Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. Rlv. 283 (1989)
[hereinafter Kress, Legal Indeterminacy]. "Indeterminacy" is here used metaphysically, not
epistemically. See Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L.
REv. 134, 138-39 (1990) [hereinafter Kress, EpistemologicalIndeterminacy]. For some invalid criticisms of views mistakenly attributed to me, see Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1
LEGAL TrmoRY 481 (1995).
42. See ALFRED TARSKI, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, in LoIC,
SEmANncs, METAMATHEMATncS 152, 154-65 (John Corcoran ed. & J.H. Woodger trans.,
Hackett Publishing Co., 2d ed. 1983) (1956).

43. See id.
at 187-88.
44. See DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 23 (1984).
45. See HART, supra note 14, at 148-54.

HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1889 1996-1997

1890

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1871

The argument is simple. The left-hand side of the disquotational
Tarski sentence differs in truth value from the fight-hand side. If
"Parliament may bind its successors by indirection" is neither true
nor false, but indeterminate, then it is not the case that "Parliament
may bind its successors by indirection" is true. Therefore, "'Parliament may bind its successors by indirection' is true" is false. But
"Parliament may bind its successors by indirection" is neither true
nor false but indeterminate - this is no more than our original
assumption. The two sides of the disquotational Tarski sentence
have different truth values.
In most three-valued logics, which are motivated by modal or
epistemic concerns, the truth table for the biconditional "if and only
if" is Indeterminate (hereinafter "I") if one (or both) of the
sentences on either side of the biconditional has the truth value L
For example, Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic interprets the third
truth value as "possible." Accordingly, "False" (hereinafter "F") if
and only if Indeterminate has the truth value Indeterminate in his
system.46 In essence, Lukasiewicz's system is metaphysically or
ontologically committed only to the two truth values, True (hereinafter "T") and F. Attributing to the sentence p the truth value I
indicates that it is possible that p has the truth value T and that it is
possible that p has the truth value F. Accordingly, modally motivated three-valued logics assign the truth value I to a biconditional
whenever either the right-hand side or the left-hand side (or both)
have the truth value L The intuition behind this is simple. Consider a biconditional sentence with truth values T if and only if L I
could be either T or F. If I is T, then the sentence becomes T if and
only if T, which has the truth value T. Alternatively, I could be F.
But if I is F, then the sentence becomes Tif and only if F, which has
the truth value F. Thus, depending upon whether I is T or F, the
biconditional could be either T or F. In short, it is possible that the
biconditional has the truth value T, and it is possible that the biconditional has the truth value F. But that is just what it means to say
that it has the truth value L A similar argument applies to I if and
only if F, and to I if and only if L
Epistemically motivated modal logics, such as S.C. Kleene's, 47
interpret Indeterminate as a matter of our not knowing whether the
sentence has the truth value T or the truth value F. For reasons
comparable to those described in connection with Lukasiewicz's
system, a biconditional in which either side has the truth value I will
46. See, eg., Jan Lukasiewicz, On the Intuitionistic Theory of Deduction, 14
INDAGATIONES MATREMATCAE 202 (1952); Jan Lukasiewicz, Le principe de contradiction
chez Aristote, BULLETnN INTERNATIONAL DE L'ACADP MIE DES SCIENCES DE CRACOVIE, ANNqE 1910, at 15 (1911).
47. STEn
COLE KLEENE, INTRODUCTION TO METAMATHEMATICS § 64 (1952); S.C.

Kleene, On Notationfor OrdinalNumbers, 3 J. SYMBOUC LoGIc 150 (1938).

HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1890 1996-1997

May 1997]

Jurisprudence and Truth

have the truth value L Under such three-valued logics, my
argument would demonstrate not the falsity of the disquotational
thesis, but rather that it has an indeterminate truth value, as Illustration 1 indicates. This would constitute a serious problem for the
disquotational thesis.
Illustration1
"Parliament may
bind its successors
by indirection"
is true
F

if and only if
if and only if

Tuth Value of Biconditional on
Modal or Epistemic
Interpretation of I

I

luth Value of Biconditional on
Metaphysical Interpretation of I

F

Parliament may
bind its
successors
by indirection.
I

In the case of "Parliament may bind its successors by
indirection," the indeterminate truth value is metaphysically or
ontologically motivated as an actual gap in the law. It is not that we
are uncertain as to whether that proposition is true or false, or that
it is possible that it is true and possible that it is false. We know for
certain, according to Hart, that it is not the case that it is true and
that it is not the case that it is false. It is neither true nor false, but
Indeterminate.48 Under that interpretation, "p if and only if q" is
true just in case p and q have exactly the same truth value.
Therefore, as Illustration 1 indicates, "F if and only if /' has the
truth value F under a metaphysical or ontological interpretation of
the truth value L Such an interpretation takes I seriously
ontologically as a third truth value that exists on a par with T and F.
By comparison, the modal and epistemic three-valued logics,
discussed above, take I seriously semantically as a third truth value
on a par with T and F, but not ontologically. I simply means that it
could be T or F, or that we do not know whether it is T or F.
The falsity of the disquotational thesis in the case of the truthvalue gaps is a serious problem for the disquotational thesis. But
the problem should not be overstated. This difficulty with truthvalue gaps does not necessarily demonstrate the complete
inadequacy of the disquotational thesis or demonstrate that belief
in it is unjustified. Before reaching those conclusions we would
need to consider and compare alternative theories of truth.
48. Of course, if Parliament attempts to bind a future Parliament not to repeal a
minimum-wage law for engineers without the approval of the Engineer's Union, this attempt
may be tested in the courts. Once the courts have spoken, what was formerly Indeterminate
will become either true or false. I am considering the situation before that proposition has
been tested in the courts.
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Moreover, before rejecting disquotationalism we would need to
consider its virtues and other deficiencies. Indeed, the crux of the
matter would require determining whether disquotationalism or
some substantive theory of truth - such as correspondence,
coherence, or pragmatism - provides a better explanation of our
truth-related practices, beliefs, and dispositions. Finally, we would
need to reexamine the claim that law contains truth-value gaps.
Perhaps upon reexamination that thesis will prove less supportable
than the conventional wisdom would have us believe.
2. Do the Forms of Argument Constitute a Coherent Practice?
A serious concern about the forms of argument is whether there
is a coherent practice that undergirds them. The point can be
illustrated most powerfully in constitutional law because constitutional interpretation 49 is so controversial, although the same concerns, mutatis mutandis, arise respecting precedent and statutory
interpretation. According to Bobbitt, there are six forms of argument in constitutional law: historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential,
structural (inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it creates), and ethical (deriving rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos
that are reflected in the Constitution). 5 0
Some lawyers and judges decide constitutional issues with reference to historical intent only. Others decide constitutional questions solely with reference to the plain meaning of the Constitution.
Still others combine these methods. Yet others decide constitutional issues based upon prudential considerations alone. Some
deploy all six forms of constitutional argument. Others accept only
four. Yet others, a different four. Still other lawyers may be expedient, deploying one or another form or combination of forms as
suits their present purpose. A sociology of the practice of constitutional lawyers may conclude that constitutional law does not
amount to a coherent practice. If these are the facts of practice,
then an explanation needs to be given as to why all six forms are
legitimate must be provided, given that for nearly every form, there
are some apparently competent practitioners who would reject that
form.
Another way of looking at this difficulty would be to consider
proposals for new forms of argument. Someone proposes that ref49. "Constitutional interpretation" is employed here in its ordinary legal sense - not in
Patterson's restricted usage of "interpretation" as being required only when the forms of
argument conflict.
50. P. 137 (citing (incorrectly) BOBnTrI, CONSTnONAL FATE, supra note 19, at 12-13).
Patterson must have intended to cite BOnBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra
note 19, at 12-13.
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erence to social morality is a legitimate form of constitutional argument. Someone else proposes that reference to critical morality is
legitimate. Some of these claims have support among legal practitioners, including in their legal practices, but they do not command
universal or near-universal compliance. How do we determine
when a form of argument is legitimate? More needs to be said
about when a form of argument is legally legitimate because determining the full list of legal forms of argument will make a difference
to which legal propositions are warrantedly assertible by the forms
of argument and are therefore commendable as legally true.
3. Patterson'sInterpretive Coherentism
Patterson claims that when the forms of argument conflict, the
conflict is resolved by deploying Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation as an interpretive technique: resolve the conflict by changing
as few previously held beliefs or practices as possible (p. 172). Yet
Patterson's examples of interpretive resolution to conflicts or challenges to a form of argument do not clearly exemplify minimizing
change. At times, they appear to illustrate maximizing coherence,
or maximizing legal values generally, including coherence (pp. 17279). Moreover, coherence is a notoriously difficult notion to pin
down. 51 Patterson does not provide an account of coherence, or of
the two most plausible candidates for its analysis, monism and pluralism with relations of support among the principles and norms of
the theory.52 In the absence of an account of coherence, the full
import of Patterson's examples of, and account of, interpretation
remains elusive. Because understanding these considerations is
facilitated in concrete context, I elaborate upon them below in connection 3 with Patterson's discussion of United Steelworkers v.
Weber.5
Indeed, in comparison to his otherwise atheoretical
Wittgensteinian instincts, Patterson's account of interpretation as
coherentist conservatism appears excessively theoretical and insufficiently descriptive. Patterson is not advocating the coherentist
maxim of minimum mutilation as a prescription for law, but as a
description of legal interpretation in the face of controversy. So
shouldn't we, as Wittgenstein urges, go out and see what lawyers
and judges do, rather than armchair philosophize? Just as we raised
a concern about whether there is a coherent practice underlying
51. Or so it has appeared to me on the occasions when I have attempted it. See Kress,
Coherence,supra note 35, at 539-46; Kress, Coherence and Formalism,supranote 35, at 650-

66.
52. See Kress, Coherence and Formalism,supra note 35 at 657-58, 663-66; Kress, Coherence, supra note 35, at 542-46. See generally Kress, Coherence and Its Normative Value,
supra note 35.
53. 443 U.S. 193 (1979); see infra text accompanying notes 121-26.
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Bobbitt's and Patterson's forms of argument, and a method by
which to resolve disagreements about whether an argument form is
a legitimate form of argument, so there is a heightened concern
about whether - in the face of conflicts among forms of argument
- there is a coherent practice for resolving those conflicts.
I suspect that a well-designed empirical study would find that
different practitioners resolve controversial cases requiring
Pattersonian interpretation by different methods. Some may follow
the maxim of minimum mutilation. Others may maximize coherence. Those who do maximize coherence may maximize differing
conceptions of coherence. Others may simply do what they think is
right, or what they think critical morality would recommend.
Others may follow the dictates of social morality. Still others may
try to induce a set of principles that underlies legal practice and
apply those principles to the case at hand. Once again, some practitioners will act expediently, inconsistently applying different techniques as suits their current purpose. No doubt, still other
techniques are practiced. We have no reason to think that most
judges and lawyers resolve hard cases in similar ways, or that interpretation forms a coherent practice. One of the appealing aspects
of Dworkin's theory of law is his recognition of how thoroughly
controversial it is, particularly with respect to theories of precedent,
statutory and constitutional interpretation,
and even more so as
54
such theories are applied in hard cases.
D. Locating Patterson'sAccount of Legal Truth in
PhilosophicalSpace
There are three main types of theories of truth: metaphysical,
justificatory, and speech-act theories.5 5 These categories are not
mutually exclusive. Metaphysical theories include extensional theories such as the semantic theories of Alfred Tarski 56 and Saul
Kripke. 57 These semantical theories attempt to build materially
adequate definitions of the truth of sentences from their structure
and the references of their parts. While correspondence and coherence theories are occasionally presented as materially equivalent
metaphysical theories, more frequently they purport to provide the
essence or meaning of truth. Most metaphysical theories purport to
explain what constitutes truth. The second type of truth theory is
the justificatory, and includes coherence, pragmatist, and war54. See DwonmN, supra note 32, at 11; see also Ken Kress, The Interpretive Trin, 97
ETmcs 834, 835-38 (1987) (reviewing DwoRtN, supra note 32).
55. See RIcHARD L. KnwxAm, TimoRiEs OF TRuTH: A CRMCAL INTHODUCrON 37 tbl.
1.1 (1992). See generally id. at 20-40.
56. See TA sia, supra note 42.
57. See Saul Kripke, Outline of a Theory of Truth, 72 L PHIL 690 (1975).
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ranted-assertibility theories. Some theories, for example Brand
Blanshard's coherentism 58 and William James's pragmatism, 59 are
advanced as both metaphysical and justificatory theories of truth.
Justificatory theories of truth are often closely related to epistemic
theories of justified belief.
The last category of truth theories encompasses speech-act theories. Speech-act theories include Peter Strawson's performative
theory, 60 according to which the utterance of "'snow is white' is
true" affirms "snow is white" but does not assert anything, and
Alan White's appraisal theory. 61 Speech-act theories also include
deflationist and disquotational accounts such as Patterson's account
for law. In addition, Patterson's account includes an appraisal,
commendation, or endorsement aspect (pp. 70, 152), which he
regrettably never elaborates.
Although Patterson rejects this label, many will read Law and
Truth as advocating a warranted-assertibility theory of legal truth
and therefore as being a justificatory account as well as a deflationist account. 62 At first sight, this may seem inconsistent, since a nonsubstantive deflationism appears to be married to a substantive
warranted-assertibility account. Patterson might claim that he has
an appraisal/commendation, deflationist account of legal truth that
commends legal propositions as true when they are warrantedly
assertible but does not have a warranted-assertibility theory of legal
truth simpliciter.
But there is another way of reconciling Law and Truth's nonsubstantive deflationism with a substantive warranted-assertibility
theory. In another context, Richard Rorty has suggested that those
who put forward justificatory and warranted-assertibility theories of
truth frequently have something else in mind. 63 They may believe
that the traditional conception of truth is hopeless, particularly in
metaphysically robust versions such as the traditional correspondence theory of truth. Because developing a theory of truth is
unworkable, they develop a theory of warranted-assertibility or justified belief as the next best thing, but confusingly describe it as a
theory of truth.64 Richard Kirkham, author of the most compre58. See 2 BRAND BrAsHAR~D, TnE NATURE OF THOUGHT 212-331 (1940).
59. See WmLLAm JAMFS, THm MEANING OF TRtum (Fredson Bowers & Ignas K.

Skrupskelis eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1975) (1909).
60. See P.F. Strawson, Truth in PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, ETmcs AN

LOGIC 129

(Aristotelian Socy. Supp. Vol. 24, 1950).
61. See Alan R. white, Truth as Appraisal 66 MIND 318 (1957).
62. See, eg., David Luban, Lawyers Rule. A Comment on Patterson's Theories of Truth,
50 SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming 1997); George A. Martinez, On Law and Truth, 72 NoTRE
DAME L. Rnv. 883, 895-96 (1997) (reviewing Law and Truth).

63. See RicHIAR RoRTY, PMLosoPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATuRE 280 (1979).

64. See id.
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hensive recent book on theories of truth, nicely elaborates Rorty's
insight:
[A]s Richard Rorty has noticed, the truth-as-justification thesis, as I
shall call it, is often asserted as a roundabout way of expressing some
other doctrine. Sometimes it is an odd way of expressing the thesis
that there really is no legitimate philosophical program in which a
theory of truth could play a role; hence, we really do not need a theory of truth, distinct from a theory of justification.... Sometimes too
the truth-as-justification thesis is meant only to express
the claim that
truth is a vacuous concept while justification is not.65
Nonetheless, whether interpreted as a warranted-assertibility
theory of truth, or a deflationist, appraisal account rooted in a linguistic ability or technique to endorse legal propositions as justified
by the forms of argument, the justificatory aspect of Patterson's
view is, at least initially, plausible. Law is an assertive and argumentative practice. 66 In one of his earliest articles, Dworkin
claimed that "a legal obligation exists whenever the case supporting
such an obligation . . .is stronger than the case against it."67
Whatever their plausibility as general theories of truth, justificatory
accounts are especially at home in law and in adversarial legal
systems.
In this Part, I have described Patterson's account of what it
means to say that a proposition of law is true in terms of the forms
of argument and in terms of conservative coherentist methods for
resolving conflicts between forms of argument. I have briefly
described Patterson's Wittgensteinian distinction between understanding and interpreting. I have raised concerns about whether
the imprecision of his description of the forms of argument leads to
radical indeterminacy and concluded that responses available to
Patterson may reduce - but not entirely eliminate - the indeterminacy of the law on his account. In itself, moderate indeterminacy
is not a criticism; most legal theorists acknowledge its existence. 68
TWo criticisms that I have urged are that the forms of argument and
the technique for resolving conflicts among them may not amount
to coherent practices. Patterson's deployment of Quine's maxim of
65. Km uimM,supranote 55, at 49 (citation omitted). Similarly, William Alston recently
noted:
One thing we need to consider is what reasons epistemic theorists have for preferring
their account of truth to a realist view. Actually, apart from some bald statements that it
is implausible to think of truth as conceptually independent of rational acceptability and
the like, those reasons are confined to reasons for rejecting a realist conception, along
with a tacit assumption that epistemic accounts are the only alternative.
WILLIAM P. ALSTON, A REAT CONCEMON OF TRUTH 190 (1996).
66. P. 170; see also DwORmN, supra note 32, at 13.
67. RONALD DwoRUN, The Model Rules I, in TAmINo RxmUs SmuousLy, supra note 40,
at 14, 44.
68. See, e.g., Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 41, at 285-97 (arguing that moderate
indeterminacy does not undermine law's moral legitimacy).
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minimum mutilation to resolve conflicts thus appears excessively
theoretical, and insufficiently empirical, in comparison to
Patterson's otherwise atheoretical Wittgensteinian methodology.
I have also urged that disquotationalism and the existence of
legal indeterminacy in some cases -

both plausible views -

are

incompatible.
II.

Dwomcm, SEMANTIcs, AND TRUTH MAKERS

Patterson accurately quotes Dworkin as having, on numerous
occasions, stated that a theory of law is a theory of truth conditions
for propositions of law, and that propositions of law are true in virtue of their grounds. 69 Yet Dworkin does not much care whether
one uses the term "true" or the word "sound." More important,
Dworkin rejects definitional, necessary, and sufficient truthconditional semantics for the term "law," weaker criterial
approaches, and meaning-as-use perspectives, which Dworkin views
as rough equivalents. 7° In its place, Dworkin famously recommends interpretation of local social practices, including law.71
Dworkin is also infamous for simultaneously maintaining some
form of modest objectivity with the right answer thesis, while
attempting to squirm out of any metaphysical commitments. First,
Dworkin claims that legal argument is a special kind of moral argument. Second, Dworkin urges that moral truth depends upon moral
reasons and moral argument, which are themselves a matter of
moral practice. Dworkin denies that moral truth depends upon correspondence to moral facts that are part of the metaphysical furniture of the universe.7 2
Ironically, Dworkin's and Patterson's attraction to practiceoriented accounts of law suggests that there is a deep methodological similarity between their jurisprudences, despite surface disagreements. Viewed in this light, Patterson and Dworkin disagree
about what constitutes legal practice. They agree that law is a justificatory and argumentative practice; they disagree about which
arguments are authoritatively sanctioned. Patterson claims that
legal practice consists in argument warranted by the culturally endorsed forms of argument - historical, doctrinal, textual, and prudential.7 3 Dworkin claims that legal argument attempts to show
legal practice in the best light by interpreting law as what follows
69. See, eg., DwomcIN, supra note 32, at 4-5.
70. See id. at 31-44.
71. See id. at 45-76.
72. See iL at 76-85; Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25
Pn. & PuB. AxF. 87 (1996).
73. For a description of these forms of argument, see supra text accompanying notes 30-
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from the most morally appealing, coherent scheme of principles exemplifying a single vision of justice, due process, and fairness, and
which also justifies the bulk of the settled law.74
Patterson's criticism of Dworkin for appealing, at least in part,
to critical morality as a transcendent truth maker, as a "something"
that makes legal propositions true, is problematic (p. 8). Dworkin
does not conceive of moral 'facts' as existing transcendentally on a
par with naYve realism's view of physical facts. Dworkin, like
Patterson, is developing a practice-based account of law. Contrary
to what Patterson claims, Dworkin's critique of hard-facts positivism - because it requires complete agreement among practitioners
that a proposition is law, or else it declares the proposition not authoritatively binding - does not 'show that Dworkin appeals to
practice-transcendent facts (p. 8). It only shows that he rejects
hard-facts positivism's conception of law as complete agreement
among competent practitioners.
What Patterson needs to demonstrate is that legal practice does
not countenance appeal to critical moral principles in the special
way Dworkin asserts the law requires. Patterson can point to
judges' and lawyers' denials that their arguments depend on morality. Instead of arguing that it would be morally desirable or
required that their client prevail, lawyers argue that the law demands it. Instead of appealing to moral principles, practitioners
claim to appeal to public policy and authoritatively binding purposes. But what lawyers say they do, and what they in fact do, may
well differ. Judges avoid acknowledging their legislative activities,
except under the guise of cases of first impression. No doubt this
helps them to preserve political capital and avoids erosion of their
perceived legitimacy. Judges might avoid confessing the role morality plays in their decisionmaking for analogous reasons. Moreover,
judges frequently appear to be appealing to moral principles, however they describe those appeals. 75
Dworkin does not assert that legal propositions are decided by
appeal to a transcendent truth maker independent of our beliefs
and social practices. The 'something' that Dworkin partially
appeals to as a truth maker, critical morality, is for Dworkin itself
determined by our practice of moral argument.
To be sure, there is a substantial disagreement remaining
between Patterson and Dworkin. It is the same question that
74. See DwoxmN, Appendix, supra note 40, at 340-42, 360; Alexander & Kress, supra
note 35, at 287-88, 311; Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity and the LinearOrder of Decisions,72 CAL. L. REv. 369, 37779 (1984).
75. For a helpful discussion of an analogous issue in the Hart-Dworkin debate, see Jules
L. Coleman, Book Review, 66 CAT. L. REv. 885,892 (1978) (reviewing DwoaRmN, supranote
40).

HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1898 1996-1997

May 1997]

Jurisprudenceand Truth

1899

divides Dworkin and Raz, and Dworkin and nonincorporationist
readings of Hart: Is appeal to critical moral principles legally
authorized in judicial law application? Is such appeal part of legal
practice?
In short, on the questions of truth makers and the nature of
legal practice, Patterson misframes the issue separating Dworkin
and himself. In consequence, his critique is largely irrelevant and
unsuccessful.
III. PATTERSON AND LEGAL PosrrvisM

A. Introduction
This Part examines Patterson's discussion of legal positivism to
assess his claim that modem jurisprudence is mistaken because it
adheres (1) to a truth-conditional semantics, (2) to a representationalist semantics, (3) to the correspondence theory of truth, and
(4) to the view that some truth maker makes propositions of law
true.76 Although Patterson criticizes several contemporary jurisprudential theories on these four grounds, his argument is most
explicit and fully developed in his attack on positivism. 77
For Patterson's critique to carry critical bite, he must show not
merely that positivism holds the above theories and goes awry
because of them. Rather, Patterson must show that positivism is
committed to these theses and would be a significantly different and inferior - theory if it attempted to subtract them from the rest
of its theoretical commitments. Otherwise, Patterson's critique
amounts to a friendly amendment to positivism. Similarly, it will
not suffice to show merely that there is a plausible reading according to which one positivist might have held these views.
Patterson attacks legal positivism by critiquing his reading of
H.L.A. Hart's views. 78 While Patterson is perhaps on shaky ground
in describing one positivist's views, rather than positivism generally,
given Hart's prominence, this procedure may perhaps be forgiven.
Dworkin, you may recall, developed his initial argument against
positivism by attacking positivism generally, employing Hart's version only when a specific target was necessary. 79
76. Only in passing does Patterson critique Hart as a representationalist beyond his criticisms of the other three views. See, eg., p. 70.
77. For example, since Ernest Weinrib holds a coherence theory of truth, Patterson criticizes Weinrib not because he holds the correspondence theory, but rather because Weinrib
does not argue that the version of coherentism that he advocates is superior to alternative
coherentist theories of truth. Pp. 32-35. Patterson also urges that legal concepts and objects
generally are not truth makers independent of their functions and roles within our way of life
- in Wittgenstein's overblown phrase, in our "form of life." P. 38. Put differently, Patterson
critiques Weinrib for failing to recognize the social construction of reality. Pp. 39-42.
78. That is, he critiques those views as they are elaborated in HART, supra note 14.
79. See Dwo=aN,supra note 67, at 17, 22.
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In this Part, I argue that Patterson misreads Hart and positivism
in ways that undercut his critique. Specifically, he misinterprets
Hart and positivism as committed to a pedigree test for law that
countenances as criteria of legal validity only simple social facts,
such as whether a legislature has duly enacted a particular statute.
To the contrary, Hart has explicitly rejected the strict pedigree test,
and even if Hart were committed to it, legal positivism is not. Second, I demonstrate that Hart rejects necessary and sufficient truthconditional semantics, but acknowledge that his views are consistent with a weaker criterial truth-conditional semantics. Third, I
demonstrate that theories of law and legal validity have no entailments for theories of legal truth. Thus, Hart's theory of law is consistent with nearly any theory of legal truth: including coherence,
correspondence, warranted assertibility, and deflationist. Since
Hart never spoke to the issue of his views of legal truth, and his
theory of legal validity is consistent with many theories of legal
truth, pinning the correspondence theory on him is unjustified.
Finally, I claim that even if Hart were committed to the correspondence theory of truth and to the existence of truth makers, that
would not undercut either of positivism's two major theses: the logical separation of law and morals and the claim that law and its
authority are matters of social fact. Indeed, I urge, in essence, that
Patterson's view of what makes propositions of law true is similar
to, if not identical to, a version of particular positivism's.
B. Patterson'sDescription of H.L.A. Hart's Legal Positivism
Patterson claims that in The Concept of Law Hart advances
both an account of the idea of a legal system (this is correct) and a
theory of adjudication (this is incorrect) (p. 59).
In The Concept of Law, Hart provides a general jurisprudential
account of a mature, municipal legal system. That is, Hart is providing a conceptual account of all possible, mature legal systems.
Although it is frequently misinterpreted as a theory of adjudication,
Chapter 7 of The Concept of Law is better understood as a defense
of Hart's crucial concepts of rules and rule-guided behavior against
skeptical attacks. In prior chapters, Hart argues in numerous places
that Austin's ontology is too meager: in addition to Austinian habits, a theoretical understanding of law requires understanding rules
and rule-guided behavior. Hart defines law as the union of primary
rules about behavior and secondary rules about rules, including the
rule of recognitions 0 The concept of a rule is crucial to Hart's
account of law. If rules and rule-following behavior are incoherent
or unintelligible, Hart's theory fails. Hart therefore seeks to
80. See

HART, supra note 14, at 98.
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demonstrate that rules are not metaphysically mysterious - as
Austinians might urge. Hart also defends rules against legal realists' claims that law is indeterminate because rules do not and cannot function in law and because rules cannot determine judicial
decisions.
Chapter 7 is entitled "Formalism and Rule-Skepticism," not "A
Theory of Adjudication." The last two sentences of the prior chapter are:
This aspect of law is often held to show that any elucidation of the
concept of law in terms of rules must be misleading. To insist on it in
the face of the realities of the situation is often stigmatized as 'conceptualism' or 'formalism',
and it is to the estimation of this charge that
81
we shall now turn.
In fact, Hart believes that there are so many differences and so few
similarities in the practices of adjudication of particular legal systems that any general legal positivist theory of adjudication would
be nearly vacuous.82
C. JurisprudentialMethodology
Indeed, positivist jurisprudential methodology in general, and
Hart's methodology in particular, differs from Patterson's, or
Ronald Dworkin's, in ways that are crucial to fully understanding
disputes among those theories. Hart consistently maintains that his
enterprise is descriptive and conceptual, even though it describes a
normative phenomenon.8 3 Positivist methodology countenances
both particular and general jurisprudence. Particular jurisprudence
describes a legal system such as that of the United States, or a set of
closely related legal systems, such as those constituting AngloAmerican law. Alternatively, it may describe a legal concept within
a legal system. Hart and Honor6's Causationin the Law is an exercise in particular jurisprudence, describing causation in AngloAmerican law.84 Typically, hornbooks are exercises in particular
jurisprudence.
Most examples of legal positivist jurisprudence, and Hart's The
Concept of Law in particular, are exercises in general jurisprudence. This enterprise "is not tied to any particular legal system or
legal culture, but seeks to give an explanatory and clarifying
account of law as a complex social and political institution with a
rule-governed (and in that sense 'normative') aspect."85 General
81. Id.at 120-21.
82. Interview with H.L.A. Hart, formerly Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University,
in Berkeley, Cal. (1988). Joseph Raz agrees: "Adjudicative institutions vary greatly from
one country to another." RAP.,supra note 37, at 180.
83. See HART, supra note 14, at 239-44.
84. H.L.A. HART & ToNY HONopt, CAUSATION iN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
85. HART, supra note 14, at 239.
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jurisprudence attempts to describe all possible legal systems,
thereby providing a conceptual understanding of law.
By contrast, Dworkin's interpretive methodology is tied to a
particular legal culture, or a few closely related ones. Thus,
Dworkin interprets American or Anglo-American legal practice.
Additionally, Dworkin rejects conceptual and criterial semantics
and analyses of social practices, including law, as misguided because
they lead to the semantic sting's conclusion that theoretical disagreement about law is impossible.86 In its place, Dworkin advocates a version of interpretation with both descriptive and morally
evaluative aspects. Dworkin interprets law -as those propositions
that follow from the morally best set of principles that meet or
exceed a set threshold of fit with the settled law.87 Unlike positivism's methodology, Dworkin's is not purely descriptive or
conceptual.
Patterson's philosophical account of law, like Dworkin's interpretive account, is tied to a particular legal culture. Like Hart,
however, Patterson's enterprise appears to be a certain kind of
descriptive account, and neither a prescription for nor an interpretation of legal practice. Patterson's jurisprudential methodology is
closer to particular jurisprudence than to general jurisprudence or
to Dworkinian interpretation. Patterson also rejects traditional
semantics as applied88 to legal language, but for different reasons
than Dworkin does.
Legal positivists, including Jeremy Bentham, J.L. Austin, H.L.A.
Hart, and Joseph Raz, but excluding Steven Burton8 9 and possibly
Jules Coleman, 90 develop their theories as theories of the existence
conditions for a legal system and for the identification of its general
propositions of law. Hart famously argued that a legal system exists
only when there is a practice among its officials - particularly
judges - of identifying general propositions of law by means of a
generally unstated rule of recognition.91
By contrast, Dworkin, Burton, Patterson, and perhaps Coleman
can be understood as developing accounts of law grounded in legal
86. See DwomuN, supra note 32, at 31-46. I describe and critique the semantic sting in
Kress, supra note 54, at 836-38, 852-59.
87. See DwognxN, Appendix, supra note 40, at 340-41, 360; DwoRuuN, supra note 32, at
vii, 225.
88. I do not accept Dworkin's and Patterson's attributions of traditional semantic theories to positivism, and in particular to Hart. See Kress, supra note 54, at 852-54; infra text
accompanying notes 107-112.
89. See STEVEN J. BURTON, J3umcIN GOOD FA=TH at xv-xvi (1992).
90. See Coleman, supra note 38.
91. See HART, supra note 14, at 91-98. Hart also claims that general - but not universal
- obedience to laws valid under the rule of recognition is a necessary condition for the
existence of a legal system. See id. at 113.
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reasoning or theories of adjudication. A positivist theory of legal
systems and general propositions of law must be supplemented with
a, theory of adjudication to provide a complete explanation of
authoritative judicial behavior. Regrettably, positivists rarely provide a theory of adjudication. One reason for this, as we have seen,
is that Hart and other positivists are engaged in general jurisprudence yet believe that a general jurisprudential theory of adjudication would be vacuous because particular legal systems' theories of
adjudication vary so greatly. A second reason is the difficulty positivism has in developing even particular theories of adjudication
and interpretation. As a theory of the official acts of legally authoritative actors such as ratifiers, legislators, and judges, positivism is
more plausible as a theory of enactments, which have canonical formulations, than of precedents, or lines of precedent, the import of
which is often controversial. To the extent that positivism is a conventionalist account of law, grounded in social agreement, it has
traditionally had difficulty explaining how law exists in the face of
controversy.9
Moreover, the positivist theory of the limits of law holds that
authoritative legal standards run out in hard or unregulated cases,
requiring judges to exercise a legislative discretion to create law to
fill the gap. Thus, positivists distinguish judicial law application
from judicial law creation. As a consequence, theories of adjudication for these traditional positivists will need to be bifurcated: judicial law creation may well require different methods from those
judicial application of law requires. For example, Raz maintains
that in regulated cases, judges must follow binding legal standards,
while acknowledging that the meaning of such standards may be
difficult to determine.93 However, in unregulated cases, where
binding legal standards are indeterminate, Raz maintains that the
law prescribes that judges should decide in accordance with critical
morality. 94
These distinctions are significant for evaluating Patterson's critique of positivism. The case which Patterson will deploy against
positivism, United Steelworkers v. Weber,95 Hart probably would
consider to be a hard case, one in which the law does not determine
the answer. Hart could claim that Weber could be decided only by
the exercise of judicial discretion, that is, by the creation of new law
by the Supreme Court. Patterson's apparent presupposition that
the forms of argument showed the majority position to be true 92. RoNALD DwoucmN, The Model of Rules II, in TAKING RIGHTS
note 40, at 46, 49-58. But see Coleman, supra note 38.
93. See RAZ, supranote 37, at 113.
94. See id.
95. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).

SERIOUSLY,
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prior to the decision - would be denied by Hart's positivism. Hart
would claim there was a truth-value gap in the law prior to the decision. Patterson might maintain that the argument in the majority
opinion or in Blackmun's concurring opinion showed the legal
proposition that Kaiser's voluntary affirmative action program is
permissible to be true via the forms of argument prior to the decision, and thus constituted law prior to the decision. If Patterson
takes this tack, Hart could claim that Patterson commits the genetic
fallacy of assuming that anything judges do is law application,
thereby obscuring their role as lawmakers in hard cases. 96
Patterson claims that, in Hart's view, "the legal system is a system of social rules" (p. 59). This is a mistake. The rule of recognition, the master test for legal validity, is a social rule, according to
Hart, because it meets his criteria for being a social rule: it is generally followed by judges, who deploy it as a ground for criticism, and
who accept it from the internal point of view. 97 More precisely, the
rule of recognition is a social rule - or is so regarded - because it
meets the criteria Hart specifies, and is legally authoritativebecause
it is the master rule followed by legal officials, particularly judges,
for determining which other norms are legally valid. Put differently, the authority of the rule of recognition depends upon a social
practice among judges. The authority of all other legal norms
depends upon their meeting the criteria of validity specified by the
rule of recognition. Although a lower norm that is valid because it
meets the criteria of validity set forth in the rule of recognition may
also meet the criteria for being a social rule, this need not be the
case for all valid lower norms. In general, lower norms will not be
social rules.
Patterson attributes to Hart a strict, pedigree sources thesis (pp.
63, 69, 70). As elaborated by Patterson, the sources thesis means
that the rule of recognition's criteria of validity are limited to social
facts. Moreover, according to Patterson, the social facts that are the
rule of recognition's criteria of validity are simple tests of pedigree
or origins (pp. 63, 69, 70): Was the author of this norm legally
authoritative? Was this piece of legislation promulgated as authorized by the Constitution? Patterson also reads the sources thesis as
entailing that the truth of propositions of law depends only upon
social facts, such as the authoritative acts of judges, legislators, and
ratifiers.
Hart rejects a strict, pedigree sources thesis in favor of
incorporationist positivism. Hart holds that the criteria for legal
validity in the rule of recognition may go beyond social facts and
explicitly incorporate critical moral criteria. Thus, an incorpora96. See infra text accompanying notes 114-20.
97. See HART, supra note 14, at 55-57, 105-10.
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tionist such as Hart allows that the law may not be identifiable
solely on the basis of social facts, but may require reference to
moral facts in addition to social facts.
In a footnote, Patterson quotes Hart's assertion of incorporationism (p. 60 n.9). Yet Patterson fails to note that Hart's
incorporationism means that he rejects the strict, pedigree sources
thesis.98
Reading the rule of recognition to require only pedigree sources
of law is a misreading of Hart and positivism fostered by
Dworkin. 99
In the postscript to the second edition of The Concept of Law,
which Patterson cites,100 Hart explicitly denies that the rule of recognition's test for legal validity is a test of pedigree:
Dworkin in attributing to me a doctrine of 'plain-fact positivism'
has mistakenly treated my theory as not only requiring (as it does)
that the existence and authority of the rule of recognition should
depend on the fact of its acceptance by the courts, but also as requiring (as it does not) that the criteria of legal validity which the rule
provides should consist exclusively of the specific kind of plain fact
which he calls 'pedigree'matters and which concern the manner and
form of law-creation or adoption. This is doubly mistaken. First, it
ignores my explicit acknowledgement that the rule of recognition may
incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive values; so my doctrine is what has been called 'soft
positivism' and not as in Dworkin's version of it 'plain-fact' positivism. Secondly, there is nothing in my book to suggest that the plainfact criteria provided by the rule of recognition must be solely matters
of pedigree; they may instead be substantive constraints on the content of legislation such as the [First] or Nineteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution respecting the establishment of religion or abridgements of the right to vote. 101
Hart's incorporationism countenances moral criteria as well as
social criteria for legal validity under the rule of recognition.
Incorporationism generally permits that moral criteria be incorporated into constitutional provisions such as the Eighth Amendment,
Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause, or in a statute or
98. Whatever one may think of Hart's posthumous claim that he held the incorporationist
thesis and not the sources thesis as early as 1958 in his debate with Fuller and that he reiterated incorporationism in the first edition of The Concept of Law, it was clear by the mid1980s that Hart was an incorporationist. See HART, supra note 14, at 247-48,250-54; Joseph
Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 THE MoNIsT 295, 295-96 (1985). Raz, who was in
nearly daily contact with Hart, attributes to Hart the incorporationist thesis in opposition to
Raz's strict sources thesis.
99. Patterson's attributions to Hart of a pedigree test for legality are either unsupported,
or cite to Dworkin's own misreading of Hart. Pp. 63, 69.
100. See pp. 59 n.2, 60 n.9, 62 n.163.
101. HART, supra note 14, at 250 (emphasis added).
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precedent.10 2 Where morality is incorporated into the law, the
validity and identification of the law may require reference to both
moral and social facts.
Nevertheless, incorporationist positivists can maintain the crucial positivist-thesis that there is no necessary connection between
law and morality. First, they maintain that morality enters law only
contingently, in some possible legal systems, but not all. More
importantly, they hold that the legal authority of moral considerations does not depend on their truth as a matter of morality, but
upon having been made authoritative by some authoritative social
fact such as ratification or enactment like the Eighth Amendment,
Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause, or by an interpretive convention among judges.
Patterson misreads Hart and positivism as committed to sourcebased pedigree criteria of validity under the rule of recognition.
Hart rejects pedigree criteria in favor of incorporationist positivism.
Even if Hart were committed to a strict source-based criteria of
validity, legal positivism is not. Additionally, I will urge in the next
section that Patterson may misread the role of the rule of recognition within positivist general jurisprudence. Finally, Patterson
attributes to Hart a theory of adjudication that Hart rejects as
impossible as a matter of general jurisprudence. As we shall soon
see, these misreadings of Hart and positivism significantly undermine Patterson's critique of positivism.
D. Patterson'sCritique of Hart
1. Hart and a Scientific View of Law
On the basis of his misinterpretation of Hart as having a pedigree rule of recognition conforming to the sources thesis, Patterson
reads Hart as committed to (1) a truth-conditional semantics for
legal propositions, (2) representationalism in law, (3) a correspondence theory of truth for law, and (4) the view that the sources of
law - such as constitutions, statutes, administrative rulings, and
precedents - make propositions of law true. Patterson also attributes to Hart a scientific view of law and appears to attribute to Hart
103
significant metaphysical commitments.
102. See WmFRED J. WALucHow, INCLUSrVE LEGAL Posrrrmsm (1996); Coleman, supra

note 38; E. Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The HartDworkin
Dispute, 75 MIicH L. REV. 473 (1977); David Lyons, Principles of Positivism and Legal
Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415 (1977) (reviewing TAINo RIGHrs SauousLy, supra note 40).
103. Patterson states:
Hart treats propositions of law as if they were hypotheses about institutional facts
that, if verified, are then taken to be true. The forms of argument are not a bridge
between a putative proposition of law and some state of affairs. When judges decide
cases, they are not searching out facts abott past legislative acts. Deciding cases is not
the same thing as conducting an experiment.
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The claim that Hart holds a scientific view of law is mistaken. It
would be more accurate to say that, in part, he views law from a
social scientific perspective. 1°4 As a positivist, he does think that
law - and in particular its authority - is a matter of social fact.
But he also thinks that law is a normative (rule-governed) enterprise, and that a complete theory of law requires understanding law
from the internal perspective of legal officials and citizens.10 5 In
particular, Hart believes that a complete understanding of law must
explain how legal norms guide citizens' conduct. One of Hart's
major achievements is understanding law as a matter of practical
reason. Hart's methodology places law in the same category as ethics and political theory, in contrast with sciences such as physics,
biology, and astronomy, which are matters of theoretical or speculative reason.
Patterson's attribution to Hart of significant metaphysical commitments appears misplaced. While Hart adds rules to Austin's
meager empiricist ontology, he generally follows Bentham and
of his time in
Austin as well as the ordinary language philosophy
10 6
commitments.
metaphysical
his
minimizing
2. Hart and the Semantics of Legal Statements
Hart is famous for applying to law the ordinary language philosophy developed by J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein. Neil MacCormick
describes Hart as "one of the leading proponents of... 'ordinary
language philosophy."' 07 Hart explicitly acknowledges the influence of Wittgenstein, and especially Wittgenstein's notion of family
resemblance, on his own work.' 08 Hart rejects the view that legal
P. 68; see also p. 64 ("But law is not as the positivist supposes... akin to science .... ).
Positivists would respond that they treat law as a matter of practical reason - not as a matter
of theoretical reason, as philosophers consider the natural sciences to be.
104. In the preface to The Concept of Law, Hart states: "Notwithstanding its concern
with analysis [of the concept of law] the book may also be regarded as an essay in descriptive
sociology." HART, supra note 14, at v. Hart also cites, with approval, PETER WINCH, Tim
IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIEN E (1958). See HART, supra note 14, at 289, 297.
105. See Stephen Perry, Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory, in LAW AND
INmERRLTATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 97, 98-99 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995);
Gerald Postema, The Normativity of Law, in IssuEs IN CoNTEMPORARY LEGAL PrLOSOPHY:
THE INFLUENCE OF HLA. HART 81, 81 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987).

106. See HART, supra note 14, at 83-84.
107. NmIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 13 (1981). Justus Hartnack describes Hart's

early essay, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROC. AuSToTELIAN Socy. 171
(1949), as an exercise in Wittgensteinian philosophy of language. See JusTus HARTNACK,
WrrrGENSTEIN AND MODERN PHILosopHy 129-30 (Maurice Cranston trans., University of
Notre Dame Press 2d ed. 1986) (1965). MacCormick also sees that essay as an important
contribution to ordinary language philosophy. See MACCORIMICK, supra, at 18.
108. See HART, supra note 14, at 13-17, 279-80, 289, 297 (explicitly rejecting definition by
genus and species); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JuIRsUDENc AND PHILOsoPHY 1-4 (1983).
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concepts can be understood in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions:
[T]here are characteristics of legal concepts which make it often
absurd to use in connection with them the language of necessary and
"What is a trespass?" "What is a contract?"
sufficient conditions ....
- cannot be answered by the provision of a verbal rule for the translation of a legal expression into other terms or one specifying a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions. 109
Later in the same article, Hart continues: "Consideration of the
defeasible character of legal concepts.., shows how wrong it would
be to succumb to the temptation offered by modern theories of
meaning to identify the meaning of a legal concept, say 'contract,'
with the statement of the conditions in which contracts are held to
exist... ."110 Hart's discussion of international law in Chapter 10
of The Concept of Law is a paradigmatic analysis of the concept of
a legal system in terms of Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblance, thereby rejecting necessary and sufficient conditions. While
Hart did not write at length about his views of legal semantics, what
evidence there is demonstrates that he rejects necessary and sufficient truth-conditional semantics for law. On the other hand, a
weaker criterial - but not necessary and sufficient conditions truth-conditional account of legal meaning is consistent with certain
of Hart's remarks in his early work, and with ideas current in philosophical circles at Oxford when Hart wrote The Concept of Law."'
It is also compatible with Hart's understanding of the rule of recognition as providing criteria for legal validity.
The Concept of Law also exemplifies Patterson's preferred
Wittgensteinian semantic doctrine of meaning as12use. Hart was the
first to apply that doctrine in legal philosophy.
3. Hart and Legal Truth
To my knowledge, Hart never inprint discussed the proper theory of truth generally or the proper local theory of truth for law.
Agnosticism respecting Hart's view is therefore advisable. Hart's
theory is a theory of law, not a theory of truth for law. Although
109. Hart, supra note 107, at 173. Hart later disowned this article, but for reasons irrelevant to the current point. See H.L.A. HART, PuNISHmNT AND REsPONSMILrTY: ESSAYS IN
m PHILosopHy OF LAW at v (1968).
110. Hart, supra note 107, at 181. Even as late as 1983, Hart writes of statements attributing legal rights and duties as true and false in discussing his early articles, although in The
Concept of Law he eschews the notion of truth for that of legal validity. See HART, supra
note 108, at 4-6.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14 for discussion of the weaker criterial
approach.
112. See HART, supra note 108, at 4-6. See generally Hart, supra note 107.
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Hart develops a theory of legal validity, that theory is distinguishable from a theory of truth for law.
Theories of law or legal validity do not entail theories of truth
for law; most theories of law are consistent with many different theories of truth for law. A theorist could hold that legal propositions
are valid in a particular jurisdiction if they correspond to certain
legal facts, such as the contents of duly-enacted statutes, thereby
holding a correspondence theory of law and legal validity. At the
same time, she could hold a coherence theory of truth for law,
maintaining that the proposition that p is valid law in jurisdiction J
is true if and only if it coheres with other legal propositions she
accepts, including the proposition that the contents of duly-enacted
statutes are legally valid.
Conversely, one could hold a coherence theory of law or legal
validity yet a correspondence, pragmatic, or deflationary theory of
truth for law. Theories of valid law have no implications for theories of truth for law. For example, correspondence theories of truth
for law must be able to account for truths involving coherence,
including claims that coherence is a (or the) determinant of legal
validity. Consider the proposition that comparative negligence is
valid law because it coheres better with general negligence principles than any alternative doctrine, including contributory negligence. That proposition will be true according to the
correspondence theory of legal truth if and only if that proposition
corresponds to the 'legal' facts. The relevant factual questions are:
first, does comparative negligence cohere better with negligence
principles than contributory negligence or other alternatives and,
second, assuming it does cohere better, is cohering better the criterion of legal validity, thus implying that it is valid law? If both
questions are answered affirmatively, the correspondence theory
will declare the proposition that comparative negligence is valid law
true by virtue of correspondence with 'legal facts' about the coherence of comparative negligence and general negligence, and about
coherence as the criterion for legal validity.
No persuasive argument has yet tied theories of law and legal
validity in any interesting way to either global or local theories of
truth. Given Hart's failure to speak to his views of legal truth, and
the lack of logical connection from theories of legal validity to theories of legal truth, agnosticism regarding Hart's theory of legal truth
appears justified. Patterson's attempt to rewrite all theories of law
as theories of legal truth and his desire to see the history of recent
jurisprudence as a movement from concerns about legal validity to
concerns about truth does him a disservice.
But suppose I am wrong in claiming that there is no logical
entailment or connection from theories of legal validity or law to
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theories of legal truth. Patterson might then claim that Hart is committed to a version of the correspondence theory of truth by his
theory of law and legal validity, even if Hart does not recognize or
would not acknowledge his commitment.
Patterson supports the view that Hart is committed to the correspondence theory of truth for law by examining Hart's doctrine of
the rule of recognition. Hart holds that primitive societies' rules of
obligation suffer from three significant deficiencies; the one of current concern is uncertaintyrespecting their primary rules of obligation. The most important factor in the transition from a primitive
community to a mature legal system is the coming into existence of
a rule of recognition which reduces uncertainty by "specify[ing]
some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is
taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the
group. 1 13 The rule of recognition is a social practice among legal
officials, particularly judges. Hart states:
The existence of... [the] rule of recognition will be manifest in the
general practice on the part of officials or private persons, of identifying the rules by this criterion.... For the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, but its existence is shown in the way in which
particular rules are identified, either
by courts or other officials or
114
private persons or their advisers.
Patterson focuses on some of the simple examples Hart provides
for criteria of validity in a rule of recognition, such as enactment by
the legislature or judicial decision. Patterson then claims that Hart
views a proposition of law as true if it corresponds to the social fact
of having been passed by the legislature or being a precedent.
Moreover, Patterson contends that for Hart the social fact of legislative enactment or judicial decision is the truth maker that makes
the proposition of law true. By contrast, Patterson claims that legislative enactments do not make propositions of law true. Nothing
makes them true; their truth is shown through the use of the forms
of argument to justify legal propositions.
Patterson's analysis of Hart suggests that he may misunderstand
the role of the rule of recognition. There are two major interpretations. The most plausible reading of The Concept of Law is that the
rule of recognition distinguishes authoritative general propositions
of law from general propositions that are not authoritative. The
rule of recognition does not determine the application of general
propositions of law to particular instances, and it does not determine the validity of particular propositions of law." 5 To determine
113. HART, supra note 14, at 94.
114. Id.at 101.
115. See id.at 122-23; see also id. at 126 ("Particular fact-situations do not await us
already marked off from each other, and labelled as instances of the general rule, the applica-

tion of which is in question; nor can the rule itself step forward to claim its own instances.").
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the validity of particular propositions of law would require a theory
of adjudication or interpretation. Such theories are possible as a
matter of particular, but not general, jurisprudence. 11 6 Joseph Raz
offers a more radical interpretation. All the rule of recognition
does is determine which acts are law-creating acts. In order to
determine what law is generated thereby, one needs, in addition, to
understand language and any7 special interpretive conventions of
the legal system in question."1
Patterson attempts to demonstrate Hart's commitment to truthconditional semantics, the correspondence theory of truth, and the
existence of truth makers in law by examining the Supreme Court's
decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber.118 As noted above, Hart
would maintain that Weber was a hard case, requiring the Court to
exercise discretion and create new law. For Hart, Weber is not a
case of judicial application of law. For this reason alone, Patterson's deployment of Weber is inapropos. On Hart's view, the position that voluntary affirmative action programs such as Kaiser's are
permissible was neither valid nor invalid prior to a court's decision. 119 That proposition became valid law only after the exercise
of legislative discretion by a court, and in consequence of both (1)
the court's decision and (2) the practice of legal officials to identify
law with reference to precedents, statutes, and constitutions as part
of the rule of recognition. Or so Hart could argue. If Hart takes
this tack, Patterson might criticize Hart's theory as incomplete because it lacks a theory of adjudication for hard cases. Hart will respond that legal systems' theories of adjudication - especially for
hard cases - vary so greatly that a general jurisprudential theory of
adjudication would be nearly vacuous. 20 Patterson could urge that
this demonstrates the superiority of particular jurisprudence and
local description to general jurisprudence's conceptual methodology. Hart would probably reply that general and particular jurisprudence are different yet complementary jurisprudential
methodologies: there is no reason to view them as incompatible.
But suppose we pretend that Weber were a case of judicial application of law, or consider a case of judicial application of law.
Would Patterson's critique of positivism succeed under these circumstances? Consider a rich, particular positivist theory of
American law, including a rule of recognition incorporating
116. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
117. Raz, supra note 40, at 1107 n.12.
118. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
119. I say a "court's," not the "Supreme Court's" decision, since lower court decisions,
especially intermediate appellate court decisions, also create law.
120. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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Patterson's forms of argument and coherentist conflict resolution
techniques, or equivalent criteria of legal validity.
In Weber, the plaintiff, a white employee of Kaiser, sued his
employer on the ground that Kaiser had unlawfully discriminated
against him within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Because there were racial imbalances in its skilled worker population, Kaiser, as a private employer, had voluntarily adopted an
affirmative action plan that provided craft training to blacks with
less seniority than whites. Relevant statutory language prohibited
discrimination "against any individual because of his race [or] color
...inadmission to, or employment in, any program established to
provide apprenticeship or other training.' 121 Regrettably, the Act
does not define "discriminate." Weber urged a literal interpretation under which Kaiser's voluntary affirmative action program
would be unlawful.
The Supreme Court disagreed. As Patterson interprets it,
Brennan's majority opinion held that Congress's intent was to prohibit discrimination against blacks because of our social history of
past discrimination, but not to require private employers to adopt
affirmative action programs. From this historical form of argument,
the majority inferred that in the context of racial imbalances in its
workplace, an employer may create a voluntary preferential treatment program such as Kaiser's. In short, history - legislative purpose - outweighed text - plain meaning (p. 65).
By contrast, Patterson tells us, Rehnquist's dissent urged first
that the text was clear and thus its plain meaning controlled, and
second that Congress's intent supported outlawing Kaiser's plan.
While Rehnquist's evidence established that Congress intended to
prohibit government-mandated affirmative action, its application to
Kaiser's voluntary program was less certain. Patterson therefore
finds neither Brennan's nor Rehnquist's history decisive. At bottom, Patterson contends that the upshot of Rehnquist's argument is
that history is inconclusive and therefore plain meaning controls (p.
65).
Patterson prefers Blackmun's concurrence to either the majority
or the dissenting opinion. Blackmun argues:
Preferential hiring along the lines of the Kaiser program is a reasonable response for the employer, whether or not a court, on these facts,
could order the same step as a remedy. The company is able to avoid
identifying victims of past discrimination, and so avoids claims for
backpay that would inevitably follow a response limited to such victims. If past victims should be benefited by the program, however,
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703 (d), 78 Stat. 241, 256 (codified at

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1994)); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255.
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the company mitigates its liability to those persons. Also, to the
extent that Title VII liability is predicated on the "disparate effect" of
an employer's past hiring practices, the program makes it less likely
that such an effect could be demonstrated.1 22
Patterson analyzes Blackmun's opinion as weaving "prudential
judgment with doctrinal argument to break the deadlock between
text and history played out in the majority and dissenting opinions"
(p. 67).
As a preliminary matter, and in support of the critique of the
forms of argument and resolution of conflict among them by coherentist methods discussed above in section I.C, note that Patterson's
explanation why Blackmun's opinion is superior is unsatisfying.
Patterson does not mean to claim that Blackmun's concurrence is
superior to the majority and dissenting opinions because every
weaving of prudential and doctrinal forms of argument is preferable
to arguments that tie on history, while one has plain meaning in its
favor, as Patterson describes the majority and dissenting opinions.
Since the forms of argument, as deployed by Brennan,
Rehnquist, and Blackmun recommend inconsistent outcomes, the
conflict is to be resolved, according to Patterson, by the application
of Quine's maxim of minimum mutilation: change as few legal
practices and beliefs as possible. But Patterson does not argue here
that Blackmun's opinion is preferable because it changes fewer

legal practices and beliefs than Brennan's or Rehnquist's would:
Patterson simply asserts that its weaving of doctrine and conse-

quentialist forms of argument "break[s] the deadlock between text
and history played out in the majority and dissenting opinions" (p.
67).
Moreover, how would one count which argument, or combination of arguments, changes the least? There is no simple metric for
counting numbers of precedents, statutes, constitutional provisions,
and other institutional facts that a form of argument fits, and those
that it would change. Moreover, even if there were such a metric, it
is ublikely that we would follow it. Some aspects of the settled law
are more important than others. Giving up the law's conception of
individuals as autonomous - or, if this is too woolly, its presumption of liberty - would be a greater change than amending the
default rule for loans which fail to specify an interest rate from five
to six percent, or dropping the tort doctrine of joint and several
liability. My own view is that the determination of importance
would be a matter of moral evaluation, including the importance of
the legal doctrine to citizens' lives and how appealing it is, morally
speaking, compared to what would replace it. A coherentist legal
122. Weber, 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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positivist, such as Roll Sartorius 23 or Steven Burton, 124 might
argue that importance is a matter of principles and values that have
been embedded into the law by some legally authoritative act.
Patterson's discussion of Posner's rule of law critique of Calabresi's
proposal to grant courts the power to 'overrule' statutes, grounded
in the rule-of-law virtues, raises the issue of importance. Patterson
states, "the form of Posner's criticism is that Calabresi's proposal is
too inconsistent with our fundamental beliefs, specifically separation of powers" (p. 176 n.91; second emphasis added). The judgment that separation of powers is "fundamental" is not merely a
judgment of how much would change if we limited separation of
powers to allow judicial 'overruling' of statutes. It is also a judgment of the significance of those changes, and therefore a judgment
of importance.
Patterson needs to elaborate his conception of coherence, and
his conception of minimizing change, in order to provide an adequate understanding of conflict resolution among the forms of argument. The failure to have done so leads to what I described in Part
I as Patterson's interpretive vacillation between minimizing change,
maximizing coherence, and maximizing legal values generally.l z2
These considerations also illustrate one of the reasons why coherence is such a difficult notion to understand or analyze. 126
In fairness to Patterson, it should be acknowledged that he does
elaborate the notion of forms of argument and the resolution of
conflicts between them later in Law and Truth, and gives more convincing explanations for the superiority of one opinion to another
(pp. 172-79). Even with this additional content, however, Patterson
has barely scratched the surface: an enormous amount of work
remains before the account is adequately developed. I suspect that
Patterson would agree that additional elaboration is desirable.
However, Patterson expresses some uncertainty as to whether further development of the forms of argument is a philosophical enterprise. It may be historical, or sociological (p. 182).
4. Hart,Legal Truth, and Truth Makers
We are now well positioned to examine the crux of Patterson's
critique of positivism as committed to the correspondence theory of
truth for law and the existence of legal truth makers. Patterson
states:
123. RoLF E. SARTORIUS, INDIvIDuAL CoNDucr AND SOCAL NoRMs 192 (1975).
124. ST-vEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCrION TO LAW AND LEOAL REASONING 124-34
ed. 1995).
125. See supra text accompanying note 51.
126. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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For the positivist, "truth" in law states a relation or correspondence between the disputed proposition and some state of affairs
(social facts). The rule of recognition states criteria that, if they
obtain, make the proposition at issue true. Thus, the proposition at
issue in Weber is true if and only if there exists some social fact (e.g.,
an act of the legislature) in virtue of which it is true. Lawyers and
judges are agreed on the criteria for satisfying the test for law set
forth by the rule of recognition; the only question is whether those
criteria are satisfied.
As this discussion of Weber illustrates, the proposition of law at
issue there is not true in virtue of facts, social or otherwise.... The
truth of propositions of law turns on facts about what Congress or the
legislature has done. But as the discussion of Weber shows us, there
are no "facts" about what Congress has done that are the conditions
for the truth of legal propositions. Yes, it is true that the proposition
in question cannot be true unless the legislature has "done" something. But the point is that it is only through the use of forms of legal
argument that we can even say what it is the legislature has done. The
mistake legal positivists make is to believe that the meaning of the law
lies in the acts of certain institutional players in the legal system.
What the analysis of Weber shows is that the meaning of legislative
action is a matter of forms of legal argument. Practice, not facts, is
what the truth of legal propositions consists in.
Propositions of law are not true in virtue of criteria specified by
the rule of recognition. The forms of argument - the grammar of
legal justification - are the means by which the truth of legal propositions is shown. There are no legal truths - no true propositions
of law - outside these forms of argument. This is why the positivist's
criterial test of legal truth misses the mark. Propositions of law are
not [true] in virtue of anything; not social facts, legislative facts, nor
facts of past institutional decisions (e.g., prior judicial decisions). [pp.
67-68; footnote omitted]
A proponent of positivism could urge that the validity of a proposition of law founded in a statute depends both upon enactment of
the relevant statute and upon the practice among judges that constitutes the existence conditions for the rule of recognition, including
those parts of the practice respecting interpreting statutes. In The
Concept of Law, Hart emphasized enactments and precedents as
law-creating acts, but he did so in the context of having already
discussed the rule of recognition as a necessary condition for the
existence of a mature legal system. The rule of recognition, and the
practice underlying it, was presupposed. Hart would not deny that
the practice underlying the rule of recognition and enactments combine to create law, or that in a mature legal system they are both
necessary for statutory law.127
127. Recall the qualification provided supra note 23.
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Indeed, one of the consequences of the coming into existence of
the rule of recognition is that what in a primitive society is merely a
list of primary obligations is now unified into a system. A norm is
law only by virtue of membership in the legal system, and a norm is
a member of the legal system only if it meets the criteria of validity
set out in the rule of recognition. Thus, being valid law depends
both upon (1) the social practice underlying the rule of recognition
and (2) meeting the criteria for validity set out in the rule of
recognition. 128
Providing a slight sophistication of earlier interpretation of Patterson as holding that the deployment of the forms of argument in
legal practice makes propositions of law true, the above quote suggests that Patterson, like Hart, holds that the combined force of the
enactment of Title VII and legal practice makes the proposition
that Kaiser's program is permissible true.129 Thus, but for minor
differences, soon to be discussed, Patterson and positivism differ
mainly in emphasis. Both agree that the enactment of Title VII and
the practice of statutory interpretation are the two main factors in
determining whether the proposition that Kaiser's voluntary affirmative action program is permissible is valid (Hart) or true
(Patterson). Because Hart presupposes the rule of recognition, he
emphasizes enactments and precedents. As a Wittgensteinian, Patterson wishes to oppose a scientific view of legal truth and legal
semantics, reject the correspondence theory of truth, oppose the
idea of truth makers, and counsel as methodology description of
local practice. Therefore, he emphasizes the role of legal practice.
Additionally, Hart may have misled his readers by speaking of
the rule of recognition rather than emphasizing the social practice
that is the condition for the rule of recognition's existence. In a
sense, the rule of recognition itself is unnecessary. All its work
could be performed by the underlying social practice. 130
128. As noted earlier, the existence of a legal system and thus the possibility of membership also require, for Hart, general obedience to valid law. See supra note 91.
129. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
130. Most modem correspondence theorists hold the correspondence-as-correlation thesis, according to which true propositions as a whole are correlated with facts or states of
affairs as a whole. See, e.g., J.L Austin, Truth, in PsYccnAL REsEARcH, ETrHICs AND LooIC,
supra note 60, at 111, reprinted in TRUTH 18 (George Pitcher ed., 1964). By contrast, the
correspondence-as-congruence theory maintains that true propositions are structurally isomorphic to states of affairs - their parts and structure can be put in one-to-one correspondence. See generally Knuuim , supra note 55, at 119-30.
Hart's theory of the validity of general propositions of law, such as those expressed by
statutes, cannot be interpreted as a standard correspondence theory. Nor is it a congruence
correspondence theory - such as those set forth in LuDwia XVrrroENSTEIN, TRAcrATus
LoGico-PmLosoPmcus (1921), and BERTRAND RUSSELL, Tm PROBLEMS OF PHIOSOPHY
(1912) - of the sort Patterson appears to attribute to modem philosophy and perhaps to
modem jurisprudence. P. 156.
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Moreover, both views are inadequate in roughly the same place.
Positivism fails to provide a satisfying theory of adjudication, interpretation, and proper judicial behavior in hard cases, both as matters of general and particular jurisprudence. The failure to do so as
a matter of particular jurisprudence correlates with the vagueness
of Patterson's description of the forms of argument and the vagueness of coherentist methods for resolving conflicts among them.131
According to Hart, what facts are necessary for the validity of the proposition that (1) in
Iowa, a plaintiffs tort damages are reduced by her comparative fault? Clearly relevant is
§ 668.3(1) of the Iowa Code, which provides:
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by a claimant to recover damages
for fault resulting in death or in injury to person or property unless the claimant bears a
greater percentage of fault than the combined percentage of fault attributed to the
defendants, third-party defendants and persons who have been released... but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to
the claimant.
IowA CODE ANN.§ 668.3(1) (West 1987).
But also relevant is (2) the existence of a practice among Iowa judges (thereby generating
a portion of the Iowa rule of recognition) of deciding cases and legal validity with reference
to the contents of duly enacted statutes. Thus, it is also relevant whether § 668.3(1) was duly
enacted, which means:
(3) a majority of Iowa legislators voted for § 668.3(1) during a formal vote when the
legislature was in session,
(4) there was a quorum present,
(5) those voting on § 668.3(1) were legally authorized Iowa legislators, which means:
(6) they were duly elected in valid elections by the people of the State of Iowa, as
provided for under the Constitution and laws of Iowa, consistently with the Constitution
of the United States. Moreover, the provisions of § 668.3(1) must not:
(7) violate the provisions of the Iowa Constitution nor
(8) violate the Bill of Rights or other protections of the United States Constitution.
No doubt this is itself an incomplete list of the social and legal facts necessary, on Hart's
account, for the validity of comparative negligence in Iowa. Still, even this gross simplification is a far cry from the simple idea Patterson attributes to Hart that the words in a statute
are true if they correspond to a social fact, namely, the fact of enactment On Hart's theory,
the facts necessary for the validity of a legal proposition are substantially more complex than
the facts necessary for the truth of a proposition under either correlation or congruence correspondence theories of truth.
Put differently, the correspondence relation Patterson invokes does not quite seem to be
the correspondence relationship in theories of truth. Suppose a local statute provides that no
vehicles are allowed in the park. Even in Patterson's simplified account of Hart, the fact
corresponding to the legal proposition - no vehicles are allowed in the park - is not the
legal fact that no vehicles are allowed in the park. Rather, the legal fact contains more content and structure: it is the social fact that a statute was duly enacted and that the local
statute consists of the words "no vehicles are allowed in the park." Moreover, Hart's theory
is not that the proposition's validity is equivalent to (if and only if)
there exists a social fact
that the legislature has enacted a statute that provides that no vehicles are allowed in the
park. For one thing, vehicles could have been prohibited by judicial decision. Alternatively,
despite the statute, a federal statute might preempt it, or a judicial decision qualify it for
motorized wheelchairs. Thus, the 'correspondence relation' that Patterson attributes to Hart
as part of Hart's theory of legal validity differs substantially from standard accounts of the
correspondence relation in correspondence theories of truth, and from strict congruence correspondence theories. Because Hart's theory differs in these ways from standard correspondence theories of truth, Patterson's attribution to Hart of a correspondence theory appears
misplaced.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92; see also supra section I.C.1.
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5. Is Pattersona ParticularPositivist?
A Hartian or Razian general jurisprudence would not contain a
richly textured practice for determining the application of statutes
such as Title VII to concrete contexts for two reasons. First, the
rules of recognition of particular jurisdictions vary substantially, yet
Hart and Raz engage in general jurisprudence. Second, Hart and
Raz would consider Weber to be a hard case, to be decided by a
supplementary theory of proper judicial behavior when the law
runs out.
A particular positivist theory of American law with a fully
developed particular rule of recognition and a particular theory of
adjudication and interpretation provides a more appropriate comparison to Patterson's view. Consider a particular jurisprudence in
which Weber could be decided as a matter of judicial application of
law and would not require the exercise of judicial discretion. To
maximize the analogy, suppose that this positivist theory includes a
rule of recognition and theory of adjudication in terms of the forms
of argument and their deployment in statutory interpretation along
Pattersonian lines. This positivist theory maintains that Kaiser's
voluntary affirmative action program is lawful and that Weber's discrimination claim fails in consequence of both Title VII and the
practice that underlies the American rule of recognition.
There is still a difference between this interpretation of
positivism and Patterson's actual view that I have been obscuring
by interpreting Patterson as holding that institutional acts in combination with legal practice make propositions of law true. Patterson
claims that when a speaker utters a legal proposition, she is thereby
commending, appraising, or endorsing the proposition as justified
by the forms of argument of legal practice. Patterson's view of law
and legal truth therefore appears to be noncognitive. Noncognitive
language expresses emotions or attitudes. Understanding this
noncognitive aspect is complicated by Patterson's simultaneous
assertion that "[c]laims in law are assertive in nature" (p. 170).
Generally, cognitive language is thought to be assertive and descriptive, while noncognitive language is expressive. 132 Patterson
mentions the commendation/appraisal/endorsement view of legal
truth only in passing, and only on a few occasions (pp. 70, 152). He
does not develop it. As elsewhere, an understanding of Patterson's
view must await its elaboration.
132. See, eg., AJ. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LoGic 102-19 (Dover Publications 2d
ed. 1952) (1936) (positing a naive emotivism); ALLAN GIBBARD, NVISE CHOIcES, APT
FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NOamAunvE JUDGEMENT (1990) (advocating norm-expressivism);
R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963) (advocating universal prescriptivism); R.M.
HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MoRALs (2d ed. 1961) (arguing for universal prescriptivism);
CHARL.s L. STEVENSON, ETIcs AND LANGUAGE (1944) (presenting a sophisticated
emotivism).
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To his credit, Patterson considers the possibility that the forms
of argument are the rule of recognition, albeit a complex one, and
thus that he is a positivist.133 Patterson rejects this possibility for
two reasons. Patterson's weaker argument interprets Hart, and
positivism generally, as committed to pedigreecriteria of legal validity under the rule of recognition that are source-based, such as
enactments or precedents. Patterson argues, quite plausibly, that
his analysis of Weber in terms of textual, historical, doctrinal, and
prudential forms of argument goes beyond source-based arguments.
But we have seen that Hart also rejects pedigree source-based positivism in favor of incorporationism, and even if Hart were a pedigree source-based positivist, legal positivism is not committed to the
pedigree sources thesis. That is Dworkin's misinterpretation of
positivism. Unless Patterson can show that positivism is committed
to pedigree source-based criteria of validity, Patterson's first reason
for why the forms of argument could not be a rule of recognition
fails. More important, Patterson's argument fails to understand the
limited role of the rule of recognition in the general jurisprudence
of Hart and Raz.
Patterson's second argument is more interesting. He claims that
"the forms of argument are not a rule (or several rules). They are
what makes following a legal rule possible" (pp. 68-69). Once
again, Patterson's point is elusive. Perhaps it comes down to this.
As noted above, Hart may have misled his readers by speaking of
the rule of recognition rather than the underlying social practice
that makes identification of legal propositions possible.' 34 While
Hart claimed that the rule of recognition is generally unstated, perhaps Patterson's point is the stronger one that
the underlying social
practice can never be made fully explicit.' 35
133. Patterson puts a slightly different spin on this: he suggests that if the forms of argument were the rule of recognition, then he would have demonstrated the truth of positivism.
This would be true, however, only of American particular jurisprudence and not of general
jurisprudence.
134. See supra text accompanying note 130. To be fair to Hart, it does seem more natural
to understand the aspect of the internal attitude consisting in criticism of deviations or
threatened deviations in terms of a deviation or violation of the rule, rather than in terms of a
deviation from the practice.
135. See Gerald J. Postema, "Protestant"Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 LAW &
PrI. 283, 306-15 (1987). John Searle has developed the position that truth-conditional
semantics and intentionality cannot be made fully explicit. For his arguments that truthconditional semantics cannot be made fully explicit, see JomN R. SEARLE, THm
CONSTRUCrnON OF SocIAL REALrrY 127-47 (1995); JoSIN R. SEARLE, ExPuRssIoN AND
MEANING:

STuDUis IN mn THEORY OF SPEECH ACTs 117-36 (1979); JoHN R. SEARLE,

INTENIoNALrr,: AN ESSAY INTHE PHILOsoPHY OF MnD 160-79 (1983); JoHn R. SEARLE,
Trm REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 175-96 (1992); John R. Searle, The Background of

Meaning, in SPEECH Acr THEORY AND PRAOmATics 221, 231 (John R. Searle et al. eds.,
1980).
Even under this interpretation, this attempted reconciliation of Patterson and Hart still
leaves some differences. To name only two, Hart believes the rule of recognition is a matter
of the practice of legal officials, especially judges. Patterson's use of the phrase "culturally-
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Assume the underlying practice cannot be made fully explicit.
Would this demonstrate that positivism is incorrect? Hart concedes
that the rule of recognition is generally unstated and that it may be
partly indeterminate and fail to resolve some difficult issues, such as
whether Parliament could limit its future legislative power by binding itself not to repeal a minimum wage statute for engineers unless
the Engineers' Union agrees. 136 Although the rule of recognition
reduces uncertainty, it does not eliminate it.137 Positivism is sometimes described as a theory intended to distinguish spurious from
genuine propositions of law. 138 In light of the above admissions,
positivism could concede, if it were true, that the social practice
underlying the rule of recognition could not be made fully explicit
without damage to its two major commitments: first, that there is
no necessary connection between law and morals, and second, that
law, and its authority, are matters of social fact. And, we may add,
if true, matters of social fact that cannot be made fully explicit.
If the rule of recognition cannot be made fully explicit, then its
ability to reduce uncertainty by providing a "conclusive affirmative
indication" that a norm is legally valid might be impaired. 139 Put
differently, the rule of recognition's role in identifying law might be
hindered. I say "might" - not "would" - because complete
agreement among practitioners within the scope of the aspects of
legal practice that cannot be made fully explicit would entirely alleviate any uncertainty in identifying law. Only to the extent that
disagreements arise where the social practice underlying the rule of
recognition cannot be made fully explicit would indeterminacy
arise.
Positivism's doctrines of the limits of the law and judicial discretion countenance indeterminacy. Unless the indeterminacy is pervasive, it would not be problematic for legal positivism or for law's
legitimacy. 40 Moreover, whatever indeterminacy arises from disagreement in areas that cannot be made explicit, positivism would
share with all other conceptual and descriptive jurisprudence,
endorsed forms of argument" suggests that the practice involves a larger community, and
perhaps the full citizenry. Second, Patterson's account has a commendation/appraisal aspect
absent from Hart's.
136. See HART, supra note 14, at 151. See generally id. at 147-54.
137. See id at 130 ("In fact all [legal] systems, in different ways, compromise between...
the need for certain rules ... and the need to leave open ... issues which can only be
properly appreciated ... in a concrete case.").
138. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 75, at 887.
139. See Hart, supra note 14, at 94.
140. I have argued elsewhere that law is not radically indeterminate, but at most moderately indeterminate, and that moderate indeterminacy does not undermine law's moral legitimacy. See Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 41, at 285-97; see also Kress,
EpistemologicalIndeterminacy, supra note 41.
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including Patterson's. So positivism would be no more -141 or less indeterminate than Patterson's account in this respect.
Finally, reconsider Patterson's claim that nothing makes propositions of law true, that the truth of propositions of law is shown
in the use of the forms of argument, and that the utterance of a
legal proposition is a commendation, endorsement, or appraisal 42
of it as justified by the forms of argument. In order to provide a
satisfying postmodern critique of positivism, Patterson must
demonstrate that the above account is superior to a positivist explanation of law in terms of rules of recognition, legal sources (or
sources and incorporated norms), and theories of interpretation
and adjudication. For Patterson's account to be superior, it must
provide a better explanation of legal practice - of the phenomenon of living under law, uttering legal propositions, assessing their
truth, and the like - than positivism. Regrettably, Patterson's critique is undermined because he mistakenly attributes to positivism
a source-based, pedigree rule of recognition, misreads the role of
the rule of recognition, and ignores particular positivist theories of
adjudication and interpretation.
Patterson provides no reason why the forms of argument
explain - or, in Patterson's preferred methodology, describe legal practice better than positivist descriptive jurisprudence does.
Instead, Patterson provides his reader with a few obscure, coy,
Wittgensteinian remarks about nothing making propositions of law
true and describes assertions of legal truths as appraisalsor commendations as justified by the forms of argument. Neither of these
views is developed.
It has become fashionable in certain intellectual circles to look
askance at the concept of truth. Some philosophers respectfully
reject.the idea that there are truth makers; others scoff at the notion
as incoherent. Yet as soon as these critics begin developing their
own positive account of the relevant subject matter, careful observation discloses that they too believe in the existence of a truth
maker, although generally a different truth maker than that of the
theories critiqued. Like some philosophers, Patterson explicitly
rejects the idea of truth makers, at least in law. However,
Patterson's own words suggest that he too believes in truth makers,
namely, legal practice, and authoritative institutional acts. Ironically, this is the same truth maker as positivism.
141. For discussion of potential Pattersonian responses to charges of indeterminacy, see
supra section I.C.l.c.
142. Patterson conflates commendations, endorsements, and appraisals. But commendations are not endorsements. Neither commendations nor endorsements are appraisals.
Appraisals are not commendations. Once again, clarification from Patterson is needed.
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Patterson's other major criticism of contemporary jurisprudence, including legal positivism, is that it is committed to truthconditional semantics. As I read it, Law and Truth never clearly
articulates significant reasons why adherence to truth-conditional
semantics is problematic. Patterson asserts, but does not argue for,
this sweeping claim. Patterson does indicate that he prefers
meaning-as-use theories to truth-conditional semantics, yet the two
theories, at least in some versions, need not be inconsistent. Perhaps Patterson's ultimate position is simply that meaning-as-use
theories are prior to and more fundamental than truth-conditional
semantics.
Moreover, we have seen that Hart rejects strict necessary and
sufficient truth-conditional semantics for law, and at most advocates weaker criterial semantics. In the next Part, I argue that
Patterson's account of legal truth is committed to, or at least consistent with, an associated truth-conditional semantics for law.
IV.

A TRUTH-CONDITIONAL

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FORMs

OF ARGUMENT

Patterson argues that Hart (and positivism) is committed to a
truth-conditional semantics for legal propositions despite how little
Hart wrote about meaning and legal meaning. Moreover, what littie Hart wrote conclusively demonstrates that he rejects necessary
and sufficient truth-conditional semantics. 14 3 Patterson might claim
that even if Hart explicitly rejects truth-conditional semantics, deep
aspects of his theory commit him to it, or, in a weaker version,
permit a reconstruction of Hart's views consistent with a truthconditional semantics.
In making either the stronger or the weaker of these claims,
however, Patterson places himself in a logically precarious position.
Positivists can argue that deep aspects of Patterson's account of
legal practice and of the meaning of claims that legal propositions
are true commits him to a truth-conditional semantics for law.
Alternatively, they could assert the weaker claim that Patterson's
account is consistent with a truth-conditional semantics. Disregard
Patterson's claims that nothing makes propositions of law true, that
the forms of argument are not "truth conditions for propositions of
law," and that legal utterances are appraisals or commendations (p.
20). Focusing on other aspects of Patterson's discussion of the
forms of argument as justifying claims to legal truth, we shall construct a truth-conditional semantics that flows from the rest of

Patterson's account.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
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Truth-conditional semantics' conception of reference is thin thin enough to be consistent with any nonskeptical theory of language of which I am aware. This includes Patterson's preferred
Wittgensteinian meaning-as-use perspective. Even if Wittgenstein
is correct that language does not refer in the way the picture theory
of meaning or Augustinian approach suggests, neither Wittgenstein
nor Patterson would deny that some objects are red and others are
not. To the contrary, they would insist that local practice distinguishes red and non-red objects, that a philosophical account of
correct and of mistaken color attributions is possible, and that this
account helps us understand that color attributions are, in a certain
sense, modestly objective.
These concessions are more than what is necessary to engage in
truth-conditional semantics. Truth-conditional semantics does not
require the picture theory of meaning, or even a rich representationalism. All it requires is a distinction between objects to which
predicates and names apply and those to which they do not. To
convince yourself of this, remember that in describing truthconditional semantics above, I employed only the distinction
between those entities to which names and predicates apply and
those to which they do not.'"
Patterson provides a practice-oriented account of law. But practices can be described, at least in the sense necessary to serve as
truth conditions. True legal propositions would be conclusions of
correct applications of the culturally endorsed forms of argument
from legitimate legal grounds. Put formally, a legal proposition p is
true if and only if there is a legally valid argument from legally valid
grounds via correct (perhaps Patterson would prefer 'warranted')
applications of the forms of argument. Of course, as Patterson
notes, a form of argument might be applied by different lawyers to
reach opposed conclusions, different forms of argument might give
conflicting conclusions, and some may even question the legitimacy
or precise form of a form of argument (p. 152). So we must complicate the truth conditions to account for these conflicts. But
whatever resolution Patterson provides, the truth-conditional theorist can coopt it.
As noted earlier, Patterson maintains that conflict is resolved by
resort to Quinean coherentist methods, applying the maxim of minimum mutilation to resolve the conflict by changing as few prior
beliefs or practices as possible.
Then a truth conditional analysis can incorporate Patterson's
claim and hold that p is true if and only if either
144. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
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(1)(a) There is an argument for p from legally valid grounds via a
correct application of the culturally-endorsed forms of argument
and
(b) there is no argument for not-p from legally valid grounds via a
correct application of the culturally endorsed forms of argument
or else
(2)(a) There is an argument for p from legally valid grounds via a
correct application of the culturally endorsed forms of argument
and
(b) there is an argument for not-p from legally valid grounds via a
correct application of the culturally endorsed forms of argument
and
(c) resolution of the conffict between p and not-p via the culturally-endorsed conservative Quinean coherentist method recommends
p over not-p.
The referents of legal terms and predicates could be determined
in a similar manner. For example, "first-degree murder" would
refer to intentional killings with malice aforethought if and only if
the proposition that a first-degree murder is an intentional killing
with malice aforethought is true according to the above criteria,
employing the forms of argument and the maxim of minimum
mutilation.
Patterson might resist this truth-conditional semantics with the
claim that, like Aristotle's sea-battle tomorrow, the practice has not
yet unfolded. Such resistance would be inconsistent with his apparent approval of Dummett and Putnam on warranted assertibility
(pp. 166-68). Moreover, it would turn his position, at least implicitly, into a form of legal realism: law is the outcome of legal practice, and nothing more mysterious. It would also have the
consequence that any legal proposition not yet tested - in the
courts or in the arena of legal practice or argument - has no truth
value.
Patterson might attack from a different vantage point. He could
accept the truth-conditional reconstruction of his account of law,
yet point out that the truth conditions to which it refers are not
external to law, or part of the material world, but are instead part of
law's grammar. Patterson would then claim that all the work he
wanted done with his critique of truth conditions can be done via a
critique of the externalist truth-conditions approaches. Put differently, Patterson could concede that truth conditions can be stated
so generally as to cover his conception of grammar and forms of
argument, yet argue that such a generalization shows truthconditional semantics to be vacuous. Then Patterson could
reproduce his complaint by distinguishing external and practiceoriented truth-conditional analyses and argue for the superiority of
practice-oriented versions.
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This argument might succeed against moral realists such as
Michael Moore. But it is unavailing as a response to Hart, since
reconstructed Hartian truth-conditional semantics, like
Pattersonian truth-conditional semantics, is internal to law.
Patterson claims that his main goal in Law and Truth is to
destroy truth-conditional semantics in law (p. 19). Patterson does
not distinguish between strong, necessary, and sufficient truthconditional semantics and weaker criterial truth-conditional semantics. Some modern jurisprudes, most notably Hart, reject strong
truth-conditional semantics. Nevertheless, perhaps on the basis of
deep aspects of Hart's theory, Patterson urges that Hart is committed to a truth-conditional semantics. However, Patterson's criticism
of modem jurisprudence, and especially Hart's, for adhering to a
truth-conditional semantics is not persuasive, as Part III demonstrated. The argument in this Part completes the critique of
Patterson on truth-conditional semantics. As noted above,
Patterson might urge that some jurisprudes are committed to truthconditional semantics by deep aspects of their theory, even if they
would deny it. By the same token, however, Patterson's account of
legal truth is at least consistent with, and perhaps committed to, a
truth-conditional account of truth for law.
CONCLUSION

In Law and Truth, Patterson provides a postmodern perspective
on contemporary jurisprudence. His main goals are to reveal that
all major contemporary jurisprudences are truth-maker accounts, to
demonstrate that these accounts are mistaken, and to demolish
truth-conditional semantics for law.
I have urged that the best reading of Law and Truth is that
Patterson himself provides a truth-maker account of law that is similar to -

if not identical to -

the account provided by one version

of particular positivism. Patterson has not persuasively demonstrated why truth-maker theories are problematic. In particular, he
has not shown positivism's truth-maker account - conceived to include the practice underlying the rule of recognition as well as authoritative acts

-

to be mistaken.

Patterson's claim that positivism's alleged commitment to truthconditional semantics for law is unsuccessful for similar reasons.
Patterson does not demonstrate that truth-conditional semantics for
law is problematic. At most, he indicates his own preference for
meaning-as-use theories. Moreover, general jurisprudence does not
attempt to provide truth conditions for particular propositions of
law. Particular positivism, including a theory of adjudication that
decides particular propositions of law, could be conceived as providing truth conditions for particular propositions of law. Contrary
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to Patterson's suggestion that positivism includes only authoritative
social facts as truth conditions, positivism is better interpreted as
also including as truth conditions the legal practices underlying the
rule of recognition and theory of adjudication. So conceived, positivism avoids Patterson's critique. Moreover, as Part IV demonstrated, Patterson's account of law can itself ground a truthconditional semantics for law. If modem jurisprudence fails
because it is committed to truth makers and truth-conditional semantics, then 145
Patterson's postmodern jurisprudence suffers from
the same fate.

145. I have focused this review essay on defending positivism against Patterson's critique.
A defense of moral realism and a more complete defense of Dworkin's law as integrity could
be provided if space permitted it.
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POSTMODERN LEGAL MovEMENTs: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT

CENTURY'S END. By Gary Minda. New York: New York Univer-

sity Press. 1995. Pp. xii, 350. Cloth, $36; paper, $18.95.
American legal scholarship of the past thirty years has been
characterized by nothing so much as fragmentation. The accelerating evolution of contemporary scholarship has brought about forays
into all manner of cognate disciplines, has elicited considerable criticism,1 and, for some scholars, has reflected an extreme disaffection

with traditional techniques of law teaching and analysis. 2 This lat-

ter condition has come to be known by some as the "postmodern"
condition (p. 2). In Postmodern Legal Movements, Gary Minda3
attempts nothing less than to capture the whole sweep of American
jurisprudence. In so doing, he purports to 4explain this postmodem
condition as it exists in the legal academy.
Postmodem Legal Movements does two things. First, the bulk of
the book provides an overview of American jurisprudence, from
Christopher Columbus Langdell to the present. This overview is
necessary because, in order to understand "postmodem forms of
jurisprudence, we must first explore what came before postmodernism, that is, modernism" (p. 5). Second, the relatively short latter
portion of the book presents an argument about the current state of
American legal scholarship and its future. Minda's picture of contemporary legal thought is that of a paradigm shift in the making.
As he explains it:
1. Judge Edwards, for example, complains that law schools "should be... producing
scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use.... But many law schools especially the so-called 'elite' ones - have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing
abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy." Harry T. Edwards,
The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MIcH. L.
REv. 34, 34 (1992). See generally sources cited infra note 22.
2. One scholar recently described this disaffection thus:
So complete is this marginalization that even a legal theory as peculiar as Ronald
Dworkin's - a theory that claims, among other things, that there are such entities as
legal "principles" that are neither positive legal rules nor autonomous moral norms, and
that always generate a single correct legal answer in "hard" cases - is treated with a
symptomatic combination of respectful attention and fundamental indifference by an
academic discourse whose real interests obviously are elsewhere.
Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotex4 94 MIcH. L. Rnv. 2178, 2180 n.4 (1996).
3. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
4. Postmodernists will already have objected to my use of the term postmodern - for to
use it to describe a school or a style of scholarship or, indeed, to draw sharp distinctions
between it and modernism seems to be a hopelessly modernist pursuit. Unfortunately, in
order to discuss the matter at all, one must use some term as an admittedly simplistic shorthand for the postmodem phenomenon; otherwise, sensible discussion of the matter is simply
impossible. Furthermore, it would be difficult to raise this argument in defense of Minda's
book, for it too is couched in modernist language and argument. See infra section II.B.

1927
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[T]he mainstream or modem view has broken into a diverse body of
jurisprudential theories and perspectives. The current state of law
and modem jurisprudence has become like a delta just before a river
empties into the sea. The mighty river that was once modem jurisprudence has broken down into separate rivulets as it merges into a
larger and different body of water. [p. 257]
Postmodern Legal Movements will prove useful to those in
search of a basic introduction to the standard account of American
legal thought.5 Minda is well read in jurisprudence, and his book
provides a comprehensive overview of legal philosophy as it has
developed in this country during the twentieth century.
As an argument about the direction of legal thought, however,
the book suffers from certain problems. It has a strong tendency to
overgeneralization and is at times ideologically one-sided. Furthermore, the book's more fundamental arguments - about the nature
of the postmodem phenomenon, its causes, and its future - seem
unduly conclusory. This book is a lumper, as it were, not a splitter;
its tendency to compartmentalize intellectual trends seems
Procrustean and simplistic.
These criticisms lead to a more general one. Minda is quite
sympathetic to the postmodem view, 6 and yet his book seems
unduly categorical and rigid - vices, if anything, of modernism (as
Minda uses the term). Thus, the irony of Postmodern Legal
Movements is that the book seems itself to be a modernist work.
This may be no serious criticism in itself,7 but one is left to wonder
why a scholar so critical of modernist scholarship has taken on such
a modernist project.
Part I of this Notice discusses Minda's historical treatment. It
sets out in abbreviated fashion the story as Minda has told it, in
order to set the stage for his more central arguments. Part I also
briefly examines the book's deeper claims and considers Minda's
view that modem jurisprudence is at a critical point, verging on an
inexorable turn to postmodemism. Part II takes a more critical
view, assessing the problems and ironies mentioned above.
5. Be forewarned, however, that this book is sometimes hard to read. For example:
"[Legal scholars] continue to practice Langdellian formalism as the rhetoric of the transcendental object or subject in which the legal subject-interpreter is eclipsed, even while they
strive to be normative." P. 59. Or try this one: "This quasi-scientific perspective presumes
that lawyers can discover a relatively stable basis for justifying legal results by universalizing
legal propositions abstracted from hypothetical examples structured by behavioral assumptions about economic motivations of homogeneous individuals." Pp. 100-1.
6. Minda finds postmodernism to be "the basis for satisfaction, hope, and new intellectual
inquiry" and believes that "the time has come to seriously consider the transformative
changes now unfolding in American legal thought," because postmodemism has "hasten[ed]
the death, not of jurisprudence, but of the particular methods that modem legal scholars
have employed in thinking about their subject[s]." Pp. 256-57.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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I. THE THREAD OF LEGAL HISTORY
A. Early Trends
Minda first lays out a lengthy exegesis of what he calls "mod-

em" jurisprudence.8 He does so because definitions of postmodern-

ism are usually given in relational terms -

postmodernism is

everything that is not modernism. 9 Modernism, in turn, seems to be
basically everything that we have known as jurisprudence until the
present time; only in the past few decades have we begun to explore
postmodern modes of legal thought.1 0

The first four chapters set out a fairly traditional account of the
history of American legal philosophy. Minda locates the beginning of modem jurisprudence in the 1871 publication of Langdell's
A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts.12 Langdell is for
Minda the source of considerable evil in American legal thought he was the father, or at least a chief proponent, of American "formalism."'' 3 The evil of formalism was that it ignored the cultural
context in which law exists. As later thinkers understood, formal8. The following summary of jurisprudential history is taken solely from the book and is
intended only to reflect the story as Minda has told it. Any criticism will be made in the
accompanying notes.
9. See, eg., Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of PostmodernistTheory, 62 U. COLO. L. REv.
577, 577 (1991).
10. As Jamieson notes, the relational definition is basically uninformative because legal
scholars do not agree on what modem means. See id. at 577-78. I will generally follow
Minda's usage of terms. Note that he uses "modernism" somewhat differently from how it
has been used elsewhere in philosophy. As Leszek Kolakowski explains, "modem" usually
refers to the recurrent trend in popular culture to question prevailing orthodoxy. See LEs ZE
KOLAKOWSm, MODERNTY ON ENoLEss TRIAL 3-13 (1990). While definitions are hazardous
in this area, I take Minda's use of "postmodem" to mean essentially what Kolakowski means
by "modem"; by "modem," in turn, I take Minda to mean the generally accepted dogma of
the time, or at least the dogma of the present time.
11. See NaL DuXiuRY, PArrERNs OF AMEICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2 (1995) (summarizing the standard story roughly as laid out by Minda); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding
Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL_ L. Rv.

2505, 2507 (1992) (same).
12. See p. 13 (citing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELEcrION OF CASES ON Tim LAW OF
CoNmRAcrs (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1871)).
13. Formalism holds that the principles underlying law, if properly applied, produce
"right" answers to legal questions, as if those principles were the major premises of legal
syllogisms. Pp. 13-14. Minda also uses the term conceptualism to describe Langdell's jurisprudence. Conceptualism generally is "a form of logic that classifies legal phenomena on the
basis of a few fundamental abstract principles and concepts developed from the distinct
methods of legal reasoning." P. 14. Thus, conceptualism is the belief that law is a value-free
set of principles that exists independently of culture. Pp. 14-15. A good example of
Langdell's outlook is found in the introduction to his casebook:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines ....
Moreover,
the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed ....
If these doctrines could be so classified and arranged that each should be found in its
proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their number.
LANODELI, supra note 12, at viii-ix, quoted in Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics:
The Interpretive TRm in Jurisprudence,76 IowA L. Rav. 661, 661 n.5 (1991).
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ism allowed the application of rules without respect to the social
inequities that may have given rise to them - racial, class
inequality, and so on - or the unfairness that may result from their
application (pp. 64-65).
The second major phase of American jurisprudence, which is
commonly seen as a reaction to the ills of formalism, 14 is known as
realism. Minda identifies the origins of realism in the frustration
felt by certain faculty at the Columbia and Yale law schools with
formalistic law and jurisprudence and their "deep skepticism about
the possibility of decision making according to rule."' s According
to Minda, however, most legal realists did not wholly reject formalism. Although the realists recognized the "relationship between
law and society [that] enabled [them] to argue in favor of 'nontechnical' or 'extra-legal' considerations in legal decision making"
(p. 28), they "were not that different from the traditional legal
scholars they criticized" (p. 31). While Langdell had argued that
"law is a science," the realists "advanced the similar idea that 'law is
a social science' " (p. 31). Thus, although realism was a rejection of
the formalist ideal of a discrete set of guiding legal principles, it
nonetheless maintained the view that "correct" legal answers could
be discovered through social science methods that properly take
into account the cultural context in which law operates. 16
Realism, which flourished throughout the 1920s and 1930s and
lived on into the 1940s, was ultimately defeated by a temporary
return to formalism. The 1940s saw the birth of several strands of
thought that ultimately crystallized into what is now known as the
"legal process" or "neutral principles" school (pp. 33-40). Legal
process scholars proposed that law could be made objective if decisionmaking were based only on process values rather than on substantive values. This could be accomplished, they argued, by
14. See ROGER COTrERRELL, TmE PoLrrcs OF JURISPRUDENCE 185-88 (1989).

15. P. 27. In particular, realists rebelled against the Supreme Court's so-called economic
due process jurisprudence, as epitomized by the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905). Pp. 26-27.
16. Duxbury shares this view. See DuxEURY, supra note 11, at 158-59 (arguing that
although the realists rallied against Langdellian formalism, they "generally lost their nerve
when faced with the implications of their own jurisprudential constructions"). For a defense
of the more traditional view - that realism fully broke with formalism and that, in fact,
twentieth-century jurisprudence has merely been a "pendulum swing" between realism and
formalism - see Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of

Nightmares and Noble Dreams, 84 GEo. LJ.2215, 2222-27 (1996) (reviewing DuXEuRY,

supra note 11).
As a general matter, Minda seems largely to accept the "pendulum swing" model of jurisprudential history. Although he shares some doubt that the realists wholly rejected formalism, he nevertheless seems to understand jurisprudence as an ongoing struggle between
formalism and the rejection of formalism - from Langdell's formalism to the indeterminacy
claims of the realists to the formalistic rigidity of the legal process scholars (discussed in more
detail below) to the more skeptical works of the 1960s and 1970s that have led to the
postmodern condition of today.
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allowing the courts to consider only those matters within their institutional competence - disputes involving the individual interests
of private parties - and requiring that they defer in all other matters to bodies more competent to resolve them. Thus, awkward
value choices would be left to the representative legislatures, rather
than the antimajoritarian courts. 17 This, in turn, would allow law to
be more like the "science" envisioned by Langdell.
Modernism - all the jurisprudence predating postmodernism,
including formalism,' realism, and legal process - finally met the
beginning of its end when courts and commentators began to
understand the reciprocity of law and society. That is, the first
seeds of postmodernism were sown when it became clear that law
and the people who make it and are subject to it are interconnected
and interdependent. Minda locates this shift in two places. First, he
cites two scholarly articles written in the early 1960s: Ronald
Coase's The Problem of Social Cost 8 and Charles Reich's The New
Property.'9 The "common jurisprudential perspective" of these two
articles was their "similar critical responses to the role and function
Both authors implicitly rejected traditional
of law in society ....
faith in the efficaciousness of the legal process and the autonomy of
fundamental rights" (pp. 72-73). Thus, they both considered it
important to reject the prevailing formalist view that law may be
studied profitably in a vacuum, without reference to the cultural
context surrounding it.20

17. Pp. 34-35. This view of legal process "winning" temporarily over realism again
reflects the "pendulum swing" model. See Gordon, supra note 16, at 2222-27.
18. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cos4 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
19. Charles A. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964).
20. This statement of the roots of postmodernism may sound suspiciously like legal realism. After all, they both focus on the fact that formalistic doctrine and scholarship obscure
the cultural and political content of law. Indeed, postmodernism and its most recent antecedent, critical legal studies (CLS), are often said to be at least closely analogous to, or even
simply a rehash of, realism. See J. Stuart Russell, The Critical Legal Studies Challenge to
Contemporary Mainstream Legal Philosophy, 18 OTrAWA L. REv. 1, 5 (1986) (claiming that
critical legal studies has "a very pronounced ancestral relationship with Legal Realism");
A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal Ideals, 58 U. CN. L. R~v. 819, 830-31 (1990)
(arguing that "iconoclasm" unites skeptical philosophies and that the differences between
skeptical philosophies are superficial); Discussion: Jurisprudential Responses to Legal
Realism, 73 CORmLL L. REv. 341, 345 (1988) (comment by Charles Fried) ("The whole
difficulty which the pseudo-philosophy of critical legal studies and legal realism raise[d] is the
difficulty about explaining.., how it is that you can follow rules, the rules about following
rules, and so on. And that is a mug's game... we do not need to play."). Indeed, some
postmodern authors seem to admit as much. See e.g., Mark 'iushnet, CriticalLegal Studies:
An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 516 (1986);
Sanford Levinson, Writing About Realism, 1985 AM. B. Fout. REs. J. 899, 908 (reviewing
ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THm ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACt ON
AMERicAN LAW (1985)).

The fact that Minda understands these and other intellectual trends as distinct and separable makes up a major component of this Notice's criticism of the book. As discussed below,
see hifra notes 41-45 and accompanying text, if postmodernism is anything, it is a rejection of
attempts to categorize and compartmentalize the world. To be sure, Minda is hardly the only
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Minda also sees the beginnings of postmodernism surfacing
in the civil rights case law of the Warren Court. In particular, in
Brown v. Board of Education,21 the Court rejected the thendominant "separate-but-equal" regime because "traditional legal
analysis had failed to recognize that law contributes to the construction of social reality" (p. 64) - that is, that "separate" seemed
"equal" at least in part because the law said it was (p. 74).
The recognition of the reciprocity of law and society precipitated the changes in scholarly thought that have led to current jurisprudence. Young thinkers influenced by this recognition "rejected
the notion that law was distinct from political and moral philosophy; [they] also rejected the idea that law could be rendered coherent by a comprehensive legal theory" (p. 77). This new brand of
culturally influenced scholarship soon spurred the growth of five
distinct scholarly movements - the "law-and" movements and the
critical theory schools - that remain with us today. These recent
movements are dealt with in the second part of Minda's book.
B. The Five Schools
Minda explains "that... five jurisprudential movements of the
1980s have.., come to reflect the emergence of a new skeptical
aesthetic, mood, or intellectual condition in American jurisprudential studies, which many have identified as postmodern" (p. 2).
These five schools, each of which is treated separately in its own
chapter, are (i) law and economics (chapter 5), (ii) critical legal
studies (chapter 6), (iii) feminist legal theory (chapter 7), (iv) law
and literature (chapter 8), and (v) critical race theory (chapter 9).
Minda explains that each school has gone through "generations"
(p. 94). In each case, initial proponents of the school, while innovative, retained too much of the modernist baggage that they sought
to discard. Later scholars purported to avoid their predecessors'
mistakes. For example, "first-generation" law-and-economics
scholars practiced a sort of orthodoxy that held that "law was economics, and economics was a neutral, apolitical science of 'reason"'
(pp. 94-95). This did not differ in essence from Langdell's optimistic view that rigid rules underlie the law. By the mid-1980s, however, the strict first-generation orthodoxy, embraced primarily by
"the 'hardliners' of the Chicago School" (p. 94), had begun to give
way. "Second-generation" law-and-economics scholars came into
their own, rejecting the rigidity of their forebears and accepting that
values other than allocational efficiency can be used legitimately to
drive legal choices (pp. 95-101).
person who sees these trends as discrete entities. See e.g., DUXBuRY, supra note 11, at 424.
The point, however, is that Minda is a postmodemist who sees them that way.
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Furthermore, Minda apparently believes that the same
postmodern forces that brought about the five schools themselves
have caused them, in recent years, to deteriorate. He says that "[i]t
is only now becoming clear that the new legal discourses of the 'law
and' movements of the late 1970s and 1980s have themselves
become transformed by a general disenchanted condition that has
affected contemporary legal scholarship -postmodernism" (p. 79).
Thus, the five schools "deepened and advanced a process of crisis
and transition in modem jurisprudence" (p. 189). Apparently, this
transition has caused many legal scholars to reject modernism
entirely and enter fully into the phase of postmodemism.
C.

The Postmodern Turn

It is not entirely clear what this turn to the postmodern means
for legal scholarship. 2 In fact, the term postmodern itself has
24
proved notoriously difficult to define. 23 As mentioned above,
postmodernism is generally defined by reference - it is that which
m 5 This approach is significantly complicated by the
is not modern
fact that no one really agrees on what modern means26 - the most
precise definitions are to the effect that modernism is an extension
of "the Enlightenment Project," 27 and generally is an adoption of
22. What is dear, however, is that the postmodern turn has not been received very
warmly in many quarters. See, e.g., DuxBuny, supra note 11, at 422-28; Owen M. Fiss, The
Death of the Law?, 72 Com LL L. REv. 1 (1986); Michael S. Moore, The InterpretiveTurn in
Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. Rnv. 871 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Skepticism About PracticalReason in Literatureand the Law, 107 HARV. L. Rnv. 714 (1994);
Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of
Legal Theory, 72 TEXAS L. Ruv. 1, 20-21 (1993); John R. Searle, The World Turned Upside
Down, N.Y. Rnv. BooKs, Oct. 27, 1983, at 74, 78 n.3 (book review) ("One [philosopher]
characterized Derrida [a major influence in American postmodernism] as 'the sort of philosopher who gives bullshit a bad name.' We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that this
may be an expression of praise in the [postmodern] vocabulary.").
For the reaction typical of many scholars when confronted with postmodern work, see
David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 Mic. L. REv. 1656 (1986). Upon first reading Roll Over
Beethoven by Duncan Kennedy and Peter Gabel, Luban thought "it was a pile of crap" that
"sounds like a pair of old acid-heads chewing over a passage in Sartre." Id.at 1671-72 (discussing Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984)).
23. Minda himself notes that "[t]o identify postmodernism with a set of propositions,
beliefs, or 'postmodern narrative' would be too essentialist, too modernist, to be
postmodern." P. 4.
24. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
25. Minda does this at one point. See p. 5 (claiming that we understand postmodern
jurisprudence by "explor[ing] what came before postmodernism, that is, modernism").
26. See KoLAKowsar, supra note 10; Jamieson, supra note 9, at 577.
27. See, eg., pp. 58-59; Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death
of Necessity and the Transformationof the Supreme Court's Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. iN.
L. REv. 1119, 1144 (1995); Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law,77 CORNELL L.
Rnv. 254, 262 (1992) ("Modernism is the form of thought identified with the spirit of the
Enlightenment .... ").
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foundationalist knowledge and theoretical approaches. 28 Perhaps
the best that can be done is to identify salient characteristics of
postmodern scholarship. Postmodernism apparently contemplates
both a set of approaches - such as deconstructive social criticism,
antifoundationalist epistemology, and rejection of traditional metaphysics29 - and a collection of attitudes - such as distrust of social
categories like race or sex and a subjective view of personal identity.30 One commentator attempted to capture the meaning of
postmodernism by identifying four "interrelated concepts" with
which it is associated. They are:
(1) The self is not, and cannot be, an autonomous, self-generating
entity; it is purely a social, cultural, historical, and linguistic creation.
(2) There are no foundational principles from which other assertions
can be derived; hence, certainty as the result of either empirical verification or deductive reasoning is impossible. (3)There can be no such
thing as knowledge of reality; what we think is knowledge is always
belief and can apply only to the context within which it is asserted.
(4) Because language is socially and culturally constituted it is inherently incapable of representing or corresponding to rdality; hence all
all interpretations, even texts, are themselves social
propositions and
31
constructions.
It is unclear what Minda means by "postmodemism." As is perhaps evident from the discussion of the five schools above, he uses
it to describe different phenomena - for example, both the emergence of the schools themselves (p. 2), and the current sense of
ennui and disaffection that has begun to spell their downfall (p. 79),
are postmodern in nature.3 2 His most general definition of the term
28. See STEvm

BE-T & DouGLAs

KELLNER, POSThMOD-RN TrmoRy:

CRMICAL

INTERROGATIONS 206-07, 230-31 (1991) (asserting that postmodernism rejects foundationalism); Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought From Langdell and
Holmes to Posnerand Schlag, 28 IND. L. REv. 353, 353-54 (1995) ("Legal modernism is...
motivated largely by the lawyer's romance, faith, and yes, obsession with the central idea that
it is possible to uncover and explain the essential truths of the world by employing the correct
methodology, narrative technique, or mindset."); Patterson, supra note 27, at 263 (asserting
that modernism is characterized by "epistemological foundationalism").
29. See Feldman, supra note 13, at 663-64 (claiming that while deconstruction and philosophical hermeneutics do not reject all metaphysics, they do reject Cartesian subject-object
metaphysics); Moore, supra note 22, at 892-957 (arguing that a wide range of philosophers
associated with postmodernism have rejected traditional metaphysics and epistemology).
30. See Jamieson, supra note 9, at 583-84.
31. Schanck, supra note 11, at 2508-09. Minda largely rejects Schanck's formulation
because "any attempt to locate the core concepts or essence of postmodernism falls prey to
modernism." P. 190. That is, to attempt to identify the principles driving postmodernism
would be to create a narrative, which is a modernist, and not a postmodernist, pursuit.
Minda's argument is exceptionally ironic. It may be right, but it also identifies what
seems to be exactly the weakness in Minda's own book. See infra section II.B.
32. Minda devotes an entire chapter to "postmodern jurisprudence," giving it a treatment
not unlike his treatment of the five schools. Thus, he seems to see postmodernism as both a
set of forces guiding scholarship and a brand, or at least a loosely discernable class, of scholarship itself.
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is that it is "a skeptical attitude or aesthetic that 'distrusts all
attempts to create large-scale,
totalizing theories in order to explain
33
social phenomena."'
II. THE- PROBLEM WITH THEopms
Both as a historical account and as an argument about jurisprudence, Postmodern Legal Movements presents certain problems.
First, as will be discussed in section II.A, the book's historical overview and synthesis of modernist legal thought seem too categorical.
The discussion moves at rapid-fire speed through all of twentiethcentury jurisprudence, and in the process puts forth an unduly rigid
account. This occurs, it seems, both because the pace is very fast
and because Minda tends to take ideological sides. 4 In the process,
his historical analysis reveals a second and rather ironic problem:
the book is subject to its author's very criticisms of modernism.
This second problem will be addressed in section II.B.
A. Difficulties of Method
First of all, Minda's historical account often seems unduly
wooden. This is an important problem in intellectual history; as
Neil Duxbury writes, "the ways in which jurisprudential concepts
and themes are interpreted and applied influence the manner in
which ideas about law come to be understood historically" and
therefore "intellectual historians ought to be wary of using words
'35
like birth and death.
Postmodern Legal Movements has a powerful tendency to categorize and reify intellectual movements. Ironically, Minda suggests
that even postmodern legal thought itself can be lumped into two
33. P. 224 (quoting CosTAs DouZINAS, POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE at x (1991)).
34. In particular, Minda berates the modernist status quo and predicts its downfall. Pp.
247-57; see also pp. 21-22 (claiming that legal modernism is based on a "paradoxical mindset" defined by "a set of conflicting and paradoxical abstract propositions about the nature of
the legal system and the power of legal actors within the system"; thus, "Itihe dilemmas of
modem legal theory have never been resolved"); pp. 64-65 ("[T]raditional legal analysis ha[s]
failed to recognize that law contributes to the construction of social reality" because it is
"naive."); p. 75 ("[T]he old modes of representation" of modem jurisprudence "[are] no
longer credible."); p. 79 (arguing that modernist scholars fail in their attempt to "ground their
particular rights in a stable meta-ethics, moral epistemology, or interpretive practice"); Gary
Minda, The Dilemmas of Propertyand Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era: The Regulatory
Takings Problem, 62 U. CoLO. L. REv. 599, 603 (1991) ("Postmodemist scholarship typically
proceeds by uncovering the contradictions, paradoxes, and puzzles of American law."); Gary
Minda, The JurisprudentialMovements of the 1980s, 50 Onio ST. L.J. 599, 660 (1989) ("I[T]he
prevailing visions of the 1950s and 1960s no longer adequately explain or justify the operation and conflict of everyday social life occurring in the marketplace, the workplace, and the
family."); Minda, supranote 28, at 353 (describing legal modernism as an "obsession with...
essential truths").
35. DuxBtuy, supra note 11, at 1, 6.

HeinOnline -- 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1935 1996-1997

1936

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:1927

"sides" or "schools": the neopragmatists and the ironist. 36 It is
unclear how this abstract classification of postmodern movements
can be reconciled with Minda's general claim that the
all attempts to create large-scale, totalizing
postmodernist "distrusts
37
theories" (p. 224).
Furthermore, much of the historical discussion is one-sided and
argumentative. For example, Chapter Six, devoted to the critical
legal studies movement, is surprisingly polemical and defensive.
The previous five chapters (setting out "modernism") are largely
impartial, but when Minda reaches CLS, the book suddenly shifts in
tone to read virtually like an appellate brief. CLS, says Minda, is
"liberating" (p. 126), it is "important" because it "reveal[s] ...the
privileging process of legal hierarchies, ' 38 and it is even "amazing"
(p. 124). CLS is not "irresponsible" or even "irrelevant" or
"banal," but rather it is of "continuing influence," for it presents a
"critique [that] remains, to this day, unanswered" (pp. 123-27).
This tendency towards encapsulation and rhetoric is if anything
more pronounced in Minda's characterizations of the overall
Gestalten of various points in intellectual history. For example, in
his sweeping, almost breathless summary of "Jurisprudence at
Century's End" (pp. 247-57), Minda argues that postmodernism is
36. See chapter 12. In brief, the neopragmatists hold that there are no "essences" or
inherent truths to be discovered by humans, and thus that "right" and "wrong" are at best
mere beliefs that are contingent on historical circumstance. See, e.g., RICHARD RoRTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SounARrrY 189-98 (1989); cf.Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other
Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. Rpv. 1569, 1569 (1990)
(describing pragmatism as "freedom from theory-guilt"). Thus, neopragmatist legal scholars
may believe that the law "should" take a given turn in a given case but that the normative
"should" does not flow from any extra-human principle or value. These scholars are
postmodernists, in Minda's view, because their "real interest is not in truth at all but in belief
justified by social need." P. 235 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RICHARD A.
POSNER, TmE PROBLEMS OF JuRisPRuDENCE 464 (1990)).
The ironists take a different view, rejecting the neopragmatic "middle ground" of normative answers based on historically contingent beliefs. The ironist viewpoint is "ironic"
because, while legal ironists seek to "decenter and displace modernist claims of a universalist
method" of legal thought, they recognize that they are themselves hopelessly trapped within
modernist ways of thinking and arguing and thus that in their criticisms of modernism they
are doomed to repeat its paradoxes and inconsistencies. P. 237. For an explication of this
predicament and a defense of the postmodernist who operates within it, see Pierre Schlag,
Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167, 174 n.18 (1990) ("Postmodernists are
quite unlikely to take the demonstration of a paradox in their text as in and of itself evidence
of weakness or flaw... [They view the] naive rationalist conceptions of coherence, consistency, elegance, etc., [as] largely the product of disciplinary hubris and the inertia of academic bureaucracy."). It is this recognition that even postmodernist scholars cannot escape
modernism that has led the ironists to reject even neopragmatism. Pp. 236-37.
37. See discussion infra section n.B.
38. Pp. 116-17. That is, CLS, by way of "deconstruction," demonstrates how the selection
of one value by a legal rule arbitrarily rejects all other possible values; it "privileges" the
chosen value. Adherents to the writings of Jacques Derrida, which have influenced CLS and
postmodernism heavily, distrust this privileging process because the "hierarchies of the 'text'
[that is, socially constructed narratives], which are frequently taken for granted, are essentially impossible to use for justifying foundational claims of knowledge." P. 118.
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gradually overcoming modernism, and, apparently, will eventually
win. He says that "[t]he older modes of defining, appropriating,
and evaluating the objects of artistic, philosophical, literary, and
social sciences [are] no longer credible because the boundary
between subjects and their objects [has] dissolved" (p. 249). Therefore, it seems natural to Minda that "[t]here is a rising sentiment in
the legal academy that modem legal theory has failed to sustain the
modernists' hopes for social progress" (p. 249).
Strictly on the basis of numbers, however, it would seem that
new "modernist" works of legal theory by far outnumber new
works of arguably postmodern criticism, and while there may have
been a surge of postmodem scholarship in recent years, there has
also been a surge of scholarship bitterly criticizing it. 9 Thus, it
seems that Minda is unduly hasty in his announcement that
postmodernism will overcome modernism. Oddly enough, he
claims in this same passage that "[c]ynicism comes with the realization that each succeeding generation of modem legal scholars has
merely recycled the work of the previous generation ... without
ever achieving a successful... theory that can withstand the criticism of the next generation" (pp. 249-50). But it could as easily be
said of legal postmodernism that it is in substance just a rehash of
other skeptical movements that have already come and gone notably the more radically skeptical works of the legal realist movement.40 If so, then Minda's claim that postmodernism is "hastening
the death" of modernist scholarship (p. 257) is surely exaggerated.
39. See sources cited supra note 22.
40. For example, Felix Cohen argued that law and politics are interwoven, because the
social forces that inform our ideals are the same forces that construct our law. See Felix S.
Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 81012 (1935). As early as 1924, Joseph Hutcheson, himself a federal judge, claimed that legal
decisions were nothing more than "hunches," seasoned, perhaps, by experience, but nonetheless not driven by external principles, suggesting an extreme sort of indeterminacy, and although Hutcheson did not say as much - opening the door to wholly politically driven
judicial decisions. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Functionof the
"Hunch" in JudicialDecision, 14 CoRnoLL L.Q. 274, 277-78 (1924).
It is not immediately clear how postmodernism differs significantly from radical realism;
both perspectives seem to share the same views as to law's indeterminacy and its inseparability from politics. Minda admits that the critical legal studies movement grew from realism, p.
110, and that CLS as a movement grew from postmodernism, p. 116 (noting that late 1980s
CLS papers began to apply postmodern techniques). But perhaps the relationship could better be stated as "reiterates." See generally supra note 16.
Furthermore, one might ask: What if there is no interesting difference between any of the
skeptical schools, in that their basic claim - doubt - does not really differ across different
schools? If so, then postmodernism can hardly be thought to be the revolution that Minda
makes it out to be. Rather, it is merely the most recent resurgence of the skepticism that has
always been with us. In this vein, Brian Simpson points out that there have always been
skeptics or "iconoclasts" in law, and, although their methodology and jargon may change
over time, their central thrust - simple doubt - has remained constant. See Simpson, supra
note 20, at 830-31. Simpson identifies written evidence of such legal iconoclasm from as early
as 1345. See id. at 828; see also Christopher L. Sagers, Waiting for Brother Thomas, 15-22
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (developing a similar point). Not everyone
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In any event, the point here is not whether modernism or
postmodernism is the victor, but only that Minda for whatever reason has chosen to tell an ideologically tilted story that is not so clear
as he makes it out to be.
B. The Modernism Irony
These difficulties in Minda's historical presentation are ironic
ones to discover in a work about postmodernism, and they point to
the basic irony underlying the book: they are problems associated
with modernism, if anything, and they occur because the book itself
is a modernist project.
As discussed above, 4 1 postmodernism has proved notoriously
difficult to define. If postmodemism for legal scholars has meant
anything at all, however, it has been a rejection of the idea that
truth can be summed up in "a theory or a concept," because in fact
there is no "'real' world or legal system 'out there'. ' 42 Morton
Horwitz - himself both a CLS adherent and a noted legal historian
writes that "[t]he subversive assault [on] traditional theories of
law" has caused legal thinkers to "focus[ ] upon the classification
and categorization of legal phenomena and [to] conclude[ ] that...
[b]ecause there are no 'natural classes,' the process of categorization and classification is a social creation, not an act reflecting some
prior organization of nature. '43 It is thus often said that
postmodernists deeply distrust "metanarratives" - that is, broad,
generalized explanations of phenomena.44 As Minda explains:
agrees, of course; for the view that realism, CLS, and postmodernism are more than trivially
distinct, see Duxauny, supra note 11, at 422-28.
41. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
42. P. 224 (quoting DouziNAs, supra note 33, at x); see also DAvrD HARVLY, Tim
CONDITION OF POSTMODERN=Y 44 (1989) ("I[T]he most startling fact about postmodernism
[is] its total acceptance of ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic ....
Postmodernism swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and chaotic currents of change as if
that is all there is."); Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal
Scholarship andJudicialPractice(with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule AgainstNew Rules in
Habeas Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. L. Rnv. 1046, 1080 (1994) ("Postmodernism is antifoundationalist and anti-essentialist ... . [it accentuates that meaning always remains
ungrounded[, and] ungrounded meanings are always unstable and shifting: meaning cannot
be reduced to a static core or essence."); Jacobs, supra note 27, at 1144 (arguing that
"postmodernism attacks the foundationalism of modernism, or the modernist belief that
knowledge rests on some ultimately verifiable truths"); Schanck, supra note 11, at 2508
(identifying as major tenets of postmodernism that "there are no foundational principles
from which other assertions can be derived" and that "[t]here can be no such thing as knowledge of reality"); Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There Politics After
Postmodernism?),89 Mich. L. Rlv. 1549,1550 (1991) (reviewing MARTHA MxNow, MAKING
ALL Trm D ERENcE (1990)) (describing postmodernists as the "obituarists of Truth and
Grand Theory").
43. Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without
Fundamentalism, 107 HARv. L. REv. 30, 33 (1993).
44. Jean-Frangois Lyotard coined the term metanarrative as a means to define
postmodernism itself, which, he said, is an attitude of "incredulity towards metanarrative."
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is an aesthetic practice and condition that is

opposed to "Grand Theory," structural patterns, or foundational

knowledges. Postmodern legal critics employ local, small-scale problen-solving strategies to raise new questions about the relation of law,
politics and culture....
'.. They seem to be united in their resistance to the sort of con-

ceptual theorization and system building routinely practiced by legal
academics and analytical philosophers. [p. 3].

The book thus argues at length that contemporary scholars have
begun to lose faith in their ability to abstract categorizations from
their observations and research. In Minda's terms, members of the
American legal academy currently face a transition to a new era of
scholarship in which "foundational truths, transcendental values,
and neutral conceptions" are replaced with "more pluralistic, contextual, and nonessential explanation[s]" (p. 2).
Given this outlook, one might expect a postmodemist's recounting of intellectual history to be wary of rigid conclusions and categorizations. Quite to the contrary, however, Minda seems to
believe that legal philosophies can be neatly sized up and summarized. Indeed, from the beginning he states as his purpose "to present a general overview of the state of law and jurisprudence at
twentieth century's end" (p. xi). To do this, he "tr[ies to] capture
the general jurisprudential climate by reviewing some of the 'great'
books and law review articles on jurisprudence and legal theory"
(p. xii). In other words, the jurisprudential zeitgeist can quite simply be crammed into "conceptual theorization and system building"
because, apparently, there really is a "real" world "out there." The
irony, then, is that Minda has written a book of the sort that he says
should not be written. It does not "employ local, small-scale problem-solving strategies to raise new questions about the relation of
law, politics and culture." It is simply another straightforward his-

A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE at
xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., University of Minn. Press 1984) (1979).
Lyotard defined "metanarratives" as "grand narratives," such as "the dialectics of spirit, the
hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth." Id.; see also David E. Cooper, Modem European Philosophy, in THE
BLACKWELL CONMANION TO PHuLOSOPHY 702,714 (Nicholas Bunnin & E.P. Tsui-James eds.,
1996) (defining "metanarratives" as "the grand attempts, from the Enlightenment until very
recently, to 'legitimate' various 'discourses' both scientific and moral"). Minda defines "legal
metanarratives" as "rhetorical modes of conceptual and normative legal thought that presume the existence of a correct answer for every legal problem." P. 103 n.96. This seems
unduly limited, given Lyotard's broad use of the term, and, in any event, appears indistinguishable from Minda's use of "formalism." Perhaps a better use of "legal metanarrative"
would be "any attempt by legal scholars at generalized system building" or "legal theorization." For useful explanations of the influence of Lyotard and other continental philosophers
on American jurisprudence, see Feldman, supra note 13; Stephen M. Feldman, The Politicsof
Postmodern Jurisprudence,95 MIcE. L. REv. 166 (1996).
JEAN-FRA 4OIS LYoTARD, THE POSTMoDE=RN CONDITION:
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tory of twentieth-century jurisprudence, several examples of which
already exist. 45
Minda's approach is more than simply ironic. A more careful
analysis might have led Minda to face many important problems
that instead are ignored here. That is, if Minda had engaged in criticism of postmodern criticism itself, he might have reached the
many perplexing difficulties of postmodernism that are, to be frank,
more interesting than the literature summary that makes up the
bulk of this book.
For example, the thoughtful postmodernist might ask: How can
one both deny the metaphysical reality of social values and engage
in social criticism? That is, if all values are socially constructed, historically contingent, and relative, how can we ever say that any policy choice is "good" or "bad"? Opponents of postmodernism have
raised this complaint often.46 Several scholars have attempted to
face this exceptionally difficult problem, 47 but it goes virtually
unmentioned in this book. 48 Postmodernism raises many such paradoxes, all of which seem central to Minda's project. Yet, while he
acknowledges some of them in passing, the vast bulk of the book
ignores them in favor of lengthy literature review and synthesis.
A likely response to these criticisms would be that postmodernism, by its nature, is not troubled by contradiction or paradox.
Postmodernism recognizes and embraces the predicaments of modernist language and argumentative techniques because the
45. See, eg., DuxBuRy, supra note 11; GRANT GILMoRE,Tam AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
(1977); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THm COMMON LAW TRADON (1960).
46. See, eg., DuxBuRY, supranote 11, at 422-23; Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism,Protest,
and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & Socy. REv. 697 (1992); Nussbaum, supranote 22
(arguing that the techniques of Jacques Derrida, which have been highly influential amongst
postmodern legal philosophers, are nihilistic and morally relativistic); Patterson, supra note
22, at 21 (arguing that postmodern "interpretivism" leads to an "infinite regress" of solipsism
and moral relativism, because every interpretation is subject to another interpretation).
47. For example, Stephen Feldman suggests that postmodernism does not lead to moral
relativism or an infinite regression of interpretations because the interpretive or critical act
that, in his view, is central to postmodernism is itself ontologicaL That is, the act creates
meaning and thus allows us to act in the world. See Feldman, supranote 13, at 671-90 (arguing that postmodernism does not reject metaphysics but merely revolutionizes it; therefore,
we can still meaningfully criticize); Feldman, supra note 44, at 185-92. J.M. Balkin, in contrast, seems to think that there are "transcendental" values on which humans can draw,
including, most importantly, "justice." For him, postmodernists evade nihilism by searching
for those values that flow from "the wellsprings of the human soul." J.M. Balkin,
Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MicH. L. REV. 1131, 1139 (1994).
Similarly, Joseph Singer has argued that law can be reconstructed in the wake of nihilistic
critique by an essentially pragmatic process of "moral decisions" that are no different than
our "everyday moral decisions." Singer sets out a short list of rudimentary values he believes
should be discovered through this process, including the prevention of cruelty and misery.
See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
LJ.1, 62, 67-70 (1984).
48. The problem is briefly raised late in the book, but receives no more attention than a
three-page summary of the scholarship of Pierre Schlag. See pp. 243.46.
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postmodernist, while aware of these problems, does not believe that
scholars "should, will, or [are] even capable of demonstrably standing outside of [the modernist] system. '49 The postmodernist will
thus claim that it is no argument to point out the paradoxes or
inconsistencies in Postmodern Legal Movements, because they are
merely the result of the paradoxes or inconsistencies of modernist
thought. Furthermore, postmodernists might argue that to attempt
to avoid the paradoxes of postmodern scholarship would be not
only impossible, but limiting; to "claim to stand outside of this system, and thus claim to avoid paradox" would be to "beg the exceedingly interesting question of where the boundaries (if any) of this
system of... legal thought are located and whether this system can
even be adequately conceptualized
as having a determinate or
'50
localizable inside and outside.
The point, however, is not that Minda has not solved these
problems, but rather that in this book he does not even face them.
Furthermore, the problem is not simply lack of completeness - it is
not as if this were a book on property law that fails to say enough
about zoning. On the contrary, the book fails to address issues central to Minda's picture of postmodernism overtaking the legal academy, and it fails to address the awkward irony of heralding such a
paradigm shift in a book that does not itself seem to be
postmodern. Thus, Postmodern Legal Movements is like a book
about property law that fails to say anything about property law.
Finally, these various problems raise a much more basic question or paradox of postmoder jurisprudence, and it is again one
that remains completely unmentioned in Postmodern Legal
Movements. The question is this: Can one be a postmodern legal
scholar? That is, can one share in the doubts and criticisms
postmodernists share, and yet also engage in the sort of discourse
on which legal scholarship traditionally has been based - which,
according to the postmodernist, appears to be useless? At the very
least, can one do so without being disingenuous? If not, then why
do it?51
Some postmodernists have suggested that there is no reason to.
Robert Williams, for example, believes that
49. Schlag, supra note 36, at 174 n.18.
50. Id.
51. As Louis Menand wrote, "[Ilf one is a professor at Harvard or Stanford or
Georgetown law school, one enjoys a rather desirable set of occupational conditions to have
to worry about. It's nice to have available a style of radical politics that doesn't require

giving any of them up." This outlook commends itself to "schemes for professors and janitors to share in communal decision-making at law schools, as a substitute for asking why given their analysis - law schools... should exist." Louis Menand, Radicalismfor Yuppies,
Tim NEw REPuBmc, Mar. 17, 1986, at 20, 23.
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the model of the law professor that I had bought into during the early,
cursed, deformative years of my academic career was
a nineteenth-century relic[; it] was constructed out of a Victorian-era law
professor's wet dream [and was] warped and twisted and il-suited to
the demands of a postmodern multicultural world ....

52

Williams therefore urges postmodem scholars to engage in
postmodern practice - in his case, "Critical Race Practice." That
is, the postmodemist should apply theory to practice by helping
others, or serving the needs of the community, or whatever; the
point is that postmodernism counsels one to discard traditional
modes of argument in favor of more appropriate action. This is so,
says Williams to the postmodernist, because it does not advance the
postmodem'53 project to "deconstruct the world with your word
processor.
The postmodernist might answer that, while it does seem to be
inconsistent to be a postmodern legal scholar, there is nothing
inherently wrong with inconsistency, and perhaps that it is impossible for humans not to be inconsistent. That would seem to be an
implication of much of postmodern thought. Perhaps there are
other compelling answers. But, again, the weakness of Postmodern
Legal Movements is not its failure to resolve these perplexing questions, but its inexplicable failure even to address them. It could be
a more interesting and provocative book if it did.
CONCLUSION

The project underlying Postmodern Legal Movements is ambitious and interesting, and to a certain extent the book is a successful
effort. It is a useful and reasonably accessible primer on the basic
concepts of American jurisprudence, and it will serve as a good
introduction to students or lawyers who have little background in
legal philosophy.
Beyond that, however, the book is problematic both on a superficial and on a deeper level, and for more advanced readers it will
prove frustrating. On the surface, the book lacks caution in its historical rendering. Conclusions follow too quickly from scanty evidence. Minda often makes fairly sweeping claims about whole
movements or schools in the face of plentiful evidence in favor of
other interpretations. More important, the book is by its nature at
odds with its own premises. The implicit claim of Postmodern Legal
Movements seems to be that one can identify movements in legal
thought, even though the postmodernist must apparently believe
that whenever we arrive at such a claim - such a metanarrative 52. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and CriticalRace Practice,95 Micu. L.
REv. 741, 756-67 (1997).
53. id.at 757.
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we are constructing the world, not merely describing it. One construction is not more useful than any other, at least not for any reason that Minda provides. A whole series of issues arise from this
conflict that are never addressed in the book but that would be very
interesting and are important in defending Minda's thesis. Thus,
Postmodern Legal Movements seems to raise more problems than it
solves, whether as a defense or even a basic description of
postmodernism.
-Christopher L. Sagers
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